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Preface
The European University Institute (EUI) and the Brevan Howard Centre 
at Imperial College London organised a conference entitled “The New 
Financial Architecture in the Eurozone” at the EUI in Florence, Italy, 
on 23 April 2015. The conference brought together leading economists, 
lawyers, historians and policy makers to discuss various aspects of the 
performance so far, as well as the prospects for the future shape, of the 
financial architecture for regulation and supervision of finance within the 
Eurozone established in the wake of the financial crisis.
The Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
at the EUI, Professor Brigid Laffan, opened the event, which consisted 
of three panels, a keynote speech and a dinner speech. The first panel, 
chaired by Elena Carletti (EUI), posed the question “Is the Banking 
Union as Stable and Resilient as it Looks?” Mario Nava from the Euro-
pean Commission opened the discussion talking about the achievements 
of the Banking Union so far. Christos Hadjiemmanuil (University of 
Piraeus and London School of Economics) continued the session with a 
consideration and critique of the legal instruments underpinning finan-
cial stability and integration in the Banking Union. He was followed 
by Sascha Steffen (European School of Management and Technology), 
who presented an analysis of data from 41 publicly listed banks used to 
gauge the current strength of European banking. Natacha Valla (French 
Research Center in International Economics) concluded the discussion 
focussing on the issue of the Banking Union’s failure to deal with the 
issues of defeasance structures and State guarantees.
In his keynote address to the conference, Ignazio Angeloni, Member 
of the Supervisory Board of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, consid-
ered the nature of “supervision” and distinguished it from its near relation 
xx
“regulation”. He made reference to the seminal work of the late Tommaso 
Padoa-Schioppa to highlight the peculiar nature of the role of all banking 
supervisors wherever they may be and encouraged a stronger dialogue 
between academics and supervisors.
The speakers participating in the second panel, chaired by Franklin 
Allen (Brevan Howard Centre, Imperial College London and Wharton 
School, University of Pennsylvania) took the need for a European Cap-
ital Market as its theme. Thorsten Beck (Cass Business School) asked 
whether the case for a European Capital Market was made out and, if so, 
how best should it be achieved? Giovanni Dell’Ariccia (IMF and CEPR) 
explored the barriers to market efficiency in the existing fragmented 
capital markets within Europe. Mitu Gulati (Duke University) then pre-
sented an evaluation of the Eurozone experiment with Collective Action 
Clauses since 2013 and Pierre Schammo (Durham University Law 
School) addressed the question of the need for a Capital Market Union 
from the perspective of SMEs.
The final panel, chaired by Joanna Gray (Birmingham University) 
considered the more general theme of the implications of the deepening 
integration within the Banking Union for the relationship between the 
European Union and the Eurozone. Simon Gleeson (Clifford Chance) 
opened the discussion by declaring the improbability of BREXIT and 
pointed out that there was already in existence a single European Cap-
ital Market in the form of the City of London. Carmelo Salleo (ECB) 
explored the points of tension around financial stability and macropru-
dential policies between the single market and the Eurozone. Kasper 
Roszbach (Riksbank) followed with a perspective on the Banking Union 
from those countries that have decided to remain outside of the SSM. 
Finally Harold James ended the day’s formal proceedings with a histor-
ical perspective on the question of the relationship between the EU and 
the Eurozone. A question made all the more acute by the prospect (now a 
certainty) of a referendum in the UK on EU membership.
An entertaining but thought provoking after-dinner speech was 
given by Richard Portes (London Business School and EUI) in which 
he touched on many of the issues considered during the day and posed 
the challenges that lie ahead for Europe, its markets, its leaders and its 
people. His speech was largely motivated by the ESRB report on “The 
Regulatory Treatment of Sovereign Exposure” available at https://www.
esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/esrbreportregulatorytreatmentsovereign-
exposures032015.en.pdf?4d3d71b889b28a86d63216003ad0cdd0.
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The conference follows a 2014 conference entitled “Bearing the Losses 
from Bank and Sovereign Default in the Eurozone”, a 2013 conference 
“Political, Fiscal and Banking Union in the Eurozone”, a 2012 conference, 
“Governance for the Eurozone: Integration or Disintegration” and that of 
2011, “Life in the Eurozone With or Without Sovereign Default.” As with 
all four of those previous conferences, the debate after each panel and 
guest speakers was lively and thoughtful. We prefer not to take a stance 
here on any of the issues but simply present all the papers presented and 
let the reader draw his or her own conclusions.
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1Executive Summary
Pierre Schlosser
Highlights
The logic, features and future shape of the new financial architecture of 
the Eurozone were discussed under Chatham House Rules on the occa-
sion of a high-level conference hosted in Florence on 23 April 2015, by 
the European University Institute in cooperation with Imperial Col-
lege London. The conference was attended by central bankers, EU pol-
icy-makers, members of the financial industry as well as by academics. 
The following key conclusions came out from the discussion: 
1. Despite its incomplete nature, the Banking Union represents a great 
achievement in terms of financial stability control, thus ensuring a 
more resilient euro area. 
2. By contrast, the exact objective, scope and institutional capabilities of 
the Capital Markets Union remain a puzzle to many participants. 
3. Risks of regulatory fragmentation arising between the European 
Union and the Euro Area are somewhat exaggerated, it was overall 
felt. The existence of European platforms such as the European System 
of Financial Supervision (ESFS) acts as a safeguard to the integrity of 
the single market.
Background 
Meeting in June 2012, at the height of the euro crisis, European heads 
of state and government established a “Banking Union” with a view to 
breaking the deadly embrace between sovereigns and their home-grown 
2banks. Following this policy commitment, two major mechanisms came 
into life to provide a sounder institutional framework for the euro area’s 
banking system. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), adopted in 
December 2012 and located within the European Central Bank (ECB), 
strives to improve the supervision of Euro-area banks by centralizing it 
at a supranational level. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which 
followed one year later, foresees the constitution of a privately financed 
resolution fund of € 55 bn to address insolvent banks. Other elements 
complement the overall concept, although they remain to be adopted (i.e. 
a European Deposit Guarantee Scheme and a fiscal backstop) or fully 
enforced (i.e. the Single Rulebook). 
In the meantime, the entry into office of the Juncker Commission in 
September 2014 coincided with a new priority: establishing a European 
Capital Markets Union. A Green Paper was hence published on this topic 
by the Commission on 18 February 2015 and it stirred a debate on the key 
regulatory barriers impeding such a Union. The creation of both a Banking 
Union and a Capital Markets Union occurs against the backdrop of a hectic 
reform activity of the European Union institutions in banking and finance 
regulation. Over the past 5 years, 41 new directives and regulations have 
been adopted to strengthen and reinforce Europe’s banking and financial 
markets regulation. This caused uproar in several Member States, including 
in the United Kingdom, which heavily relies on the City for its prosperity. 
As a result, the UK has become increasingly defiant about integration steps 
taken at euro area level, leading some analysts to consider it as a possible 
argument in favour of a British exit from the EU (also called “Brexit”). 
1. Is the Banking Union stable and resilient as it looks?
The first conference session revolved around the intricacies and challenges 
left open by the recently established Banking Union (BU). While some 
attendees contested the idea that Europe can praise itself to have a genuine 
Banking Union, the overall mood in the audience was that with the advent 
of the SSM and of the SRM substantial progress was made in terms of 
centralized supervisory and resolution capabilities. In contrast to earlier 
timid and slow attempts to promote further harmonization steps in this 
domain (like the Segré Report or the De Larosière Report), the Banking 
Union materialized literally over a matter of weeks. Its advent coincided 
with an intellectual shift from bail-out towards bail-in considerations. 
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the incomplete and at times complex nature of the BU and of its chaotic 
governance. The BU’s announcement, one participant claimed, was much 
more effective in quelling turbulences than its actual implementation.
Participants proved to be particularly convinced by the strength of 
the new supervisory capabilities of the SSM, backed by the credibility of 
the ECB. Nevertheless, the duplicity of roles between the ECB’s monetary 
policy function and its banking supervision function remains a crucial 
challenge faced by the institution. So far however, Chinese Walls seem 
to be operational and conflicts of interests between the SSM’s Supervi-
sory Board and the ECB appear to be neutralized by the new govern-
ance framework. Participants agreed that it was too early to tell whether 
the current governance is optimal as it was recognised that the Eurozone 
architecture is still in the process of being built-up and is likely to take 
more than a decade to reach its maturity. Criticism was stronger on the 
Single Resolution Mechanism whose firepower remains too limited to 
make a key contribution towards financial stability. Touching on the bor-
ders of the current Banking Union, one participant complained about 
the fact that state guarantees of banks seems so far to be a non-issue 
although nothing seems to prevent the ECB to exclude those assets from 
being eligible as collateral for ECB credit provision. Another attendee 
explained that absent a European Deposit Guarantee Scheme, European 
savers would continue to face a fragmented system of Deposit Guar-
antee Scheme with varying values throughout Europe. Lastly, against the 
background of the coordination role it performed during the phase of 
national bail-outs, the role and scope of EU competition policy in the 
future banking union was questioned.
Overall, some reassuring signals came from a tour d’horizon of the 
European banking sector whose fundamental health is sounder than a 
few years back. There has been considerable deleveraging, a substan-
tial shift in the liability structure (from wholesale funding to deposit 
funding) and capitalization has improved markedly. Several participants 
even claimed that the European banking sector is now over-capital-
ized compared to its profitability. However, there remain challenges in 
assessing risky assets and as a result in determining the adequate risk 
weights. Similarly, there is no clear evidence that the loop between sov-
ereigns and banks has been reduced. Lastly, the proclaimed single rule 
book is not 100% unified nor is it fully implemented. There are thus 
challenges left open on the Banking Union side.
Pierre Schlosser 
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SSM perspective
Ignazio Angeloni, Member of the Supervisory Board of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism, addressed the audience in a public keynote. 
He highlighted the peculiar nature of banking supervisors’ role in an 
intellectual dialogue with the seminal works performed by late Tom-
maso Padoa-Schioppa. Mr Angeloni encouraged a stronger dialogue 
between academics and supervisors.
2. Is a Capital Markets Union needed? 
The second session dealt with the Capital Markets Union (CMU). 
The CMU’s declared objective is to pursue deeper capital markets and 
enhance their integration to diversify sources of funding and provide an 
alternative to banks. Compared to the US, whose financing model relies 
more on financial markets – not to mention the 100% equity model of the 
Silicon Valley – Europe is characterised by a twin focus on bank financing 
and on debt financing (as opposed to market-based & equity financing). 
As one participant put it, both bank-based and market-based systems 
should however complement each other to fit the varying risk appetite of 
the demand side. In this spirit, the audience seemed to agree that efforts 
towards a Banking Union and towards a CMU should go hand in hand. 
However, participants were puzzled by the exact meaning and regula-
tory implications of a CMU. Despite the merits of the recent Green Paper, 
its scope and precise building blocks are not yet clearly delineated. As 
such CMU risks falling short of expectations. This has led some to believe 
that, at best, it is in line with earlier reform mapping attempts like the 
Financial Services Action Plans or the Giovaninni Reports or, at worse, 
that it remains a mere PR exercise. Consensus gathered on the idea that 
the emergence of a genuine CMU in Europe is impeded by political, fiscal 
and most importantly legal factors. A key challenge lies with the co-ex-
istence of several national legal systems with their distinctive culture and 
logic; the persistence of which is likely to hamper the convergence of 
capital markets regulation principles and practices. Insolvency law is a 
case in point. The argument was illustrated by the varying stringency of 
Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in Northern and Southern Europe as 
most recent CACs have been quite oddly written under local law. Lastly, 
delegates felt that the CMU will not improve SME’s market access as the 
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funding needs and information access. 
In contrast to the banking union – which resolutely entailed the cen-
tralization of powers in the hands of a supranational supervisor – the 
CMU appears, in its current form, as a legally focussed endeavour to 
remove barriers to cross-border trade. Yet, one participant argued that 
the CMU would end up sooner or later with a genuine and centralized 
CMU supervisor. Another delegate insisted that in the future the discus-
sion would revolve around the mandate and scope for action of a ‘pru-
dential markets’ supervisor and of its interaction with the banking super-
visor. This will prove difficult as the two areas have different supervision 
logics: one focuses on actors (banks) while the other deals with activities 
(financial markets). On the other extreme of the spectrum, some par-
ticipants questioned whether one would really need a European capital 
markets union in the first place. Diversifying the funding of Europe’s 
economies could also be achieved within the realm of national markets. 
3. Single Market vs. Eurozone 
The last session dealt with the inconsistencies and possible tension stem-
ming from the existence of a dual EU-Euro Area regulatory system. The 
first point of possible friction would lie with the narrow focus of the 
BU’s SSM on the euro area. One participant explained that there are nine 
EU countries which are not part of the SSM. Yet, those nine countries 
host six out of the EU’s fifteen systemically important banks. Those six 
banks have subsidiaries in the euro area. He thus asked whether it was 
so unreasonable to expect regulatory inconsistencies between the euro 
area and the other EU countries. Several speakers pointed, however, to 
the existing bridges between single market institutions and the banking 
union, outlining the latter’s openness to new participants. Asked whether 
non-SSM countries were likely to join in the future, one participant 
explained that the SSM is leaned very strongly on the ECB, which means 
that the ultimate decision-making powers of non-euro area members 
would be structurally weaker than Euro Area members if they decided to 
join (making this more unlikely). The existence of the European System 
of Financial Stability (ESFS) was greeted as a safeguard to prevent regu-
latory fragmentation. Yet, in addition, joint-stress tests across EU juris-
dictions could be promoted to avoid blind spots and the reinforcement of 
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the creation of a permanent head); the ESRB is indeed the only EU-wide 
macro-prudential institution.
Participants then considered the implications of the adopted capital 
requirements regulations for both Euro Area and non-Euro Area econ-
omies in view of possible divergences within the EU. While much of the 
immediate ‘fixing’ was done in the Euro Area, the EU level is however 
the level where the new Basel III requirements were transposed into law 
- through the Capital Requirements Directive IV and Capital Require-
ments Regulation. The aim was to increase the harmonization of pru-
dential policies to avoid the build-up of financial instability risks (e.g. 
pro-cyclicality, too big too fail phenomena, contagion and fire-sale risks). 
As part of this development, the varying attitude towards capital require-
ments among Euro Area and non-Euro area countries (and before and 
after the crisis) was pointed out by a participant. Before the crisis, all EU 
Member States experienced a race to the bottom in the apparent belief 
that markets were self-regulating. After the crisis, the trend in some non-
euro area countries seems to be opposite, i.e. one marked by ‘gold-plating’ 
capital requirements, doing more than necessary. 
Another dividing line is the differing approach towards fiscal policy. 
As a speaker highlighted, outside of the euro area, policy makers can 
coordinate effectively fiscal, monetary and prudential policies, while in 
the SSM world fiscal policies remain at the national level and are diffi-
cult to coordinate among themselves, let alone with the other policies. 
With the Six Pack, the fiscal interdependence (mostly) among euro area 
members has been recognised. Greater cooperation has been achieved, 
in particular against the background of financial stability spill-overs. By 
contrast, this awareness is not yet so developed among all EU countries. 
However, the mood was not alarmist about the fragmentation risk that 
the progressive deepening of the Euro Area would pose to countries 
remaining outside of the euro area. The argument was advanced that any 
regulatory effort performed at the level of the euro area would in any case 
amount to a de facto European harmonization. The point was thus made 
that one should stop treating the euro area as a single large Member State. 
In the absence of credible scenarios of Grexit and Brexit, antagonizing 
the EU and the Euro Area would thus constitute nothing more than an 
irrelevant distraction. 
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It was my great pleasure to welcome a distinguished audience of scholars 
and practitioners to the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
for this important conference on The New Financial Architecture in 
the Eurozone. I congratulate the co-organisers Professors Elena Carletti, 
Joanna Gray and Franklin Allen for their initiative in putting together 
such an impressive programme on this very important topic. The 
Schuman Centre is committed to research and debate on all aspects of 
the Eurozone given the nature and depth of the crisis that faced the young 
currency from autumn 2009 onwards. Moreover, the EUI has taken the 
decision, as part of its European vocation, to launch a School of Banking 
and Finance in autumn 2015. The School will engage in research, policy 
dialogue and executive training in this crucial field. 
Banking Union, together with the European Stability Mechanism, 
have so far been the major responses to the crisis in terms of building 
institutions and policy instruments to ensure that the Eurozone is better 
prepared for future challenges. The salience of Banking Union is not 
surprising because the depth of financial integration and the interde-
pendencies that this created proved to be the Achilles heel of the single 
currency. Although the architects of the Euro were fully aware of its lim-
itations and understood that further integration would be necessary in 
the longer term, remarkably little concern was expressed at the creation 
of a single currency without centralised supervision of financial institu-
tions. The dangers of that toxic link between sovereigns and banks, which 
was acknowledged by the European Council in June 2012, lent urgency 
to the quest for a centralised supervisory mechanism in the Eurozone. 
The pressure was also driven by the importance of banks for funding and 
liquidity in the real economy in Europe. 
8In normal times, the EU would only engage in deep institution 
building like this over a protracted time frame. Essentially there has 
been a major federalisation or Europeanization of power in the sphere of 
banking and finance. Many analysts and scholars have concluded that the 
Banking Union as presently constructed is incomplete, a partial banking 
union. There is much debate about the strength of the backstop and its 
ability to deal with a major crisis. The Banking Union has a set of infant 
institutions- still finding their feet, understanding their role and settling 
into a complex institutional environment within the European Central 
Bank (ECB), and with other institutions at the EU and national levels. 
The system is being built on the credibility of the ECB, a relatively young 
institution but one that proved its presence and power. How will Banking 
Union operate? How will it be tested and by whom? All we can say with 
any certainty is that it will be tested in the years ahead. 
Let me again thank the conference organisers for their initiative and 
our distinguished guests who joined us at the European University Insti-
tute for what was a lively discussion on a new and important develop-
ment in European integration. 
Brigid Laffan Director Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
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the SSM Perspective
Speech by Ignazio Angeloni | Member of the 
Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank
Introduction: remembering TPS [1]
I am grateful to the organisers for inviting me to this conference, as it also 
gives me the opportunity to visit the European University Institute (EUI) 
one more time. Every return to the hills of Fiesole is pleasant and brings 
back memories. This time the memory is that of Tommaso Padoa-Schi-
oppa: a long-time “friend of the EUI”, as your website reads. Tommaso’s 
association with EUI was a long one. In 1982 he met here Altiero Spinelli 
[2], whose professional and personal influence would become central to 
his life. After that, he came back regularly to lecture and give speeches; I 
am honoured to say that I joined him a few times. Following his untimely 
death in 2010, his personal archives were donated to the EUI and will be, 
in due course, available to scholars. Recently, the Institute has created a 
Chair named after him, which will help preserve his memory and con-
tinue his research.
15 years ago (in March 2000) Tommaso wrote an article that, though 
not being among his most cited ones, I always found remarkable. The title 
is “An institutional glossary of the Eurosystem”. [3] The word “glossary” 
is an understatement, and refers to the dictionary-like form of the article. 
The ambition of the piece is no less than to review, for the newly created 
ECB, some of the foundations of central banking developed over 30 or 
more years of research and debates: things like central bank goals, inde-
pendence, transparency, accountability, and so on. The semantic expe-
dient is used to convey two implicit messages: first, that those notions 
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are not immutable but should be interpreted and applied according to 
the times and circumstances; second, that the euro and the ECB are such 
novel endeavours that in order to understand them one must, first and 
foremost, redefine the language.
This article came to my mind while we were preparing for the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and during its first year of activity. The 
crisis called into question many established wisdoms regarding financial 
policies: monetary policy strategies and operations, lending of last resort, 
banking regulation and supervision, crisis management, contagion con-
trol, state support to banking, and so on. The lessons are relevant espe-
cially for the euro area, which is, in fact, where the main institutional 
changes are taking place. As the dust settles, one feels the need for a sys-
tematic rethinking and redefinition of many of those common wisdoms 
that looked immutable to many of us until 2006. In the field of banking 
supervision, the SSM, newly created precisely to respond to some of 
those challenges, is ideally placed to put any new thinking into practice.
I do not plan to carry out a similar task in my intervention today. I 
lack the time, let alone the vision and the insight, to do for supervision 
what Tommaso did for monetary policy 15 years ago. I just want to offer 
some reflections triggered by our experience in starting the SSM, also in 
the light of the crisis and my earlier experiences in the ECB monetary 
policy function. The similarities and differences between the two policy 
areas are instructive. I will organise my arguments around a few main 
themes, starting with the scope of banking supervision, its goals or mis-
sion, then moving on to its independence, transparency and accounta-
bility, and concluding with the relation with its “host”, the central bank.
Banking supervision: drawing the boundaries
Let’s indulge, for once, in Tommaso’s habit of starting a discussion on 
a topic by examining first the literal meaning of its name. The Webster 
online dictionary, under “supervision”, refers to “watching and directing 
what someone does or how something is done”. The Latin origin ( super 
and visio) literally means “to view from above”. The English terms “sur-
veillance” and “oversight” are etymologically equivalent, though some-
times they acquire different meanings in economic policy practice. The 
German Aufsicht and the French supervision convey the same idea, while 
in the Italian vigilanza the etymology is lost.
Rethinking banking supervision and the SSM perspective
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What does “seeing from above” mean? I think it would be presumptuous 
to assume that those who exercise supervision are always “superior” to 
those being supervised, professionally, morally or in other senses. It doesn’t 
hurt if they are, but we cannot count on this being always the case. The 
interpretation I favour is that, in order to watch and direct, the supervisor 
has to be in a position to observe the broader context in which the actions 
take place. It has recently become clear that this superior perspective is 
essential: it is impossible to gain a proper understanding of the “safety and 
soundness” of a bank, in any relevant case, if that picture does not include 
the links between that bank, other banks and the broader economic and 
financial environment. The banking system is nested in the broader global 
financial and economic system in a complex interconnected structure, with 
different layers. [4] Recently, for example, shadow banking is increasingly 
in focus, as are the potential risks from the insurance and pension funds 
sectors. The interconnection with banks should not be underestimated. 
Supervision focused only on the books and activities of individual banks is 
insufficient and potentially misleading. I will say something later on how 
the SSM tries to combine the micro- and macro-financial perspectives.
Observing supervisors at work, I have noticed a recurring tension in 
the way the limits between supervision and regulation are defined. In 
English, the term “banking regulation” encompasses both supervisory 
and regulatory functions, but in continental Europe we consider them 
distinct. Regulators (including lawmakers) are supposed to write the 
rules, while supervisors merely ensure they are observed. I have used this 
distinction myself at times, because it is easy to explain and to understand. 
But it is to some extent illusory, and there is a risk it may at times become 
a way to elude responsibilities. The line between the two functions has 
weakened further recently. Let’s consider the European example. In 2011, 
three “supervisory agencies” were created; in fact, they are not supervi-
sors – in the strict sense of monitoring compliance – but EU secondary 
regulators, tasked with ensuring that European laws are transposed into 
national law and applied consistently across all countries in the Union. In 
the area of banking, the European Banking Authority (EBA) does this by 
issuing implementation rules and technical standards that Member States 
(notably their supervisors and banks) are supposed to apply. Conversely, 
the EU supervisory authorities – meaning the SSM for 19 Member States 
and the respective national authorities for the remaining 9 – not only 
check compliance, but actively contribute to shaping the rules within the 
EBA’s decision-making process.
Ignazio Angeloni
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More importantly, national and European banking laws and sec-
ondary regulations typically set minimum standards (for example, for 
capital and liquidity ratios), not specific levels that banks have to main-
tain. Nothing prevents banks from upholding standards above those 
minima, and supervisors in fact typically require sizeable additional 
margins as part of their so-called Pillar 2 evaluation and intervention 
process. The Pillar 2 process consists in examining all sources of risks to 
banks, in addition to those inherent in the determination of minimum 
solvency criteria; this includes other balance sheet features, like liquidity 
and maturity transformation, plus internal organisation, governance, 
controls, the sustainability of the bank’s business model in different eco-
nomic scenarios, and so on. The Pillar 2 process includes also macro-pru-
dential elements, according to European legislation (CDRIV and CRR), 
though it rarely plays a central part. Supervisors typically incorporate all 
these elements in a framework (we can call it the “supervisory model”) 
to ensure consistency. The framework is to some extent quantified, by 
means of scoring methods, and allows margins of subjective judgement. 
[5] The end result is the determination of prudential add-ons to the min-
imum capital requirements, as well as the identification of other actions 
that banks are asked to undertake, depending on individual conditions.
There is a general tendency for Pillar 2 processes to become more 
articulated, systematic and codified, hence more transparent and con-
vergent towards international best practices. The ECB has developed a 
methodology for its own evaluation process, starting from the experience 
of its constituent national authorities, that will be applied this year for the 
first time to the banks it supervises directly.
An important warning should be made here. While supervision 
becomes more rich and systematic, acquiring some regulatory charac-
ters, efficiency and simplicity constraints become more pressing. Super-
vision should never become a further regulatory overlay. The burden of 
compliance for the industry is already high and should be kept under 
control. This is especially important in the SSM area, where new author-
ities have been created.
Mission
Let’s move one step further. If we regard supervisors/regulators as agents 
delegated by society to accomplish a mission, more questions arise. What 
Rethinking banking supervision and the SSM perspective
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is the goal of banking supervision and regulation, and who should set 
that goal?
As I am speaking in a university, let me say first that I am surprised 
to see so little research devoted to the goals of banking regulation. The 
comparable literature on monetary policy is endless; discussions on how 
to set, measure, pursue and justify the goals of monetary policy virtually 
never stop, acquiring new life at each turn of the economy – the latest 
crisis being no exception. In other policy domains, such as public budgets, 
taxation or labour markets, debates on the nature of the policy objectives 
are less intense, but still more active – it seems to me – than what we see 
happening in the field of prudential regulation and supervision.
I don’t think this depends on the questions to be asked being trivial, 
or the answers unimportant. It probably has to do with certain complex-
ities that discourage both the academic and the practitioner in tackling 
the subject head-on, and especially in entering into exchanges with one 
another. Between the banking supervisor and the theorist in the same field 
there is more distance and less understanding than between their homo-
logues on the monetary policy side. The complexities have to do, in part, 
with the confidentiality of the subject and the vested interests involved. 
Supervisors deal with companies that compete on the market and are 
therefore reluctant to release information. As a result, the supervisory 
process takes place largely in the shadows, and this makes both scrutiny 
and independent analysis more difficult. Another factor is that the policy 
process itself is difficult to define, involving a multiplicity of instruments 
used to attain a continuum of generically defined objectives. We are very 
far from the simple one-instrument, one-target, one-transmission mech-
anism environment that most monetary policy scholars are familiar with.
Those complexities and that distance have costs. To begin with, it is 
more difficult for supervisors to communicate with public opinion or 
other non-specialists. The absence of explicit analytical frameworks and 
well-articulated policy objectives makes it more difficult to explain, in 
non-technical terms, what needs to be done and when, and why occa-
sional policy failures occur. The activity of supervisors, not generally vis-
ible to outsiders, falls suddenly under the spotlight when banking crises 
occur; when that happens, the supervisor is usually found guilty without 
appeal. This lack of visibility may explain, incidentally, a somewhat 
lower perceived attractiveness of the supervisory profession relative, for 
example, to core central banking functions. The latter are – wrongly, I 
think – considered more “glamorous” because they appear to be more 
Ignazio Angeloni
14
scientific and make the newspaper headlines more often. I want to note 
here, in passing, that this perception did not prevent the ECB, last year, 
from conducting a very successful recruitment for its supervisory struc-
tures, attracting high talents both from the supervisory community and 
from the market.
A consequence of this communication gap is a widely held public 
misperception of what supervision is supposed to achieve. Most non-spe-
cialists probably think banking policies should prevent bank failures in 
all circumstances. This expectation is unfounded, of course. Banks are 
subject to market discipline like other private firms. Their specific safety 
arrangements are meant to protect not their shareholders, but other 
stakeholders, including creditors and users of banking services that are 
regarded as public goods (like payments), and ultimately the general tax-
payer, who acts as a backstop.
Is this extra degree of complexity and opacity an inherent feature of 
banking supervision, or is it the fruit of inherited working practices that 
can and should be changed? Views differ. I would agree with those who 
think that certain risks faced by banking supervisors, and them alone, 
require to be treated with particular caution in public communication. 
At the same time, I am also convinced that much more work can and 
should be done to make supervisory practices more transparent and 
better understood by all.
Let me return to the initial question now, concerning the goals of 
supervision. The Core Principles of the Basel Committee state that the 
primary objective for banking supervision is to promote the “safety and 
soundness” of banks. [6] However, the meaning of “safety and sound-
ness” needs to be clarified. For sure, it does not mean riskless. Banks are 
risky by definition; they cannot conduct their business otherwise. [7] I 
think those terms mean, generally speaking, that the risks borne by the 
taxpayer and by the creditors of the bank are appropriately contained and 
transparently disclosed. The exact extent and distribution of those risks, 
however, needs to be determined more precisely. [8]
Hanson, Kashyap and Stein [9] have proposed a definition of the 
goals of micro- vs. macro-prudential supervision, assuming, in accord-
ance with neoclassical logic, that public policy intervenes only to correct 
market failures. In their view, micro-prudential policy should correct the 
distortion towards risk taking created by the safety net. Conversely, mac-
ro-prudential policy is meant to correct for other market failures, also 
giving rise to undue risk taking, generated by “systemic externalities”.
Rethinking banking supervision and the SSM perspective
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I find this argument useful but incomplete. If bank services provide 
positive externalities to society, then not all taxpayer risk should be 
removed. Over-regulation is also sub-optimal. At the same time, the cor-
rect balance between taxpayer risk and the involvement of other stake-
holders (shareholders, creditors) depends on collective preferences. We 
are crossing the line between technical competence and politics. Political 
reasons help explain, for example, why after the recent crisis regulation 
has increasingly tended to protect the taxpayer at the expense of bank 
creditors. In Europe, the bail-in provisions of the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive, which are particularly severe, are an illustration.
I draw three conclusions from this discussion.
First, regulation and supervision should aim at balancing the risks 
and benefits of banking, taking into account all externalities involved. 
The correct solution is not one in which all taxpayer risk is removed.
Second, society should be put in a position to express more explicitly 
its preference as to where that balance is located; at present this form of 
collective guidance is lacking almost everywhere. This requires appro-
priate public communication on the nature of banking, its risks and 
implications; difficult issues on which specialists are also divided.
Third, more research is needed. We need proxies for bank risk and 
stability, providing a yardstick for setting supervisory goals and meas-
uring performance. More work is needed also on supervisory instru-
ments, clarifying how they interact with each other and how they affect 
stability (the “transmission mechanism”). Finally, evidence is needed on 
the interconnections and feedbacks between banks and the economy. 
Advances have been made, especially by network and contagion analyses; 
important micro-data sets on interbank exposures are being developed. 
Supervisory practice should hopefully be able to make increasing use of 
those data.
Independence
In thinking about supervisory independence, drawing a parallel with 
central banking can be helpful.
It is generally accepted that, in order to be successful, monetary policy 
needs to be free from short-term political interference and delegated to 
a technically equipped agency, the central bank, formally bound to a 
clearly defined goal. To balance that independence, appropriate reporting 
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obligations must exist (“accountability”), requiring the central bank to 
provide information on its actions (“transparency”). Delegation of com-
plex policy tasks where time inconsistency problems arise has proved to 
be beneficial not only in monetary policy but also in other policy areas.
Now the question arises: does the same framework apply to banking 
supervision? Or is there something inherently different there that war-
rants specific arrangements? This question was not explored in detail 
until the late 1990s, when several countries (the United Kingdom being 
the most prominent example) decided to separate banking supervision 
from the central bank and entrust it to a separate agency. This is a bit 
surprising to me, because while differences exist between the two policy 
functions – as I shall argue – they are still relevant regardless of whether 
they are performed by the same institution or not.
I think that the criteria suggesting delegation to an independent 
agency suit banking supervision no less than monetary policy. First of 
all, banking supervision is highly technical and complex, requiring a mix 
of financial, accounting and legal expertise. Moreover, the potential con-
flict between short-term and long-term objectives (the time inconsist-
ency problem) is likely to be relevant as well; for example, supervisory 
forbearance may help to protect confidence in individual institutions in 
the short run, if the supervisor enjoys a high degree of credibility, but is 
likely to be detrimental to such credibility – and to financial stability – 
over a longer horizon. In addition, banking supervision typically involves 
important vested interests, a further reason for separating policy from 
direct political control.
This notion has been recognised in recent years as a key component 
of bank supervisory practice. The Core Principles of the Basel Committee 
on Bank Supervision specifically mention the need for operational inde-
pendence of supervisors without interference by government or industry. 
[10] The supervisor should have full discretion to decide when and if it 
needs to take action.
A high degree of transparency is especially suited to a new institution 
like the SSM, which has no track record. In particular, the EU Regula-
tion establishing the SSM stipulates that the ECB should be bound in 
its decision-making process by Union rules and general principles on 
due process and transparency. In this context, the ECB is accountable 
towards the European Parliament and the Council. This includes regular 
reporting, and responding to questions by the European Parliament and 
the Eurogroup. [11]
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Transparency and accountability
While the case for independence is relatively straightforward, specific 
circumstances make transparency and accountability in supervision 
especially delicate, requiring particular safeguards.
First, supervision is special in that it involves handling two types of 
information, one concerning the authority itself and its behaviour (pro-
ceedings, deliberations, internal thinking, strategy and methodologies, 
etc.), and the other concerning the supervised entities.
Second, supervisors typically obtain, in the exercise of their function, 
sensitive information about the situation of individual banks. Proprietary 
information generated within the bank may, if publicly known, affect its 
competitive position. The supervisor does not have the legal right to dis-
close such information; the obligation may fall on the banks, themselves, 
in certain cases. Banks typically trust that the supervisor will treat infor-
mation confidentially, and this facilitates the flow of information between 
them. A similar situation is not typically seen in monetary policy.
Third, the supervisory process generates information on the sound-
ness of individual banks – their solvency, liquidity, profitability, quality 
of internal governance, viability of business models, etc. Early disclosure, 
especially when the picture is not yet complete and any necessary coun-
termeasures have still to be taken or planned, can be risky and coun-
terproductive, endangering financial stability. This does not exclude, 
however, the publication of supervisory statistical data, along the lines of 
what is done in the United States, for example.
The supervisor in the central bank: cohabitation issues
I have to mention here an instance in which I disagreed with Tom-
maso. In an article written for an ECB conference, he argued that cen-
tral banking and financial stability are linked because financial stability 
is in the “genetic code” of central banks. He referred to the historical role 
of central banks, in many countries, as guardian of stability. [12] At the 
time (2002), macro-prudential policies were not established yet, hence 
what he essentially meant was that central banks should be involved in 
banking supervision.
I objected, arguing that institutions evolve, just like biological species 
do (penguins was the example I used, that nowadays use their former 
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wings as flippers); the habits of our ancestors should not impede that 
evolution when conditions change. My argument echoed the prevailing 
thinking of the time, with its preference for narrowly defined central 
banks disjoint from supervision. [13]
I felt rather happy about my objection at the time, but in fact events 
proved him right shortly after. The crisis produced a unification – or 
re-unification – of central banking and supervisory functions almost 
everywhere. The most documented case is probably that of the Bank of 
England, but the pattern is more general. Central banks that host super-
visory functions normally are organised so as to maintain an orderly dis-
tinction between the two activities, in the form, for example, of separate 
decision making bodies, organograms, and a degree of attention and con-
trol over the extent and the modality in which information is exchanged.
The ECB is a case in point. The decision to locate the new single 
supervisor in the ECB was almost immediate. It was dictated by legal 
considerations but also by the will to strengthen the new authority from 
the outset with the experience and the established reputation of the ECB. 
At the same time, the legislators – notably the European Parliament – 
insisted that clear separation lines should be included in the charter.
The SSM Regulation specifically mentions that the supervisory tasks 
should be separated from the monetary policy function. Provisions are 
included in the SSM Regulation to bring this about. A separate Supervi-
sory Board has been established, in which senior representatives from all 
participating Member States, four ECB representatives, and a Chair and 
Vice-Chair participate. This Board is responsible for planning and exe-
cuting the supervisory tasks and for drafting all supervisory decisions. 
The Governing Council of the ECB formally adopts the decisions via a 
non-objection procedure. In the case that the Governing Council does 
object to a draft decision prepared by the Supervisory Board, an estab-
lished mediation panel is activated to resolve the differences.
The operation of the Governing Council is completely differentiated 
as regards monetary and supervisory functions. Such differences include 
strictly separated meetings and agendas. Moreover, the supervisory 
units are organisationally distinct from and subject to separate reporting 
lines. The ECB has set up a formal “separation framework”, in the form 
of internal arrangements to distinguish the two functions, in particular 
with respect to professional secrecy and the exchange of information, 
[14] while at the same time ensuring that the organisational and infor-
mation synergies are exploited.
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These arrangements are working. The clear statutory mandates of the 
Supervisory Board and the Governing Council make a blurring of respon-
sibilities unlikely. The two bodies interact regularly, with the respective 
roles clearly delineated. Moreover, regular joint meetings are convened 
to discuss financial stability and macro-prudential issues, where central 
banking and supervisory interests intersect. [15]
Conclusion
This speech has already been long enough; moreover, its intent was to 
present elements for reflection, not firm policy statements. Hence no spe-
cific conclusions are needed.
To the prevailing academic audience, I would like to remind that the 
banking and financial regulatory/supervisory universe is in a state of 
rapid evolution everywhere, with consequences that are important for 
the society as a whole. There are many interesting and important issues 
that call for more research. Do not misinterpret the distance that exists, 
at present, between supervisors and academics as a sign that your work 
is uninteresting or unimportant. It is not. And that distance needs to be 
narrowed.
Thank you for your attention.
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NOTES
[1]I am grateful to Cécile Meys for her excellent support and to Jakob 
Orthacker for useful comments.
[2]The episode is recorded in Spinelli’s diaries, Vol. III, p. 813. I am 
grateful to Antonio Padoa-Schioppa for pointing this out to me.
[3]T. Padoa-Schioppa, “An institutional glossary of the Eurosystem”, pre-
pared for the conference on “The Constitution of the Eurosystem: the 
Views of the EP and the ECB”, 8 March 2000 (http://www.ecb.europa.
eu/press/key/date/2000/html/sp000308_1.en.html ).
[4]A. Haldane: On microscopes and telescopes, Speech given at the 
Lorentz centre workshop on socio-economic complexity, Leiden 27 
March 2015.
[5]More in detail, in the ECB the risk assessment system (RAS) supports 
supervisors’ day-to-day supervisory work. It is used for evaluating 
banks’ risk levels and controls, their business model, their internal 
governance, their capital adequacy and their liquidity adequacy on 
an ongoing basis. The outcome of the RAS is combined in the overall 
Supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP), which aims at 
ensuring that institutions have adequate arrangements, strategies, 
processes and mechanisms, as well as capital and liquidity to ensure a 
sound management and coverage of their risks.
[6]Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effec-
tive Banking Supervision, September 2012. Principle 1 states, inter 
alia, “The primary objective of banking supervision is to promote the 
safety and soundness of banks and the banking system. If the banking 
supervisor is assigned broader responsibilities, these are subordinate 
to the primary objective and do not conflict with it”.
[7]D. Diamond and R. Rajan, December 1999, “Liquidity Risk, Liquidity 
Creation and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking”, NBER 
Working Paper Series No 7430.
[8]The SSM Regulation (article 1) specifies that the stability of the 
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financial system is also an objective of the SSM (http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201311/20131104AT-
T73792/20131104ATT73792EN.pdf).
[9]See Hanson S. G., Kashyap A. K and Stein J. C., (2011), “A Macro-
prudential Approach to Financial Regulation”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 25(1), pp. 3-28.
[10]Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effec-
tive Banking Supervision, September 2012 (http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs230.pdf).
[11]See Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 
2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/
cont/201311/20131104ATT73792/20131104ATT73792EN.pdf).
[12]T. Padoa-Schioppa, “Central banks and financial stability: exploring 
a land in between”, in V. Gaspar, P. Hartmann and O. Sleijpen (eds.), 
The transformation of the European financial system. Second ECB 
Central banking conference, Frankfurt am Main, European Central 
Bank, 2003, pp. 269-310. He developed the argument as follows: “It 
was – and, I would be inclined to say, still is – an integral part or an 
inseparable component of the central bank as a bank, of its monopoly 
on ultimate liquidity, of its role as the bankers’ bank, and of commer-
cial banks as creators of money themselves”.
[13]There is a very large literature on the pros and cons of centralising 
monetary policy and supervision in the same institution. Arguments 
favouring normally refer to the advantages that an insider knowl-
edge of the banking sector entail for the conduct of monetary policy, 
especially when this takes the form of lending-of-last-resort in crisis 
times. There are also synergies between supervisors and other core 
central banking functions, such as the oversight of payment systems. 
Conversely, centralisation may give rise to conflicts of interest, as the 
fragility of the banking system may lead the central bank to pursue 
a more accommodating monetary policy stance than warranted for 
the pursuance of price stability. See, for example, C. Goodhart and 
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D. Schoenmaker (1995), “Should the Functions of Monetary Policy 
and Banking Supervision be Separated?”, Oxford Economic Papers, 
Volume 40, pages 539-560.
[14]See the Decision of the European Central Bank of 17 September 2014 
on the implementation of separation between the monetary policy 
and supervision functions of the European Central Bank (https://
www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_ecb_2014_39_f_sign.pdf).
[15]At the ECB, the ultimate decision-maker regarding the activation of 
macro-prudential policies is the Governing Council, acting on a draft 
decision submitted by the Supervisory Board. In practice, the Gov-
erning Council interacts closely with the Supervisory Board, usually 
to strict deadlines. An effort is being made to combine micro-pru-
dential and systemic considerations, against the background of the 
broader macro-financial situation. Every quarter, the Governing 
Council and the Supervisory Board convene in joint sessions to 
examine the macro-prudential situation. The Governing Council can 
also request the Supervisory Board to submit a proposal or to under-
take studies concerning specific sources of vulnerabilities. At the ECB 
a Macro-Prudential Coordination Group has been established, com-
prising Board members and staff with the relevant expertise.
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Is the Banking Union Stable and 
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The Banking Union and Beyond
Andrea Colombo and Mario Nava 
The Banking Union represents one of the greatest economic and financial 
successes of the EU of the last few years. It brought back a much-needed 
stability, reassured markets, significantly contributed to further integra-
tion of European markets and gave them a sense of political direction and 
perspective. EU economic conditions and prospects are better than three 
years ago when the Banking Union was launched. However, both growth 
and job creation are still lower than their desired pace.
This note first analyses the Banking Union along three dimensions 
(institutional, financial and economic). Second, it argues the case for the 
next steps that Europe may need to take to restore economic growth and 
it shows how the Banking Union has made those steps possible.
1. The Banking Union: a successful story
There are several dimensions under which the Banking Union could be 
examined. We look hereafter at three of them and at their interrelation-
ship: the legal and institutional foundations of the Banking Union (sec-
tion 1.1), the impact of the Banking Union on private and public market 
financing conditions (section 1.2), and its impact on economic condi-
tions (section 1.3).
1.1. Institutional and legal foundations
The Banking Union legal and institutional setting relies on three pillars: 
the Capital Requirement Directive and Regulation (CRD/CRR), which 
constitutes the main part of the Single Rulebook, the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which 
be looked at in subsections a, b, and c, respectively. 
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a. The Single Rulebook: Capital Requirement Directive and Regulation
The (fourth) Capital Requirement Directive (CRD4) and the first Cap-
ital Requirement Regulation (CRR) constitute the most important and 
well-known piece of legislation composed of the Single Rulebook, along 
side the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive and the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive (see c infra). The European Commission (from now 
on, Commission) issued its proposal for the CRD4/CRR in July 2011; the 
proposal obtained the Council General Approach in May 2012, under the 
Danish Presidency, and was finally politically adopted by the European 
Parliament (from now on, Parliament) and the Council of the European 
Union (from now on, Council) in March 2013, after 37 political and more 
than 100 technical trilogues between the three European institutions.
The CRD4/CRR is composed of more than 700 articles, is based 
on Art. 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU)1: it translates into European law the Basel 3 guidelines, com-
plementing them with a number of prudential requirements regarding 
corporate governance and the prudential use of capital buffers, which go 
beyond the Basel 3 guidelines. 
The CRD4/CRR package regulates through the Regulation (CRR) 
banks’ liquidity, the quantity and quality of banks’ minimum capital 
requirements, banks’ leverage, banks’ counterparty risks and national 
flexibilities. It also regulates through the Directive (CRD4) the ability of 
the supervisors to impose prudential buffers, corporate governance rules, 
harmonised sanctions and general enhanced supervision rules. 
The Commission’s choice of designing a regulation for capital require-
ments allowed for a harmonised and homogenous implementation of 
rules across the whole European Union. 
This legislation provides for a minimum capital requirement of 7% of 
banks’ Risk Weighted Assets (RWAs), for the top quality capital (CET1, 
essentially equity), compared to 2% of Risk Weighted Assets previously 
and an overall minimum capital requirement, for both first and second 
tier quality of capital, of at least 10.5%, more in many cases, especially for 
larger banks. The use of the Regulation, which is directly applicable to 
market operators, was essential to ensure market uniformity.
1 “The European Parliament and the Council shall, acting in accordance with the or-
dinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Commit-
tee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market.” – Art. 114, TFEU.
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b. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)
On 29 June 2012, the Council of Heads of State and Government asked 
the Commission to put forward a proposal for the single supervision of 
the Euro Area banking sector “to break the vicious circle between banks 
and sovereigns”, based on Art. 127.6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union2. Nine weeks later, on 12 September 2012, the Com-
mission officially presented a proposal to the informal ECOFIN of Nic-
osia. One year later, the Council and the European Parliament adopted a 
regulation creating the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), composed 
of the European Single Supervisory Board and the national authorities 
along the lines proposed by the Commission. The SSM applies to all the 
Euro Area countries and it is open to the participation of non-Euro Area 
countries3.
At the time of the conception of the single currency, in the early Nine-
ties, the issue of whether the single currency also needed single banking 
2 “The Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure, may unanimously, and after consulting the European Parliament and 
the European Central Bank, confer specific tasks upon the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and 
other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings.” – Art. 
127.6 (TFEU).
3 At the time of writing, Denmark is the non-Euro Area country closest to joining the 
SSM.
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Figure 1: Overview of the Basel 3 capital requirements, as implemented 
in the EU by the CRDIV package.
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supervision was already raised. It found, eventually, its solution in 2013 
with the creation of SSM, which was both an economic and political act 
responding to political and economic challenges to the Euro Area4. 
Before its official start in November 2014, the SSM conducted the 
most detailed, rigorous and comprehensive assessment of financial insti-
tutions’ capital and assets, ever implemented in Europe and possibly in 
the world. This assessment made banks’ balance sheets more transparent. 
It simultaneously generated incentives for banks to call on the capital 
markets to improve their capital levels in order to reassure investors of 
their ability to face any adverse economic scenario.
c. Recovery and Resolution Rules and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRB) for the SSM Banks
In June 2013, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). 
The BRRD provides a triple mechanism of taxpayers protection based 
on i) resolution plans; ii) bail-in of 8% of the liabilities of banks in need 
of resolution; iii) national resolution funds, each equal to 1% of the EU 
covered deposits (for more details see Huhtaniemi, Nava, Tornese, 2014). 
The institutionalisation of the bail-in will protect taxpayers from the pos-
sible collapse of fragile banks and their bail-out through public resources. 
The BRRD minimises the risk of moral hazard, introduces market dis-
cipline and forces banks to prepare a resolution plan, in order to limit 
as much as possible any contagion risk. It is no exaggeration to say that, 
thanks to the BRRD, Europe moved resolutely away from “bailing-out” 
towards “bailing-in” of any bank needing recovery and resolution.
We distinguish, broadly speaking, two possible models of “bail-in”: a 
“broad bail-in” and a “narrow bail-in”, where “broad” and “narrow” refer 
to the choice of liabilities that can be bailed-in in resolution. Europe chose 
a “broad bail-in” approach, applied to all EU banks from the smallest to 
4 “We need to secure the economic recovery, reduce fragmentation in the euro area 
and continue the process of institutional and structural reform (…). Once the SSM 
is established, it offers a real possibility to take a new, European approach towards 
governance of the financial sector – and hence to reverse the harmful financial frag-
mentation we have seen during the crisis.” – Mario Draghi, 22 November 2013.
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the largest, whereby most liabilities5 can be bailed-in following a precise 
hierarchy. Because of the “broad bail-in” approach, the BRRD empowers 
supervisors to decide, on a bank by bank basis, if, in order to comply with 
the requirements at the point of non-viability, some additional and identi-
fied bailinable instruments should be held while the bank is a going con-
cern. The BRRD minimum bail-in requirements apply only at the bank’s 
point of non-viability and of resolution. The bank’s ability to meet them is 
monitored, by the supervisory authority, during the life of the bank. 
The US forthcoming legislation on bail-in takes a narrow approach 
whereby only some, ex-ante identified, liabilities can be bailed-in. In 
contrast to the BRRD, it imposes a minimum and permanently available 
amount of subordinated “bailinable” liabilities. As a consequence, the US 
approach envisages resolution-specific capital requirements, involving 
both equity and debt capital, to comply with during the entire life of the 
bank.
The two approaches reflect (and are best suited to) the different bank 
structures prevailing in the two continents and the set of banks to which 
they apply: in the EU, banks’ liabilities are mostly deposits and senior debts 
with some junior subordinated debts, banks are very diverse and legisla-
tion applies to all of them. In the US, instead, banks’ liabilities are mostly 
composed of subordinated debt and legislation applies only to the largest 
banks. The difference between the two approaches is particularly evident 
in the treatment of senior debt: in the EU the senior debt may be part of 
the resolution operation, but not in the US. While the two approaches 
are different, no empirical proof is (as of today) available to demonstrate 
which of the two approaches is more efficient and leads to less contagion. 
This distinction between broad and narrow bail-in is particularly relevant 
when discussing the case for further, equity and debt, capital requirements 
specific only to the Too-Big-Too-Fail banks, as is currently the case in 
international fora like the Financial Stability Board (FSB).
Within the Euro Area, and because of the existence of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism, the national resolution funds provided by 
the BRRD became a single, progressively mutualised fund (named the 
5 Liabilities excluded from the bail-in process are: deposits up to €100,000, covered by 
the Deposit Guarantee Scheme; secured liabilities including covered bonds; liabil-
ities to employees of failing institutions, such as fixed salary and pension benefits; 
commercial claims relating to goods and services critical for the daily functioning 
of the institution; liabilities arising from a participation in payment systems which 
have a remaining maturity of less than seven days; inter-bank liabilities with an orig-
inal maturity of less than seven days.
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Single Resolution Fund – SRF) for all the countries participating to the 
SSM (Euro Area countries only for the time being). The negotiations 
for its implementation required an Intergovernmental Agreement, fol-
lowing an Intergovernmental Conference, dealing with the progressive 
establishment and mutualisation of the SRF. 
In April 2014, the European Parliament and the Council approved the 
BRRD and the Intergovernmental Agreement. The last step towards the 
completion of the Banking Union was taken, less than 22 months since the 
Council declaration of June 2012. Like the SSM, the SRM applies to all the 
Euro Area countries and it is open to participation from non-Euro Area 
countries.
1.2. Financial impact of the Banking Union
The design of the Banking Union coincided with the highest peak of the 
financial crisis: spreads across sovereign bonds were mounting and confi-
dence in the health of the banking system was at its minimum. Caught in 
a vicious circle, banks and sovereigns were weakening each other. 
The Single Rulebook, its stringent rules and the credibility of its 
cross-country homogeneous implementation, created market pressures 
for banks to rapidly increase their capitalisation (Figure 2). In just a few 
years, the EU bank capitalisation and solidity reached a level comparable 
to that of the US6.
6 According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in the second quarter of 
2013 leverage ratio for global systemically important banks in EU and USA were 3.86 
and 4.30, respectively. TIER 1 Capital ratio, 12.49 and 12.73 respectively.
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June 2014. Evolution of the Common Equity TIER 1.
Source: FISMA own computation
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The announcements of the new, credible and reliable regulatory 
ratios, described in section 1.1.a supra, were immediately accepted by the 
markets. This meant, de facto, that financial institutions respected them 
well in advance of the timing provided by legislators and in so doing won 
back market confidence.
The regained market confidence in a stable banking system would 
have not necessarily translated into better financing conditions for sov-
ereigns if markets had not been convinced that the link banks-sovereign 
was clearly broken. Since its conception, the markets have considered 
the European “bail-in” model introduced by the BRRD quite reliable, 
as shown by the significant sovereign spread reduction that took place 
during and after the design of the Banking Union (Figure 3). 
1.3. Economic aspects
The Banking Union brought financial stability and reduced sovereign 
spreads. Consequently, access to finance was eased and the supply con-
ditions of European corporates and governments improved. Banking 
union also made consumers more confident to invest cross-border due 
to the harmonisation of rules, controls and safety nets (Nouy, 2015), so it 
could give a boost on the demand side. Growth results in 2014 and pros-
pects for 2015 and 2016 have improved (figure 4).
The Banking Union proved therefore to be an important element for 
stability and a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for Europe’s return 
to growth. Banking Union is an important element of a more efficient 
supply side in Europe. However for growth to emerge again, policies on 
The Banking Union and Beyond  |  Andrea Colombo and Mario Nava
Figure 3: Performance of selected sovereign bonds with respect to 
German Bund (Source: Reuters – ECOWIN).
32
both the supply and the demand side of the economy are needed. The 
next section will provide a review of the relevant initiatives recently put 
in place by the Commission.
2. Beyond Banking Union
This section discusses two areas of work, the Capital Markets Union 
and the European Investment Plan aimed at improving, respectively, the 
supply side and the demand side of the European economy.
2.1. The Capital Markets Union
The Capital Markets Union (CMU) builds on the new regulatory frame-
work of the banking sector and extends its credit-supplying potential. 
Several existing challenges, such as heavy reliance on banks, differences 
in financing conditions, different market rules and practices, limited 
SME access to finance, make the development of a Capital Markets Union 
policy urgent. In February 2015, the European Commission published 
a green paper on the Capital Markets Union, which is a declared policy 
priority for the Juncker Commission. 
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calculations)
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Capital Markets Union has three main objectives: 1) to develop a 
more diversified financial system complementing bank financing with 
deeper capital markets; 2) to unlock the capital around Europe and put 
it to work for the economy in order to give savers, from within and also 
outside Europe, more investment choices in Europe; 3) to establish a gen-
uine single capital markets in the EU where, on the one hand, investors 
are able to invest their funds without any cross-border hindrance and, on 
the other hand, businesses (SMEs and large companies alike) can raise 
funds from a diversified range of sources, irrespective of their geograph-
ical origin.
First: develop deeper EU capital markets. The European capital 
market activity (equity financing, corporate bonds or securitisation) 
increased significantly over the last two decades. Between 1992 and 2013, 
the total EU stock market capitalisation has progressed from €1.3 trillion 
(21.7% of GDP) to €8.4 trillion (64.5% of GDP). The total value of out-
standing debt securities has grown from €4.7 trillion (74.4% of GDP) to 
€22.3 trillion (171.3% of GDP). Nevertheless, market financing is still in 
need of development (figure 5).
The US public equity markets are almost double in size (stock market 
capitalisation is 138% of GDP in the US vs. 64.5% in the EU in 2013). The 
US corporate (non-financial) debt securities markets are three times as 
large (total value of corporate non-financial debt outstanding is 40.7% 
of GDP in the US vs. 12.9% in the EU in 2013)7. The US venture capital 
market is about five times bigger (in terms of amounts invested). If Euro-
pean venture capital markets were as deep as in the US, an additional €90 
billion of funds would have been available to finance companies during 
2008 to 2013. 
Second, unlock EU capital markets. Contrary to the US, 40 percent 
of EU households’ financial wealth is held in the form of deposits (figure 
6). This figure implies that most of the savings are directed towards low-
risk, easily accessible and short-term investments, rather than EU com-
panies. 
In order to run their activities, EU companies rely heavily on credit 
supply by banks, which are incidentally also key players in financial inter-
mediation in the EU. Having the European engine of growth8, dependent 
mostly only on the banking sector as a principal source of financing is 
7 Figures obtained from ECMI statistical package 2014.
8 It has been estimated that 65 percent of EU employment and more than 55 percent of 
EU value added is contributed by SMEs (European Commission, 2014).
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certainly sub-optimal and becomes a risk factor when economic and 
financial tensions emerge.
Third: greater cross-border integration of the EU equity and 
debt markets. Retail banking has remained national, while wholesale 
banking cross-border activities suffered from the crisis. While cross-
border corporate bond holdings have recently recovered, in the equity 
market about two-thirds of EU equity holdings have domestic origins. 
Moreover, there is a wide variation in capital market development across 
EU Member states. For example, domestic stock market capitalisation 
in 2013 exceeded 121% of GDP in the UK, compared to less than 10% 
in Latvia, Cyprus and Lithuania. The CMU will address these issues by 
facilitating the creation of well-integrated and deep European capital 
markets, by freeing resources for the real sector, by spreading country- 
and region-specific risk and thus smoothing the impact of recessions on 
consumption, investments and banking sector activity. 
Clearly there is not one single measure that will deliver a Capital Mar-
kets Union. There are many steps, some taken in the short term and some 
needing more time, which all together may lead to greater integration. 
In the short-term, several measures can help achieve the three objec-
tives mentioned above: 
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Figure 5: Stock market capitalisation and debt securities as a percentage 
of GDP.
 Source: ECMI statistical package, 2014
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1) Lowering the barriers to accessing capital markets through a review of 
the Prospectus Directive9, 
2) More information on SMEs will be provided to creditors and banks 
will be encouraged to give feedback to SMEs whose credit has been 
declined. Asymmetric information, usually impeding demand and 
supply of credit to match, will therefore be minimised. 
3) Building sustainable securitisation and fostering simple, transparent 
and standardised securitisation across the EU. Greater standardisa-
tion of corporate debt issuances will allow for the development of a 
more liquid secondary market for corporate bonds. Covered bond 
markets would also benefit from a greater integration, thus providing 
investors with safer and more liquid investment opportunities.
4) Boosting long term investment: Through the European Investment 
Project Pipeline (discussed in the next session), a dedicated website 
9 The Directive 2003/71/EC regulates the prospectus to be published when securities 
are offered to the public or admitted to trading.
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Figure 6: Financial portfolio of households in the EU and US, 
percentage of total financial assets (Veron and Wolff, 2015 based on 
OECD, 2011)
36
will be created to ease access to information for investors on infra-
structure projects.
5) Developing European private placements markets
To ensure the success of the CMU, attraction of foreign savings to 
foster investment in the EU is also crucial. There is a wide scope for cap-
turing additional equity and debt investment from third countries: in 
2013, the EU attracted €5 trillion of portfolio investment, out of a global 
total of €25 trillion.
Economic literature points to the fact that in addition to the short 
term measures, the CMU’s real potential can only be achieved with a 
long-term structural policy agenda dealing with areas such as more inte-
grated accounting enforcement and supervision of audit firms, better 
corporate credit information, reliance of financial infrastructure, insol-
vency law, financial investment taxation, (Veron and Wolff 2015), col-
lection and analysis of capillary data and building a comprehensive real-
time European map of risk (Issing and Krahnen, 2009).
An effective CMU needs consistent regulation, of both financial 
products and financial intermediaries, which eliminates barriers to cross-
border investments. As an example, the CMU would benefit from active 
and cross-border participation in the European capital markets of the 
insurance companies, whose solidity has been strengthened by the Sol-
vency 2 regime and who have a long term horizon for investment. 
A lively discussion at EU and national level is currently ongoing and 
several workshops on technical issues and more general conferences on 
the CMU are taking place. A CMU Action Plan, which takes into account 
the wealth of the stakeholders’ replies, is foreseen in early Autumn 2015, 
delineating short term and medium term actions needed for the period 
2015-2019.
2.2. The European Investment Plan
While during the crisis the evolution of non-core financial credit has 
been particularly volatile, the evolution of core credit dropped during 
the crisis and has never recovered. Such a peculiar pattern suggests a 
structural drop in the amount of financial resources for the core credit 
as shown in Figure 7. 
In other words, while the Banking Union succeeded in making banks 
stronger and resilient, it could not improve the amount of funds going to 
the core credit of the economy.
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Inevitably, this pattern has an effect on the availability of funds for 
investment. Any appropriate policy mix requires both a demand and a 
supply side component. Indeed, after three weeks in office, the Juncker 
Commission announced an Investment Plan aimed at reducing the EU 
investment gap that originated during the crisis and has widened since 
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Figure 7: Core vs. non-core activities of banks, Euro area MFIs, € 
billion assets (ECB Statistical Data Warehouse).
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then. Since the budget of the EU is limited and in any case unsuitable 
for traditional demand policy, non-conventional ideas have to be put in 
place in order to ensure that investors can close an investment gap of 
€300 billion required to boost growth (figure 8). 
The European Investment Plan is an innovative example of a “lever-
aged demand” policy, that is a demand policy which uses public money as 
a lever for private investment. Its goal is to create the right incentives for 
the market to invest in 3000 projects, by improving the project risk return 
balance. To do so, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European 
Union are expected to provide guarantees for €21 billion, channeled into 
the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI). By leveraging 15 
times on the EFSI, the European Commission expects to trigger around 
€240 billion of long-term investments and €75 billion of investments 
in small and medium enterprises and mid-cap firms between 2015 and 
2017. Member states10, on a voluntary basis, can also participate in the 
implementation of the EFSI thus increasing the fund’s ability to reach the 
target financial amount for the identified projects.
The list of public and private projects (which currently totals €1300 
billion) has been submitted to the Commission by every Member State, 
put forward by their promoters to the EIB and will be sorted individually 
by an ad hoc Investment Committee. 
Next to it, a European Investment Advisory Hub (EIAH) is cre-
ated to provide technical assistance to help promoters to structure and 
finance their projects better. The EIAH will further support the intro-
duction of complex financial packages and the cooperation between the 
EIB and National Promotional Banks (NPB) and will act as a portal for 
all investors. 
In May 2015, the European Commission, the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament concluded the political discussion on the composition 
and the structure of the EIAH and the selection procedure of the projects 
to be financed.
The EFSI is an important tool to attract investments, but it should 
not be the only one. An investment-friendly environment at national 
and European level, opening to several and competing forms of finance, 
is vital. In this respect, the EU institution has indeed put forward a 
10 As of May 2015, France, Germany and Italy contributed by €8 billion each to the 
EFSI through their respective National Promotional Bank, Caisse des Dépôts, KfW 
and Cassa Depositi e Prestiti. Spain contributed by €1.5 billion via the Istituto de 
Crédito Oficial.
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harmonised, predictable and reliable regulatory framework of both the 
European banking sector (the Banking Union) and the Capital Markets 
Union enabling a smooth channelling of investments towards the real 
economy.
Conclusions
The 2007 financial crisis deeply affected the European economy and is 
having lasting effects for a series of concatenated reasons. The first reason 
is the financing side of the European economy, which is heavily reliant on 
banks, and in many countries, big banks. The second reason is that those 
banks have become very exposed to sovereigns during the crisis, and in 
particular to their own sovereign. This fed a vicious circle that eventually 
hindered credit supply, as banks were the main financing source of the 
economy, for both large corporates and SMEs alike. 
The Banking Union was created to sever the bank-sovereign loop and 
provide a clear harmonised framework for financial regulation. Markets 
reacted rapidly and positively to the legislative requirements and accel-
erated a recapitalisation of banks sometimes well above the legal levels. 
While the EU banking sector is considered to be repaired, the challenges 
Figure 8: Real Gross Fixed Capital formation
Source: Commission Services, 2014
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of creating incentives for banks to serve the real economy (supply of 
credit) and the access to credit in deep and liquid markets still remain. 
The Capital Markets Union aims at responding to those needs on 
the supply side. It creates incentives for banks to be more active in the 
capital markets, by making markets more homogeneous, efficient and 
integrated cross-border. They will ultimately become, in this way, deeper 
and more liquid and therefore a credible alternative for any investment. 
The Banking Union asks for more equity investment in the banking 
sector; the Capital Markets Union makes sure that this equity investment 
is properly priced and that the credit multiplier originating from more 
stable banks is effective.
The European Investment Plan responds to a lack of investments on 
the demand side. A project pipeline, gathering selected projects in which 
any private investment will be backed up by the Commission, EIB and 
certain EU states, will be created. This is the only and most creative solu-
tion European institutions have to boost growth without relying on pure 
expansionary budget policies.
To conclude, the Banking Union is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for growth. The Capital Markets Union aims at further 
improving the economy’s supply side. The European Investment Plan, 
instead, represents a stimulus to the demand side to close the investment 
gap provoked by the crisis. 
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The Banking Union: State Guarantees 
and Defeasance Structures
Natacha Valla
1. Introduction 
In 2014, the European Parliament adopted by a comfortable majority the 
legislative acts founding the Banking Union (BU). In the words of Michel 
Barnier, the then European Commissioner in charge of Competition 
and Financial Affairs, the legislation created a “truly European system to 
supervise all banks and to treat their potential failure”. 
The Banking Union indeed represents a significant landmark in Euro-
pean integration and should reduce the likelihood of a systemic banking 
crisis and help bring down financing costs.
However, as it currently stands, the BU suffers from three main short-
comings, as highlighted by the first real life test case, Hypo Alpe Adria 
(HAA). First, it does not explicitly address the issue of defeasance struc-
tures. Second, it fails to provide a proper doctrine on the use of public 
guarantees: given the sharp deterioration in the creditworthiness of sov-
ereign borrowers, it may be ill advised not to take into account the risks 
associated with guarantees provided by national or infra-national enti-
ties. And third, there is a grey area as to the legality of decisions taken at 
the national level.
2. The core concepts of the Banking Union
Significant progress has been made in the setting-up of a banking union 
in Europe. The first pillar, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, under 
which the ECB takes responsibility for monitoring the financial stability 
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of banks, came into effect in November 2014. Just prior to this, the ECB 
published its ground-breaking ‘comprehensive assessment’ of the banking 
sector (comprising stress tests and an asset quality review on the 130 
largest banks) designed to give a transparent account of the current state 
of play and ensure a sound starting point for the Banking Union (Table 1). 
While the jury may still be out on whether having a single institution con-
duct monetary policy, fulfil the lender of last resort function and wear the 
supervisor’s hat is optimal, the implementation of the SSM can be viewed 
as a significant achievement.
The second main pillar, the Single Resolution Mechanism, became 
operational on 1 January 2015 with a remit to ensure the efficient and 
centralised resolution of failing banks. The Single Resolution Board 
(SRB) was established to act at the main decision making body of the 
SRM. The Board started work swiftly on the development of resolution 
plans and related issues, but most of the provisions in the SRM Regula-
tion will only apply from 1 January 2016 and beyond. A Single Resolu-
tion Fund (SRF) will be set up, financed by the banking sector itself and 
implemented according to the ‘single resolution’ principle. A few years 
will be necessary for the Fund to reach its full potential, but agreement 
has been reached on a target of €55bn (about 1% of covered deposits in 
the euro area).
While the SSM and the SRM are on track, the guarantee of bank 
deposits at the European level, meant to be a third pillar of the Banking 
Union, remains a thorny issue that still needs to be integrated into a 
common system.
Backing up the two main initiatives, is the “bail-in principle” whereby 
in the event of bank failure, banks’ shareholders and creditors would first 
bear the cost, before taxpayers money is used to absorb losses. This is at 
the heart of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) that 
had to be implemented by all Member States by 1 January 2015. 
Undoubtedly, the Banking Union is meeting success. Even Den-
mark, a notably Eurosceptic country, has expressed its wish to become 
a member and has started concrete negotiations with the European 
Commission. But, while its construction is sophisticated, it has not yet 
been fully tested in the field. The case of Hypo Alpe Adria ( HAA) – still 
unfolding – might be the first reality check and has already highlighted 
some key shortcomings that need to be addressed.
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3. Hypo Alpe Adria: the first real life test of the Banking Union
The slow descent of Hypo Alpe Adria (HAA)
HAA was a modestly sized Landesbank in the purest Germanic tra-
dition, based in the small state of Carinthia, a mountainous region in 
the south of Austria. Between 1990 and 2000, it became closely linked 
with local political circles, leading to a policy of aggressive balance sheet 
expansion, with little attention paid to the riskiness of its investments. 
This catastrophic approach to risk management – notably in the Balkan 
region – quickly made the institution very fragile, but the state of Carin-
thia’s (complacent) policy of granting public guarantees ensured very 
cheap market financing, with investors lured by the belief that the public 
authority would always back the bank if things went wrong. The Griss 
Report of 2015 established that “the quick expansion of the bank was 
only possible due to the liability of the Land of Carinthia, without the 
latter having been able to fulfil the respective obligations.” By 2003, these 
guarantees had reached €23bn, more than ten times the size of Carinthia’s 
own annual budget. By the end of 2008, the bank had become completely 
dependent on regional state aid, and by 2009, the situation had become 
so critical, the Austrian government injected €8bn (2.7% of GDP) worth 
of fresh capital in the bank, half its overall balance sheet size of €16bn. 
Before the end of the year, the bank had been nationalised in an emer-
gency to avoid bankruptcy (Rechnungshof (2015)) and another €20bn of 
regional guarantees had been granted.
In September 2014, the government established with the approval of 
the European Commission a wind-down, or ‘defeasance’ structure (called 
HETA) for the orderly wind-down of HAA (the Hypo Act was enacted in 
July 2014 – see Bundesgesetzblatt (2014)). In line with European Union 
law, HETA may not itself conduct deposit banking nor may it hold equity 
interests in financial institutions. 
In the course of setting up HETA the government already cancelled 
– unilaterally - the equivalent of €1.7bn worth of subordinated debt. But 
it is after October 2014, when the Banking Union really starts to take 
shape, that the story gets interesting. Austria implemented the Banking 
Union European principles ahead of the deadline of 2016, passing a law 
in January 2015 based on European Regulation 2014/59. And not long 
after, at the beginning of March, the Austrian Financial Market Authority 
(FMA) imposed a moratorium on HETA’s debt payments. With only 
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minor exceptions, HETA debt holders will not be paid any principal and 
interest before June 2016. 
Winding down the wind-down structure
In imposing this moratorium on a defeasance structure, Austria has 
interpreted the Banking Union, in a way that, though strictly speaking 
correct, could be seen as contrary to its spirit. Having said that, in the 
months preceding the March 2015 moratorium, HETA had shown recur-
ring signs of insolvency and no other alternative – either public or private 
– seemed available to avoid bankruptcy: winding down the wind-down 
structure through a (blunt version of) bail-in was thus judged to be in 
the public interest and resonates well with the idea of protecting – at last, 
after years of complacency – taxpayers’ money.
The bail-in quotas to be applied to private bond holders will be fixed 
at the end of the moratorium in 2016 and based on the results of a thor-
ough asset quality review (AQR) exercise conducted under the supervi-
sion of the FMA. 
4. BU leaves the issue of defeasance structures unaddressed
The first lesson from HETA is that the Banking Union framework 
leaves the question of defeasance structures very much up in the air. It 
is clear that the European directives have been conceived and designed 
for up-and-running commercial banks. But where does this leave wind-
down structures? Should they be subject to the same rules? Will the 
Single Resolution Fund (SRF) be called to the rescue for an ailing defea-
sance structure? And if so, will banks agree to put money in the common 
pot if they know that its resources run the risk of being eaten up by the 
‘bad banks’ of others ? 
This lack of clarity around the issue of ‘bad banks’ is all the more 
striking given the intense debate and thinking around analogous issues. 
Areas such as too-big-to-fail, related systemic risk, and specific mac-
ro-prudential requirements have all been reviewed. The European Com-
mission has even presented a far reaching proposal for a Regulation on 
structural measures for EU credit institutions (EC (2014)) looking into 
the possibility of separating a bank’s business activities into two separate 
entities. Why then have ‘bad banks’ been overlooked? 
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In terms of the role of the SRF, one could argue that its implemen-
tation will be so slow and gradual that by the time it is fully operational 
none of the ‘bad banks’ created by Member States in the wake of the crisis 
will still exist. Under an optimistic scenario, their assets might indeed be 
successfully wound down in less than a decade. But equally, a scenario of 
a long lasting deleveraging period is not unrealistic. The Banking Union 
would thus put the EU in a much safer position if it included contingency 
plans for when wind-down structures themselves run into difficulties.
Defeasance structures and commercial banks: Germany’s DuessHyp…
HETA’s role in the collapse of German bank Duesseldorfer Hypothek-
enbank (DuessHyp) highlights the underlying vulnerability of commer-
cial banks that own liabilities issued (or even just borne) by ‘bad banks’. 
DuessHyp seemingly collapsed as a result of a margin call (from Eurex) 
to post additional collateral in view of the need to write down (€348m) 
bonds inherited from HAA via HETA (DuessHyp was subsequently 
taken over by the Association of German Banks, see Moshinsky et al. 
(2015)). According to Bundesbank data as of April 2015, the German 
financial sector had about €7bn exposure to HETA, all dating from HAA 
times, and most held by banks. Whether or not those losses have a sys-
temic dimension still remains subject to debate – and should for this very 
reason be taken seriously. 
Defeasance structures and restructuring funds: Spain’s Sareb
A further example highlighting the need for the Banking Union specif-
ically to address defeasance structures, is Spain’s Sareb. In 2013, Sareb 
posted a loss of over €260m as a result of writing off loans convertible 
into equity. In 2014, Sareb saw a loss of nearly €600m as the Bank of 
Spain instructed it to write off (and provision) unsecured credit to real 
estate developers undergoing bankruptcy proceedings (Sareb (2015)). 
The accounting regime under which Sareb, a mix of bank and real estate 
asset managers, must operate still needs to be approved. Normally, Sareb 
would have accrued its losses over 15 years, but the Bank of Spain speci-
fied they be frontloaded and compensated against tax credits. One moti-
vation for this (cited by the paper El Confidencial) is the criticism by the 
European Commission of the original (under)valuations of the assets 
bought by Sareb, which could be seen as constituting state aid. As of early 
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2015, Sareb had a subscribed capital of about €5bn, 49% of which was 
owned by Spain’s bank restructuring fund FROB.
To sum up, these cases underline that there are specific and deep 
rooted issues with defeasance structures that so far have been left unre-
solved by the Banking Union: what role should the SRF play, how to con-
tain potential systemic risk to commercial banks; the (lack of) reliability 
of asset valuations when defeasance structures are set up and implied 
state aid when these are undervalued; and what accounting regime 
should they operate under, in particular the time span over which losses 
should be accrued.
5. The discretionary space left to Member States is still a grey 
area 
The second lesson from HETA is how legally sound are decisions taken 
by member states in the discretionary space that has been left to them by 
the Banking Union? It is very likely that HETA creditors are currently 
working day and night to challenge the legal basis of both the debt can-
cellation and the moratorium, the latter being related to BU legislation. 
The FMA’s decision to impose a moratorium illustrates the consid-
erable discretionary power that national supervisors still enjoy. Even 
though the Banking Union goes a long way in establishing centralised 
mechanisms for supervision and resolution, its mechanisms are layered 
on top of existing national institutions (IMF (2015)). Under the SSM, the 
ECB does not directly supervise, but simply oversees the supervision of 
less significant banks in the euro area by their respective national com-
petent authorities. Likewise, under the Single Resolution Mechanism, the 
Single Resolution Board will “simply” oversee the resolution of banks by 
national resolution authorities. 
This discretion at the national level is combined with a fair degree of 
centralisation of financial backstops: as of January 2016, the Board will 
start to have access to a common, industry-funded backstop to facilitate 
resolution if needed (the SRF, as mentioned above). Moreover, the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism (ESM) can directly recapitalise banks under 
restructuring, acting as a kind of common fiscal backstop to the banking 
union. However, the hurdles for its use are very high (for example, bail-in 
must be exhausted), and the funding available is capped at €60 billion. 
This sum would be rapidly depleted in a systemic crisis. 
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Taken together, these centralised tools should eventually help mini-
mise recourse to taxpayer-financed bailouts. But it is not clear whether 
they will be “mobilisable” if and when a decision taken at the national 
level entails the activation of financial backstops. 
6. Public guarantees: ticking bomb or useful support to 
investment?
The third issue raised by the HETA case is that of public guarantees and 
their impact on public finances. The use of public guarantees intensi-
fied during the Great Recession, and their use seems to be growing even 
faster in the aftermath. Guarantees are often seen as a way to support 
investment by reducing funding costs. Or are they an ‘open sesame’ that 
allows anyone (including the ECB) to finance anything with their eyes 
half closed? 
It must be remembered that a public guarantee is and will always 
remain a contingent liability. By definition, contingent liabilities are 
dormant and as such are difficult to manage, control, assess and value. 
As the Austrian federal government sadly learnt, they require dedicated 
monitoring and management. Public liabilities encompass both direct 
and indirect liabilities. Such liabilities are many and varied, but even the 
subset of contingent liabilities relevant to the Banking Union is more 
multidimensional than one might think. They can be explicit - entailing 
a legal obligation - or implicit - implying a social obligation (Houlihan 
Lokey (2012)).
Pricing guarantees has often proved difficult (Levy and Zaghini 
(2010)). And assuming that a hypothetical or off-balance sheet liability is 
not a genuine commitment is a fatal error. Consolidated figures for public 
guarantees extended by euro area member states are telling (Charts 1 and 
2), and putting them in the broader context of contingent government 
liabilities is even more scary (Chart 3).
Among the contingent liabilities displayed in Chart 3, many are 
related to the banking sector: loan guarantees to public and private sector 
entities, umbrella guarantees, state deposit guarantee schemes – all of the 
former are explicit – and bail-outs related to the reversal of private cap-
ital flows (though this latter category should be quasi eliminated by the 
bail-in principle).
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Chart 1: Public guarantees around of above 20% of GDP in fi ve 
Member States 
Source: Eurostat
Chart 2: Public guarantees over time : contrasted paths
Source: Eurostat
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Chart 3: Contingent public liabilities might turn out problematic
Source: Eurostat
Th is rise in guarantees is puzzling. Market participants and policy-
makers have become more wary of imprudent liability management by 
governments, and one would have thought a holistic approach to public 
assets and liabilities would have become common wisdom following the 
sovereign debt crisis. 
Local versus national government guarantees 
Following the collective eff ort to harmonise accountability at the Euro-
pean level, guarantees granted to banks at the national level are now at 
least better identifi ed and quantifi ed. But what about guarantees granted 
at the infra-national level, such as regions or Länder? Th e Carinthian case 
has shown that there is a clear fi nancial stability argument to supervise – 
or at least oversee – the fi nancial activity of local governments associated 
with guarantees. Interestingly, in the case of Carinthia, the EC forbid as 
early as 2003 the extension of further public guarantees to banks on the 
basis of their being anti-competitive. A decision that was greatly chal-
lenged by local policy heroes relying on guarantees to fi nance their pro-
jects at low cost!
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Effectiveness and distortions of public guarantees 
Beyond their consequences on the sustainability of public finances, 
public guarantees also affect the propensity of banks to take risk, as the 
HAA case clearly illustrated. Gropp et al. (2010) show that in 2001, when 
government guarantees for savings banks were removed in Germany, the 
banks reduced their credit risk by cutting off credit to their riskiest bor-
rowers. Grande et al. (2011) underline that there is a fine balance to strike 
between the positive impact of guarantees in kick-starting bank funding 
and the negative distortion caused in the cost of bank borrowing.
BU, guarantors and due diligence
The Austrian episode saw the state of Carinthia maintain its liability for 
the debts of the HAA group despite the bank’s uncontrolled, rapid expan-
sion abroad, without being equipped with the necessary risk manage-
ment systems and control mechanisms. As the independent report con-
cludes, it was “not apparent that the auditors, the bank supervision and 
the Land of Carinthia made sufficient use of the opportunities open to 
them in order to work towards limiting the risks.” The Banking Union 
does not change the incentives for public guarantors to enact appropriate 
due diligence. But nor does it address the adverse incentive for politicians 
to lower financing costs through guarantees without caring about risks as 
long as they do not materialise during their own political mandate.
Overall, the HAA case raises the question of “who is the ultimate guar-
antor”, and “what can decently be guaranteed”. In the case of Carinthia, 
the Federal government, until recently, acted as if it were legally obliged 
to step in for the contingent liabilities incurred at the infra- national level, 
as illustrated by its decision to purchase all shares of HBint, a client of 
HAA. But as its more recent stance has shown, the solidarity between 
local and national government entities should not be taken for granted 
when it comes to fulfilling guarantee obligations. HAA creditors holding 
high yielding guaranteed bonds may find out their belief that a national 
bailout would automatically occur if the regional government entity 
could not service its debt may turn out be a fallacy.
It is regrettable that the Banking Union does not take any teleological 
position on public guarantees. The amounts at stake are considerable. In 
2013, public guarantees were equivalent to more than 30% of GDP in Austria 
and Ireland, and equivalent to about 20% in Finland, Spain and Germany.
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Financial Stability and Integration in 
the Banking Union
Christos Hadjiemmanuil
How stable and resilient is the euro area’s Banking Union? The answer 
depends on the fundamentals of the euro area’s financial sector as much 
as on the Banking Union’s novel institutional and normative framework. 
The prospects for financial stability are thus contingent on the evolution 
of banks’ portfolios, conditions of operation and industrial structure, as 
reshaped by the crisis (section 1). In particular, the degree of integra-
tion of financial markets and banking systems is a key factor: continuing 
fragmentation is bound to have negative implications also in terms of 
resilience (section 2). 
Turning to public prudential regulation and crisis management, the 
establishment, as part of the Banking Union project, of streamlined deci-
sion-making mechanisms for the supervision and resolution of banks 
may not be enough; coherent and credible arrangements for the financing 
of resolution actions and, more generally, for the provision of a uniform 
and effective safety net are also needed. With a convincing and equitable 
set of burden-sharing arrangements, a future financial shock would be 
less destabilizing and a relapse to conditions of market fragmentation 
could be avoided (section 3). 
It should be noted, however, that a proper appreciation of the situa-
tion regarding the safety net should take explicitly into account the close 
interactions between banking regulation and monetary policy. From this 
perspective, the ultimate question is, whether the Banking Union can 
provide simultaneously effective stabilization mechanisms and robust 
market discipline, through unwaveringly strict enforcement of pruden-
tial standards and banks’ budgetary constraints (section 4). 
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1. The state of the banking sector in the aftermath of the crisis
The state of the euro area’s banking sector is slowly improving (European 
Commission, 2015b: ch 1). The factual evidence suggests that significant 
steps towards increased safety have already been made. 
To start with, some deleveraging has taken place. Thus, at the end of 
2008, the total volume of banking assets in the euro area stood at € 33.5 
trillion; five years later, assets were down to € 26.8 trillion (ECB, 2014b). 
The change is due to: balance-sheet repair and the write-down of bad 
assets; the divestment of non-core assets (in many cases, foreign opera-
tions); and to a very significant extent, the recalculation and scaling down 
of the derivative positions of large banks (thus potentially overstating the 
true extent of deleveraging).1 However, as the financial recovery picks up, 
the deleveraging trend is likely to be reversed (unless, of course, further 
regulatory demands for capital items in an environment of low profita-
bility put a more permanent break on credit extension by banks). 
Changes in the composition of banks’ balance sheets are also consistent 
with the hypothesis of increased safety. On the asset side, one can observe a 
modest shift towards traditional bank lending (loans and receivables) and 
away from trading assets. Of course, the situation is not uniform across 
banks and countries. Thus, trading assets represent a relatively higher pro-
portion of total assets in the balance sheets of large, systemically impor-
tant banks (19%) as well as banks based in large economies, such as Ger-
many and France (25%). On the liability side, there has been a shift from 
wholesale to deposit funding. As a percentage of total funding, wholesale 
funding, which peaked in 2009 at 36%, has declined considerably subse-
quently, and is now down to 23%. With confidence growing and activity 
picking up in the interbank market, banks are now less dependent on cen-
tral bank funding and excess liquidity in the system is being mopped up. 
In contrast, banks’ reliance on deposit funding has modestly increased, 
with deposits now contributing over 50% of total funding. 
Moreover, bank capitalization has improved markedly. At end of 
2013, the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets was about 13% for 
the median bank. Moreover, the ECB’s comprehensive assessment of the 
1 It should be noted that other financial enterprises (including insurance companies 
and pension funds, as well as ‘shadow banks’) have not been affected in the same way 
by the crisis. Indeed, within the wider financial sector (whose size has doubled over 
the past decade, reaching in 2013 a total volume of assets of € 57 trillion, or six times 
GDP) banks have lost relative ground: their share of the sector has gone down, from 
59% to 52%.
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condition of the euro area’s large, systemically important banks, whose 
results were announced on 26 October 2014, did not unearth significant 
capital shortfalls (ECB, 2014a).2
In all these respects, today the situation of the average euro area bank 
(if such a thing exists) is much sounder than it was two or three years 
ago. Of course, there are still risks and weaknesses. Most significantly, 
bank profitability remains particularly sluggish (ESRB, 2015b: 29). This 
is due to a combination of factors, not all of which are likely to improve 
in the near future. Many banks are still hampered by the previous peri-
od’s legacy of bad-asset problems, civil and regulatory liabilities and 
high restructuring costs. More generally, the macroeconomic environ-
ment, characterized by weak, uneven and fragile growth and low interest 
rates, is not conducive to strong profit performance and entails wider 
risks to the banking sector’ recovery. Still, all in all significant repair has 
taken place at the firm level and the operating environment is better than 
before. On the ECB’s assessment of the overall state of affairs, systemic 
risk is at a low level, with the indicators of systemic stress for euro area 
banks (as well as for most euro area sovereigns) returning to pre-crisis 
levels (ECB, 2014d; ECB, 2015b). 
Nonetheless, a critical caveat is in order. It is not at all certain that the 
improvement is permanent and structural, rather than conjunctural or 
cyclical. If the latter, the situation could be easily reversed in case of a new 
destabilizing shock. The present environment of low stress is largely due 
to monetary-policy decisions. At some point, the situation may change, 
either due to a shift in the ECB’s stance or because of a more profound 
real or financial shock. In any event, the current optimistic outlook does 
not necessarily guarantee the system’s resilience in a future crisis. Thus, 
the true question is, not whether the banking system happens to enter a 
better phase, but whether it is now better equipped, from a structural as 
well as a regulatory viewpoint, to withstand a drastic deterioration of the 
economic, fiscal or financial environment. 
A related question is, whether in a future crisis the banking system 
would be able to provide continuity of credit intermediation, smooth and 
uniform transmission of the monetary policy and efficient risk-sharing 
2 The comprehensive assessment covered 130 banks, whose combined assets amount-
ed to some € 22 trillion, thus representing over 80% of the euro area’s total banking 
assets. It identified capital shortfalls in just 25 banks, whose combined shortfall at 
end-2013 was estimated at no more than €24.6 billion (ECB, 2014a: 6). By the time of 
completion of the comprehensive assessment, twelve banks had already covered the 
shortfall by issuing new capital. The rest presented their capital plans by end-2014.
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across the Banking Union as a whole – something that it was patently 
unable to provide in recent years. In the euro area, the crisis was marked, 
not only by financial distress and banking failures, but also by a profound 
reversal of the substantial financial integration achieved since the intro-
duction of the single currency, especially in the money and wholesale 
banking markets. Measures of financial integration peaked in 2008, but 
between 2009 and 2012 there was a complete break-down of cross-border 
financial flows and linkages. In the early phase of the crisis, the collapse 
of interbank lending was a major source of contagion. Subsequently, the 
unwinding of cross-border financial positions was followed by at times 
wide cross-country dispersion of nominal interest rates and attendant 
conditions of credit extension. The cost of money and, more generally, 
the monetary and credit environment came to diverge systematically 
between countries, despite the fact that the euro area is a monetary 
union, with a theoretically single monetary policy and unitary monetary 
conditions. For the private sector, location, as distinct from firm-specific 
performance and risk factors, came to dominate financing costs. In this 
sense, the fragmentation of the euro area into national financial islands 
was a primary cause of the economic troubles of peripheral economies. 
This experience underlines the significance of robust and non-reversible 
financial integration for monetary and financial stability in the Banking 
Union. Financial integration is a necessary condition for uniform mon-
etary and credit conditions and the smooth transmission of monetary 
policy in the single currency area. It also facilitates stabilization by 
ensuring better risk-sharing. Conversely, any reversion to fragmentation 
can destabilize the banking system of particular economies and disrupt 
the credit intermediation function. For these reasons, ensuring perma-
nent financial integration is not an independent objective, but a major 
stability concern in the Banking Union. 
2. The limits of financial integration 
More recently, cross-border financial activity in the euro area has resumed 
and there has been strong convergence of monetary and credit conditions 
across countries. Triggered by the endorsement of the Banking Union 
project in June 2012 and the announcement of the ECB’s Outright Mon-
etary Transactions (OMT) programme shortly afterwards, market confi-
dence has improved greatly. The abatement of fears about the break-up of 
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the euro area has almost eliminated redenomination risk for the countries 
in the euro area’s periphery, with the exception of Greece. This has led 
to a remarkable narrowing of sovereign spreads. More generally, it has 
resulted in a marked increase in financial integration, with costs of funds 
converging rapidly across countries and volumes of cross-border activity 
gradually returning to pre-crisis levels. In its annual reports on financial 
integration, the ECB identifies a strongly positive trend in the period from 
mid-2012 onwards (ECB, 2014c; ECB, 2015a). This trend has affected 
all financial markets, albeit to a different extent. There is a resumption 
of activity in the money markets, especially in their secured segment. 
A decline in excess liquidity suggests that financial institutions are now 
more confident that the operation of wholesale markets will be smooth 
and uninterrupted. The situation in bond markets has improved, although 
integration indicators remain below their pre-crisis levels. Banking mar-
kets, on the other hand, show limited progress. Retail banking markets 
remain as deeply segmented along national lines as they have always 
been. Moreover, there is still dispersion in the borrowing costs faced by 
non-financial corporates in different countries – although this is not an 
incontrovertible sign of fragmentation, since the higher lending rates in 
distressed countries may also be explained by the riskier macroeconomic 
environment and increased prevalence of non-performing loans. 
The real question, however, is not whether interest-rate levels have 
converged or whether the operation of interbank markets has normal-
ized, but whether any apparent gains in integration will last. We should 
recall that the relatively high level of integration recorded in the Euro-
pean institutions’ reports for 2008 (ECB, 2008; European Commission 
2009) proved instantly reversible (ECB, 2009). The same could prove true 
of current reintegration trends, if the macroeconomic environment dete-
riorated. 
For a proper evaluation of the situation, it would be useful to draw a 
distinction between convergence, as observed over the past two years, on 
the one hand, and integration, on the other. ‘Integration’ should denote 
the effective and permanent unification of financial systems. The euro 
area is not yet there! Presently, the convergence of monetary and financial 
conditions critically depends on macroeconomic, and in particular mon-
etary, policy; it should, instead, be firmly grounded on structural factors, 
including more integrated bank ownership structures and an increased 
prevalence of cross-border banking groups. Furthermore, direct cross-
border lending transactions are still rare, especially in the retail segment. 
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Cross-border lending intermediation in the euro area has always been 
fundamentally indirect and layered, with banks in surplus countries 
advancing to their counterparts in deficit countries wholesale funds, 
which the latter then on-lend domestically to commercial and consumer 
clients. All this suggests that, even though the prospect of an imminent 
catastrophe has now receded, fragmentation has not yet been addressed 
convincingly and permanently at the structural level and a future relapse 
is always possible. 
Regarding the ownership structure and geographical segmentation 
of the banking industry, in particular, in certain respects the situation 
may have become intrinsically worse due to the pattern of recent restruc-
turing developments. The crisis was followed by a wave of consolida-
tion. At end-2013, 5948 credit institutions (including foreign branches) 
operated in the euro area; five years earlier, the number stood at 6690. 
The population of euro area-based banking groups has likewise declined 
from 2920 to 2609 groups (ECB, 2014b: 7‒8). Significantly, however, 
consolidation has taken place mostly on a domestic, rather than cross-
border, basis. In many cases, it involved intragroup transactions, as part 
of internal restructuring efforts. In contrast, the genuine M&A activity 
has been subdued in terms of both the number and the value of trans-
actions (ECB, 2014b: 12‒14). In particular, cross-border mergers remain 
few and far between. One result of this type of consolidation is increased 
market concentration at the national level, with relevant indices going up 
during the crisis years. 
Of course, there is considerable variance across countries with regard 
to the size and concentration of the banking sector and the extent of 
domestic, as distinct from foreign, control of banking assets. In a few 
small member states, namely, Luxembourg, Malta, Ireland and Cyprus, 
which specialize in financial services and operate as financial entrepôts, 
the banking sector is unusually large in comparison to domestic GDP, 
although the ratios have declined substantially after the Irish and Cypriot 
debacles. In terms of assets, while in certain smaller countries (especially 
amongst the newer member-states) the market is dominated by banking 
groups based in other European countries, in most countries there is 
clear preponderance of the domestic banks. As for market concentration, 
banking systems in the large countries are much less concentrated than 
those in smaller countries (ECB, 2014b: 14‒15). Overall, however, the 
developments suggest that in certain countries banking activity is increas-
ingly concentrated in the hands of domestic systemically important banks. 
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At the same time, many larger banks are now more focused on their 
home market than they used to be. Occasionally, the increase in the share 
of domestic to total activities was due to mergers with other domestic 
banks, but frequently it reflected the divestment of foreign operations as 
part of post-crisis streamlining. Official responses to the crisis contrib-
uted to this trend. This applies, for instance, to the way in which certain 
large, multinational banking groups such as Dexia or ING were resolved 
at an early stage of the crisis by being split into separate national successor 
entities. In numerous other cases, national governments (especially in 
programme countries) merged failing banks into new, larger entities or 
transferred them forcibly to viable institutions. 
The move towards banks of larger size, increased systemic impor-
tance and primarily domestic business focus is hardly beneficial in terms 
of systemic stability (cf Laeven et al., 2014). It increases the potential 
for country-specific financial shocks and renewed disruptions of cross-
border financial activity and capital flows. Simultaneously, it worsens the 
systemic side-effects of failure at the national level, thus aggravating the 
‘too big to fail’ (‘TBTF’) problem (Strahan, 2013). Compared to the very 
large reversal of cross-border investment flows and the extensive disrup-
tion of liquidity sharing experienced during the crisis, the decrease in the 
presence of foreign banks in national banking systems is rather limited. 
Nonetheless, a banking system’s shape when exiting the crisis is bound 
to influence its further development for years to come. From this per-
spective, even a modest scale-back of foreign bank presence in certain 
jurisdictions can be significant, since it entrenches the structural seg-
mentation of the European banking system into interacting, yet distinct 
national subsystems. 
Of course, a financial system dominated by foreign banks is not 
devoid of risks for the host economy. While it can contribute to better 
risk-sharing and a smoother adjustment in the event of a local eco-
nomic shock, it may be a problem if a financial crisis threatens the for-
eign banks in their home base: in the latter case, the banks may sud-
denly and abruptly decide to retrench their operations by scaling back 
their exposure to the host economy, thus acting as a primary channel 
of contagion. The experience of Eastern European member-states in 
2008–09 proves the point (Allen, Jackowicz and Kowalewski, 2013). On 
the other hand, with supervision now centralized at the hands of the 
ECB, one can imagine that in future the supervisory response to a situ-
ation of this type will be more appropriate: rather than insisting on the 
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ring-fencing of liquidity within the home jurisdiction, as some national 
supervisors did during the crisis (Jones, 2013), the ECB will probably 
insist on a balanced approach, seeking to maintain cross-border liquidity 
lines intact. There are other potential drawbacks of multinational bank 
dominance that must be considered, like the concentration of ownership 
power and managerial decision-making in a few national capitals, with 
potentially negative implications for other (smaller and/or peripheral) 
countries, which may find themselves at the bottom of the pyramid. Still, 
the interpenetration of national banking markets and the emergence of 
more broadly based banking groups would, in principle, result in more 
profound and irreversible integration and, other things being equal, in a 
more stable financial system. 
A strategy for overcoming financial fragmentation was presented 
to ECOFIN in late 2013 by two experts from the Bruegel think-tank 
(Sapir and Wolff, 2013). In their view, financial integration and stability 
in the Banking Union should be pursued by way of a three-step pro-
cess, involving: (a) an immediate, thorough and tough appraisal of the 
true capital needs of banks in the euro area, in the form of the ECB’s 
‘comprehensive assessment’ exercise (which at that point had yet to be 
conducted), followed by the recapitalization of undercapitalized but 
otherwise viable banks with private money; (b) aggressive resolution 
of problem banks, preferably by way of cross-border bank sales and 
mergers, so as to encourage the integration of retail banking markets and 
to break decisively the domestic bank-sovereign links; and, as a longer-
term objective, (c) the development of genuinely cross-border securities 
markets, especially for equities and corporate bonds, through the exten-
sive harmonization of corporate governance, insolvency and tax law. In 
particular, the shift to a more market-orientated financial system was 
considered essential, in order to reduce the heavy reliance of European 
economies on bank funding and to improve economic stability through 
better financial risk-sharing. 
By underlying the significance of unified, efficient and deep capital 
markets for the future development of the financial system, this strategy 
effectively presaged the Juncker Commission’s Capital Markets Union 
project (Juncker, 2014: 6; European Commission, 2015a; Hill, 2015), 
to which it may have served as an inspiration. However, the part which 
concerned the banking sector, and which should be applied first, has not 
been followed. To begin with, despite expectations to the contrary, the 
ECB’s comprehensive assessment was not particularly tough; and in any 
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event, it did not reveal significant problems, thus rendering redundant 
the suggestions regarding the preferable approach to repair and resolu-
tion. Moreover, up till now bank restructuring and resolution efforts have 
taken place on a predominantly domestic basis; and this tendency may 
well continue in the foreseeable future, since, on the one hand, so far 
there is no sign of a strong lobby for restructuring through cross-border 
mergers, while, on the other hand, national governments, which tend to 
prefer domestic consolidation, are likely to retain considerable influence 
over the engineering of resolution solutions as long as resolution funding 
arrangement have not been fully mutualized. 
As for the hope that the Capital Markets Union might of itself trans-
form the financial landscape, leading to a less-bank-centred and more 
structurally integrated financial sector, it is enough to observe that even 
its most enthusiastic proponents recognize that this is a long-term project. 
The concept may be worthy, but it clearly lacks the revolutionary, game-
changing character and clear focus of the Banking Union. It comprises 
a multitude of partial objectives, many of which lack political visibility. 
Its success depends on the combined effect of a large number of legal, 
administrative and practical steps, some of which are full of thorns. It is 
not by coincidence, nor due to a lack of vision that, almost half a century 
after its appearance (EEC Commission, 1966), the Segré Report’s plan 
for a truly pan-European and dynamic capital market remains largely 
unrealized. More recently, the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) set 
out an ambitious and very extensive legislative programme, which was 
predominantly directed to the development and integration of capital 
markets (European Commission, 1999), but this was also insufficient. 
This time too, one should not expect rapid and spectacular success. The 
Capital Markets Union can provide a frame and a theme for the Euro-
pean policy agenda for the non-bank financial sector; but it is unlikely to 
yield appreciable fruits any time soon – much less to relegate questions 
of banking policy to a secondary position in the political, legislative and 
regulatory agenda. 
3. The new regulatory landscape 
Beyond adjustments at the industry level, the robustness of the regulatory 
regime is also critical to the long-term stability banking sector. It is pre-
cisely on this plane that the most spectacular changes have been observed 
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over the past few years. Both the norms and the organizational arrange-
ments for prudential supervision and bank resolution have undergone 
radical transformations. 
Regulatory requirements
In the wake of the Lehman Brothers debacle, Europe embarked on a major 
wave of prudential reregulation. The pre-existing system of prudential 
controls was revised and tightened considerably. The overhaul was pur-
sued under the more general rubric of the development of a so-called 
‘single rulebook’, comprising highly harmonized regulatory frameworks 
for the operation of European financial institutions and markets. Signifi-
cantly, the rules of the single rulebook are not confined to the euro area, 
but apply uniformly across all member states. Relevant provisions are 
promulgated at two levels: the basic legislation (regulations or directives) 
is enacted by the European Parliament and the Council in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure; this contains numerous enabling 
provisions, allowing for further elaboration of the rules by way of sup-
plementary instruments (delegated and implementing acts), which are 
adopted in the form of Commission legislation. In the field of banking, 
the body responsible for the preparation of the supplementary instru-
ments is the European Banking Authority (EBA). 
The prudential framework is one of the two core components of the 
single rulebook for banks. In this area, the basic norms are now set out 
in the CRD IV/CRR legislative package (Directive 2013/36/EU, OJ 2013 
L176/338; and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, OJ 2013 L176/1). For the 
most part, this translates into European law the provisions of Basel III, 
the latest iteration of the Basel global capital adequacy framework, now 
reinforced with new liquidity and leverage components (BCBS 2011; 
BCBS 2013; and BCBS 2014). There is little doubt that the new capital 
requirements are much tighter than the previous system of bank capital 
adequacy. One could retort that these requirements are not exempt from 
certain serious defects inherent in the general conceptual approach and 
risk-weighting techniques of the Basel system of capital adequacy, whose 
apparent technical sophistication masks fundamental arbitrariness.3 
3 An arbitrariness only made worse as a result of the labyrinthine and non-transparent 
provisions first introduced with Basel II, which enabled individual banks to choose 
how the general standards may apply in their own case, thus opening opportunities 
for gaming the system.
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Nonetheless, regardless of one’s views on the underlying methodology, 
it is clear that Basel III raises appreciably the capital ratios that banks 
must observe and, in particular, demands that these be covered predom-
inantly with true shareholders’ capital (‘core Tier 1’ capital items, such 
as common stock and disclosed reserves), as distinct from the hybrid 
capital items and subordinated debt instruments, which were admitted 
in the calculation to a much larger extent in the past. Furthermore, the 
assessment of capital positions now takes place on a less static basis, due 
to the periodic stress-testing of banks’ portfolios; and it is possible to 
vary over time the standard (micro-prudential or bank-specific) capital 
requirements by imposing on a country’s banks additional macro-pru-
dential capital requirements, in order to counteract perceived macroe-
conomic imbalances and emerging systemic risks (Directive 2013/36, art 
133 (1); Regulation 575/2013, art 458).4 Last but not least, alongside the 
revamped risk-weighted capital requirements, the new prudential frame-
work encompasses totally new elements of protection, including liquidity 
ratios and a non-risk-weighted leverage ratio. 
The other core component of the single rulebook regulates the han-
dling of bank failure. It is based on the recently enacted Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive (BRRD) (Directive 2014/59/EU, OJ 2014 
L173/190). The BRRD establishes a special administrative regime for the 
resolution of distressed or failed credit institutions. This is a novelty, not 
only for European law, but also for the domestic law of many member 
states. In contrast with the ad hoc character of traditional bank-crisis 
management practices at the national level, the resolution process now 
becomes highly streamlined. Resolution actions will henceforth be sup-
ported by advance recovery and resolution planning, with individually 
produced plans for each and every significant bank or banking group. As 
for actual resolution-related decision-making, this will now be subject 
to openly proclaimed general principles and rather detailed procedural 
and substantive rules. Beyond enabling derogations from the general 
4 As the relevant decisions can be taken by special bodies operating at the national 
level in cooperation with supranational bodies and institutions other than the ECB 
(ESRB and EBA, Commission and Council), macro-prudential regulation is partial-
ly decoupled from supervision, both horizontally and vertically (Constâncio, 2010; 
Constâncio, 2015). Moreover, even in so far as the ECB can impose macro-prudential 
requirements in the euro area, this function is exercised under special procedural 
rules, under which the primary decision-making role is reserved for the ECB’s mon-
etary policy-makers (Governing Council), and not for its supervisory wing (Regu-
lation (EU) No 1024/2013, OJ 2013 L287/63, art 5; and ECB Rules of Procedure, art 
13h, as inserted by Decision ECB/2014/1, OJ 2014 L95/56).
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law, the BRRD delineates a structured approach to the management of 
bank failures and prioritizes particular solutions. Its norms are intended 
to eliminate TBTF concerns and to minimize the need for bailouts with 
taxpayers’ funds, thus enhancing market discipline. For this reason, they 
include a specific burden-sharing cascade, which gives precedence to the 
private financing of a failed bank’s restructuring. In particular, a failed 
bank’s existing stakeholders –namely, its shareholders, junior creditors 
and, depending on the circumstances, even senior creditors and deposi-
tors with deposits in excess of the guaranteed amount of € 100,000– are 
required to contribute to the absorption of past losses and to the recapi-
talization of the bank by means of a write down of their equity and debt 
claims and/or conversion of their debt claims into equity; this is has been 
named ‘the bail-in tool’ (Directive 2014/59, arts 2(1)(57) and 43–55). 
For reasons that will be hinted at later on (section 4), it is doubtful 
whether the new resolution regime will live up to its promise to eliminate 
TBTF and all but remove the need for public financing of bank bailouts. 
Still, it can contribute to the containment of risk, because it provides a 
more structured and predictable approach to resolution and contains pro-
visions which partially improve the incentive structure of banks’ share-
holders. Less directly, resolution planning and other provisions on the 
structure of banking groups will precipitate organizational adaptations, 
while a pre-emptive reorganization of banks’ internal and external rela-
tionships in view of the bail-in provisions may also be expected. From 
this perspective, one of the most significant elements of the new regime 
consists in the prospective imposition on systemically important banks, 
as part of their resolution planning, of a new financing constraint, the 
so-called ‘MREL’ (minimum requirement for own funds and eligible lia-
bilities), requiring these banks to retain minimum ratio of total bail-in-
able liabilities (including eligible junior debt and bonds) to total liabili-
ties (Directive 2014/59, art 45).5 This is a second line of defence, whose 
scope goes far beyond traditional bank capital. When finalized and imple-
mented, the MREL standards will result in a very substantial enhance-
ment of the resilience of large banks; additionally, the constraint on their 
liability structure will set limits to their incentives for further growth.
The new regulatory arrangements have a less evident but very signif-
icant risk-reducing effect in the area of collateralized interbank lending. 
5 More recently, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) has proposed the imposition on 
global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) of a broadly equivalent requirement 
for a minimum total loss-absorbing capacity (‘TLAC’) (FSB, 2014).
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In the pre-crisis period, the existence of European legislation establishing 
insolvency ‘safe harbours’ in favour of the holders of financial collateral 
(Directive 98/26/EC, OJ 1998 L166/45; Directive 2002/47/EC, OJ 2002 
L168/43) facilitated the development of conditions of excessive liquidity 
in interbank markets. In case of a debtor bank’s insolvency, safe-harbour 
provisions protect creditors holding financial collateral by recognizing 
close-out netting and allowing them to enforce their claims separately 
from other creditors and with immediate effect; this is achieved by means 
of the unilateral liquidation of their collateral outside the collective pro-
ceedings. The avoidance of the insolvency moratorium and of the prin-
ciple of pro-rata satisfaction is a strong inducement for the collateral-
ization of wholesale lending and the development of related securities 
financing techniques (see Keller et al., 2014). In this manner, in normal 
times safe harbours boost considerably the availability of short-term inter-
bank liquidity at low cost (Paech, 2015). However, there is a significant 
downside, in so far as the resulting liquidity exposures increase bank inter-
connectedness and systemic risk. In a crisis, collateralization provides pro-
tection to a failed bank’s immediate wholesale creditors; but, at the same 
time, it encourages the immediate cessation of further credit extension, 
the rapid foreclosure and liquidation (‘fire-sale’) of existing collateral and, 
when this takes place on a large scale, the emergence of asset-price defla-
tionary spirals, which can lead to the drying up, or even complete freezing, 
of interbank markets as the falling aggregate value of available collateral 
items can no longer support further liquidity-sharing across the whole 
system. This catastrophic dynamic made itself felt with particular force 
in autumn 2008. Even though the new regulatory norms leave the safe 
harbours intact, they partially mitigate the problem outlined above in two 
ways: firstly, the new prudential rules (e.g. Regulation (EU) 648/2012, OJ 
2012 L201/1) establish a more cautious approach to securities financing 
and, in particular, to the multiple use of the same collateral, while requiring 
the intermediation of central counterparty mechanisms for certain posi-
tions; and secondly, the BRRD imposes a mandatory and automatic stay 
on individual enforcement actions during the resolution process, thus pre-
venting the unwinding of collateral positions and the resulting collapse 
of the liquidity positions during the period when a failing bank’s fate is 
still under administrative consideration (Directive 2014/59, arts 69–71). 
These developments partially address systemic risk in a market of critical 
importance, which also constitutes a primary interface between the formal 
banking industry (credit institutions) and ‘shadow banks’. 
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All in all, the prudential framework is considerably more demanding 
today than it was before the crisis. Its general evolution reflects a shift 
away from the excessive reliance on current prices, credit ratings and 
the supposedly self-correcting market practices of the pre-crisis period. 
Instead, the emphasis is now being placed on externally imposed (that 
is, public), mandatory, more uniform and significantly stricter pruden-
tial standards. The presently relatively low capital ratios of many banks 
cannot belie this fact. Building up capital resources requires time and 
conducive macro-financial conditions; at this stage, however, we are just 
exiting a major crisis (which has naturally led to a depletion of bank cap-
ital positions, thus leading to a very low new starting point). The new 
regulatory standards are phased in only gradually; accordingly, current 
market weaknesses cannot be attributed to them. Moreover, an over-
aggressive prudential stance could be counterproductive, since it could 
harm the rather timid recovery of the European economies. 
Of course, this does not mean that all is good, or that there are no 
uncertainties and continuing problems. The long implementation horizon 
of the new prudential norms implies that during the transition the banking 
system will continue to operate below the projected levels of safety; and, 
what is more important, it provides banking interests with ample time 
for lobbying for the norms’ relaxation or further postponement. More-
over, certain elements are not totally convincing. In particular, at 3%, the 
projected leverage ratio may be too low; and the specification of the new 
liquidity requirements is rather fuzzy and highly dependent on the techni-
calities of the final implementing instruments. The fate of the proposals on 
structural controls (European Commission, 2014) is also very uncertain. 
Last but not least, the question of limits on the public-debt exposures of 
credit institutions –an issue of primary importance for breaking the infa-
mous bank-sovereign feedback loop, which reignited the financial crisis 
in 2012‒ has only recently brought into the official regulatory discussion 
(ESRB, 2015a). The effectiveness of the post-crisis regulatory settlement 
and its eventual impact on banking risk (and risk-taking incentives) thus 
hangs on a number of design choices which are still open for decision. 
Organizational centralization of supervision and resolution
While the territorial field of application of the new regulatory norms is 
pan-European, the reform of the organizational structure concerns spe-
cifically (and, at least for the time being, exclusively) the countries of the 
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euro area. Indeed, ‘Banking Union’ is but a label given to the euro area’s 
new regulatory architecture. Its hallmark is the drastic centralization of 
the administrative responsibilities for prudential supervision and resolu-
tion through the establishment of two streamlined structures, the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM), respectively. In these mechanisms, certain roles are assigned to 
the relevant national authorities; but the most important decisions are 
reserved for newly appointed European authorities. 
Thus, in the SSM, the key responsibilities (including the direct ongoing 
supervision of 123 ‘significant’, or systemic, banking groups) have been 
transferred to the ECB, but are performed separately from its monetary 
policy functions in an organizationally distinct supervisory wing, headed 
by a new organ, the Supervisory Board (Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, 
OJ 2013 L287/63). The Supervisory Board includes centrally appointed 
officials as well as representatives of the national supervisory authorities. 
There are reasons to expect that supervision will become more effec-
tive with the move to the SSM. The streamlining of supervisory practices, 
reporting requirements and lines of communication can play a positive 
role. There is also a hope that the ECB’s assessments will be more broadly 
based and more rounded than those of national supervisors. In the case of 
cross-border groups, in particular, the new system may facilitate pruden-
tial assessments on a group-wide, single-enterprise basis, and may even 
lead to somewhat lower compliance and reporting costs, since all entities 
in a group will now be subject to a single set of supervisory demands. 
Many observers, however, expect the greatest benefits to derive from 
the removal of certain perverse incentives affecting supervisory deci-
sion-making at the national level. The ECB is highly unlikely to share 
national supervisors’ attachment to ‘national champions’ and dislike for 
cross-border M&As. In periods of market turbulence, it will not seek to 
ring-fence liquidity within national borders, as they did. More gener-
ally, the ECB will tend to be less amenable to influence, not to mention 
outright pressure, from national governments and banking interests. 
Finally, the ECB may be less beset by incentives for forbearance than the 
old national supervisors. Conceivably, however, a tendency towards rel-
atively stricter enforcement might not operate in a fully consistent way. 
Strict enforcement towards middle-size banks, of primarily national sig-
nificance, could go hand-in-hand with a propensity towards leniency 
and forbearance for very large banks of pan-European importance. If so, 
this tendency would both entrench the TBTF benefits of size and result 
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in effective discrimination against the national banking industries of 
smaller and less wealthy peripheral states. 
The rather odd distribution of responsibilities within the SSM gives rise 
to other and more immediate concerns. While the ECB is directly respon-
sible for the supervision of large banks, the intention is that it will normally 
delegate to the national competent authorities the front-line supervisory 
tasks, including in relation to the collection of information and on-site 
inspections (Regulation 1024/2013, arts 4 and 6). When sanctions need to 
be imposed, the ECB may act autonomously only if these sanctions derive 
from directly applicable instruments of European law (regulations) and 
are directed to legal persons; in all other cases, the enforcement actions 
must be brought at the request of the ECB by the national authorities, in 
accordance with national law and procedure (Regulation 1024/2013, art 
18). The ECB is also only indirectly responsible for the ongoing super-
vision of less significant credit institutions (albeit solely responsible for 
the grant and withdrawal of their authorisation); and it totally lacks com-
petence in relation to regulatory matters of non-prudential nature (that 
is, for conduct-of-business and transactional banking regulation) (Reg-
ulation 1024/2013, arts 1, 4 and 6). In addition to being administratively 
inconvenient, this division of supervisory tasks is highly dependent on 
mutual trust. In theory, the close and faithful cooperation of the ECB and 
the national authorities should ensure effective coordination and help to 
avoid frictions; and in the event of disagreement, the system’s hierarchical 
structure gives the final say to the ECB. However, such semi-strong cen-
tralization cannot preclude strategic behaviour on the part of national 
supervisors. For instance, these may choose to withhold information or 
delay its transmission, or sabotage the enforcement actions required by 
the ECB (Ferrarini, 2015). The risk that national supervisors will attempt 
to game the system in this manner may increase during crises, when the 
timeframe for decisions is condensed and the preferences of domestic and 
European decision-makers are more likely to diverge. 
A specific criticism of the new regulatory architecture’s variable geom-
etry relates to the decoupling of regulation from supervision (Ferrarini, 
2015). The individuation of the single rulebook is a matter for the EBA or, 
on numerous occasions where national discretions are still available, the 
national legislative and/or regulatory authorities. Thus, in its capacity as 
regional supervisory authority, the ECB is called to apply norms having 
either a wider (pan-European) or a narrower (domestic) territorial field 
of application. The current arrangements are, undoubtedly, complex and 
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cumbersome. One wonders, however, whether the exercise of regulatory 
powers is an integral attribute of the supervisory function, as the critics 
claim. If anything, it makes sense to have a common rule-making process 
for the Internal Market as a whole, with the same rules applying to the 
euro area as elsewhere in the EU. As for the local variation and ‘gold-
plating’ of the regulatory norms, rather than being transferred from the 
national to the euro area level, it should be discouraged altogether. Thus, 
for all the awkwardness and potential tensions, there are good reasons 
for splitting the regulatory from the supervisory responsibilities and 
leaving to the EBA the development of the single rulebook, which should 
apply uniformly across the Union. On the other hand, the EBA’s internal 
decision-making arrangements are less than ideal (Regulation (EU) No 
1022/2013, OJ 2013 L287/5). The creation of the Banking Union has led 
to a revised voting system in the EBA’s Board of Supervisors, whereby 
decisions must be supported by majorities of both the Banking Union 
country representatives and those of non-participating countries. The 
representation of the Banking Union raises additional questions: the rep-
resentatives of the national supervisory authorities of the participating 
countries sit as full members, while the ECB representative participates 
without voting rights. Participation in colleges of supervisors of cross-
order banking groups also takes place by way of parallel representation. 
Time will tell, how solid and effective these arrangements are. 
The supervisory responsibility of the ECB extends to the adoption 
of appropriate measures, when a bank meets the criteria for early inter-
vention. When, however, a bank is found to be failing, its resolution will 
in future be carried out by the Banking Union’s second mechanism, the 
SRM (Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, OJ 2014 L225/1). The SRM’s admin-
istrative mechanism is backed by supranational financial arrangements 
in the form of a pre-funded Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which must 
be built up by the end of 2023 with contributions raised on a mandatory 
basis from the regulated credit institutions; and in extremis the ESM can 
serve as common fiscal backstop (Regulation 806/2014, arts 67–77; ESM 
Treaty, art. 15; ESM, 2014; Hadjiemmanuil, 2015: 26–34). 
Within the SRM, the key decisions in relation to the resolution of 
ECB-supervised banks will be taken by a brand-new European agency, the 
Single Resolution Board (SRB), but the actual execution of the resolution 
scheme will be left to the national resolution authorities, acting in accord-
ance to domestic company and insolvency law; the latter will also be pri-
marily responsible for the resolution of less significant banks (Regulation 
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806/2014, art 7). To avoid agency problems and policy frictions, all actions 
of national responsibility will be subject to the SRB’s reserve powers of 
intervention. Like the ECB’s Supervisory Board, the SRB includes national 
representatives in addition to five centrally appointed members. Indi-
vidual cases are considered either in a plenary session or in a truncated 
formation, the so-called ‘executive session’, which includes only the cen-
trally appointed members and those national representatives who repre-
sent countries where the bank under consideration has a presence (head-
quarters, branches and/or subsidiaries). Resolution decisions are taken in 
executive session, except when the resolution scheme provides for support 
by the SRF in excess of € 5 billion or when the net accumulated use of the 
Fund in the last consecutive 12 months has exceeded the threshold of € 5 
billion (Regulation 806/2014, arts 43, 49–55). 
The resolution procedure is very complex, but exceptionally expedi-
tious (Regulation 806/2014, art 18). In particular, upon notification from 
the ECB of a bank’s actual or impending failure or on its own initiative, 
the SRB assesses the bank’s condition and draws the resolution scheme, 
specifying the appropriate resolution tools and financing arrangements, 
including the extent to which the SRF may be used. To take effect, the 
resolution scheme proposed by the SRB requires the approval of the 
Commission or, when the Commission refers the matter to it, of the 
Council. In case of objection by either of them, the SRB must reconsider 
the situation and amend the resolution scheme in accordance with the 
reasons given for the objection. The various procedural steps must take 
place within very tight time limits, ensuring the completion of the whole 
procedure within no more than 32 hours – the length of the proverbial 
weekend. 
Given the high stakes, very short timeframe and high administrative 
complexity of resolution proceedings, the separation of supervision from 
resolution may generate more significant practical challenges than that 
between regulation and supervision. The operating relationship between 
the ECB and the SRB is a potentially sensitive issue. It will be interesting 
to see, how the two organizations will coordinate their functions in rela-
tion to recovery and resolution planning. More significantly, the ECB 
retains responsibility for early intervention in weak banks; the SRB takes 
over only once a credit institution has been declared ‘failing or likely to 
fail’. Since the relevant assessment can be initiated by either authority, 
the delimitation of their respective fields of action effectively becomes a 
matter for concurrent decision-making. This may be a significant source 
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of frictions; and if a bank’s failure appeared to be mishandled, it could 
provide grounds for playing the blame game. 
It is not possible to delve here into every aspect of the Banking Union’s 
institutional set-up. Certainly, the structure and operating modalities of 
the SSM and the SRM contain grey areas, some of which were mentioned 
above. Nonetheless, from a regulatory perspective, the creation of the 
two mechanisms signifies a major transition –a veritable regime change– 
whose overall impact on the effectiveness of supervisory control and the 
stability of the euro area’s banking system will, in all likelihood, be bene-
ficial. From another perspective, that of crisis management, on the other 
hand, the progress achieved so far has been rather timid. 
Bank resolution and burden-sharing in the Banking Union
One should remember that the Banking Union was motivated, not by 
considerations of supervisory effectiveness,6 but by concerns intimately 
linked to bank resolution and its financing. Indeed, the funding of the 
safety net constituted the primary cause of the Spanish crisis of early 
2012, which set in motion the series of decisions leading to the Banking 
Union. The Spanish case provided a clear illustration of the perverse 
dynamics of the bank-sovereign feedback loop, whereby a state’s financial 
weakness undermines the credibility of the (explicit or implicit) public 
guarantees in favour of domestic banks, thus leading to an erosion of 
these banks’ ability to access market liquidity during a crisis, thus making 
all the more necessary the provision of public support, which, in its turn, 
leads to a further deterioration of the fiscal position, and so on. As these 
effects were not symmetrical across the euro area, but country-specific, 
the bank-sovereign loop produced a strong divergence in monetary and 
financial conditions between the weaker peripheral economies and those 
of the centre, which called into question the very survival of the single 
currency area. The absence of supranational burden-sharing arrange-
ments for bank crisis management allowed this vicious circle to follow its 
course uninterrupted. 
When the Banking Union project was initially announced in mid-
2012, the key promise, which helped to soothe markets, was precisely 
6 Just three years earlier, in February 2009, the de Larosière report, referring to pro-
posals for the unification of the supervision of cross-border financial institutions at 
the pan-EU level, had expressed strong reservations about so bold a move, especially 
as long as the EU had not decided ‘to move towards greater political integration’ (de 
Larosière Group, 2009: 58).
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that the funding of bank bailouts and resolution actions would hence-
forth be mutualized. This would be achieved through a single deposit 
guarantee scheme (DGS) and a common fiscal backstop (with the ESM 
performing the latter function). The only reason for which the central-
ization of the supervisory function was endorsed without much resist-
ance, was that this was a prerequisite for the centralization of financing 
arrangements. This, however, did not happen or, at least, did not happen 
in a full and conclusive sense. 
While the Banking Union eventually comprised single mechanisms 
and central institutions for both supervision and resolution, the resolu-
tion financing arrangements remain to a large extent fragmented. A uni-
form safety net (as envisaged, e.g., by ESRB, 2012: 14–18, 22–24) is still 
lacking. The original proposal for a single DGS, to complement the new 
integrated supervision and resolution mechanisms (Van Rompuy, 2012: 
4–5), has been postponed sine die, if not altogether abandoned (European 
Commission, 2012: 4, 6 and 9). The ineffectual system of separate national 
DGSs will thus be retained, subject to rather unconvincing provisions ena-
bling mutual borrowing between DGSs (Directive 2014/49/EU, OJ 2014 
L173/149). As already mentioned, within the SRM, resolution actions 
can be supported by supranational financing arrangements, in the form 
of the SRF and, potentially, the ESM as common fiscal backstop. But any 
potential fiscal interventions will still be primarily based on the residual 
responsibility of a bank’s home country (Hadjiemmanuil, 2015). Thus, in 
a potential crisis, nationality and the fiscal strength of the domestic sover-
eign may continue to be a significant risk-differentiating factor. 
The abandonment of the original promise regarding the mutualization 
of bailout costs is partly due to transitional considerations, since coun-
tries of the euro area’s centre such as Germany, Netherlands and Finland 
were adamant that banks’ losses on pre-existing or ‘legacy’ assets should 
not be grandfathered into the Banking Union’s resolution arrangements. 
A basic argument against burden-sharing in relation to legacy assets was 
that the countries which exercised ex ante supervisory control over the 
problem banks should be saddled ex post with the fiscal costs of rescuing 
them. Many commentators went so far as to blame the deficiencies of 
supervision at the national level for the crisis. In actual fact, however, 
during the crisis the weaker links in the chain proved to be, not countries 
with reputedly weak supervisory systems, but those which, due to limited 
fiscal capacity or very large banking sectors relative to GDP, displayed 
limited ability to finance a fully-fledged bailout effort. Be this as it may, 
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now that supervisory control has passed from the national authorities to 
the ECB, this argument can no longer be invoked to justify the residual 
financial responsibility of national DGSs and governments. 
Still, a more general tendency to avoid burden-sharing unless strictly 
necessary is clearly in evidence, especially when the resolution actions 
necessitate public financial support. The preferences of fiscally robust 
states (which, being confident that in a crisis they will be able to finance 
on their own the bailout of domestic banks, do not want to contribute 
to the rescue of foreign ones) combines with the BRRD’s principal legal 
policy (which is to ensure that henceforth the taxpayer’s contribution 
in the financing of resolution actions will be confined to the bare min-
imum) to transform subtly but profoundly the fundamental rationale of 
the Banking Union. Instead of focusing on the viability and symmetry of 
the resolution financing arrangements, the mode of thinking that even-
tually prevailed takes it for granted that aggressive bail-in, based on the 
principles of the BRRD, will take place in each and every case of resolu-
tion. According to this narrative, in future the full, or almost full, costs of 
resolution will fall on the private sector – that is, first on a failed bank’s 
direct claimholders and then on the privately pre-funded stand-by reso-
lution financing arrangements (namely, the relevant DGS and resolution 
fund). If so, there will rarely be need even for domestic public assistance, 
much less for supranational bailout arrangements! We have thus moved 
almost imperceptibly from the original intention, which envisaged the 
eventual mutualization of public safety nets in the Banking Union, to a 
system relying on the principle of robust and quasi-automatic private 
risk-sharing (cf Buch & Weigert, 2014). However, the belief that publicly 
financed bailouts have been relegated once and for all to the ash heap of 
history is most likely false. In a future systemic crisis, the extension of 
public guarantees can once more appear politically or economically una-
voidable; then, the credibility of such guarantees will become yet again a 
critical factor, in terms both of re-establishing order in the market and 
of preserving equal conditions of operation across member states. This, 
indeed, was the intuition behind the original Banking Union approach. 
Thus, the necessity of central financial arrangements and full bur-
den-sharing currently rests on a number of considerations: the likeli-
hood that, despite the new provisions on bail-in, bailouts of significant 
banks will continue to take place; the principle of alignment of super-
visory control and liability, which, in the new environment of all but 
unified regulation and supervision, operates in favour of mutualization; 
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and the need to preserve the stability of the financial system and the 
equality of monetary and financial conditions across the euro area, both 
of which rest on flimsy grounds when the financial responsibility for 
bank resolution is divided along national lines and country-risk con-
tinues to plague banks (cf Herring, 2013). Less evidently, an additional 
argument for full burden-sharing relates to the incentives of the ECB, 
since in an environment of separate national financial arrangements the 
single supervisor may have an additional and idiosyncratic incentive for 
forbearance where a failing bank’s home country (or the relevant DGS) 
is itself fiscally weak. 
It is often said that the euro area’s banks are ‘European in life, but 
national in death’. However, due to the official and private responses to 
the recent crisis (including the ring-fencing of liquidity, the break-up of 
several large cross-border groups along national lines, the nationalization 
of many weak banks and the concentration of certain countries’ public 
debt in the hands of domestic banks) market segmentation has increased, 
and banks are more likely today than before the crisis to be national both 
in life and death! Rather than reversing this development, the Banking 
Union’s burden-sharing arrangements may actually entrench it! 
At the same time, strong doubts have frequently been voiced about 
the sufficiency of the new resolution regime’s pledged resources. Under 
the new arrangements: 
• by mid-2024, the national DGSs must be pre-funded with at least 
0.8% of their members’ total covered deposits (Directive 2014/49, art 
10(2)) – a level of pre-funding currently corresponding in absolute 
terms, according to estimations, to a pan-European total of about € 
55 billion (as long as the DGSs remain nationally based, however, 
even this amount will not be freely available for any particular reso-
lution action); 
• with pre-funding gradually rising to 1% of covered deposits (Regula-
tion 806/2014, art 69(1)), the SRF has a target level of approximately 
€ 55 billion (based on the 2011 volume of covered deposits); and 
• following political agreement in the Eurogroup, the direct recapital-
ization of banks by the ESM (as distinct from its provision of indirect 
assistance to national recapitalization programmes, through loans to 
the home country) is subject to an overall cap of € 60 billion (out 
of the ESM’s total lending capacity of € 500 billion) (Dijsselbloem, 
2014). 
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In practice, this means that the pre-funded part of the relevant finan-
cial instruments will possibly suffice to resolve even one of the largest 
European banking groups – subject, however, to the rather unrealistic 
assumption that this takes place in isolation, and not as part of a wider 
crisis! In view of the banking system’s total size (with assets of € 26.8 
trillion), the amounts are clearly insufficient to address a systemic crisis. 
If proof is needed, this is provided by the experience of the recent crisis: 
according to Commission estimates, between October 2008 and end-
2012 the member states extended €591.9 billion of public funds –an 
amount equivalent to 4.6% of the Union’s 2012 GDP– for the purpose of 
recapitalizing banks or providing asset relief; in addition, they provided 
guarantees and other forms of liquidity support in relation to transac-
tions whose outstanding amount reached in 2009 a peak of € 906 bil-
lion – that is, an additional 7.78 % of the Union’s 2012 GDP (European 
Commission, 2013). Thus, even when the prescribed target levels of the 
financial instruments will have been reached after several years, we will 
still be very far from a convincing level of readily available resources. 
Of course, the SRF can supplement the pre-committed amounts by 
borrowing, while the levying of ex post contributions from the banking 
sector is also possible. But the latter may be inadvisable in the midst of 
a crisis; accordingly, the primary use of ex post contributions may be to 
repay borrowings after the crisis has ended. And this brings one back to 
the perennial quandary of fiscal backstops and their mutualization! 
A final concern in relation to the SRM relates to the possibility that 
the financially stronger countries may be able to exercise ad hoc influence 
over the resolution decision-making process. This is due to two institu-
tional factors: firstly, the SRB is constructed, not as a purely European 
administration, but as a board where national resolution authorities are 
represented; and secondly, the ESM takes lending decision with una-
nimity, thus providing lender countries with an effective veto over the 
activation of the direct recapitalization instrument. These factors lessen 
the automaticity of the resolution process and open the road for the 
politicization of crisis management, thus reducing the predictability and 
credibility of the arrangements. Even worse, the proliferation of institu-
tional actors and retention of national vetoes creates serious concerns 
regarding the management of major crises: the non-automatic access 
to fiscal resources is aggravated by the absence of a clearly identifiable 
institutional centre for relevant decisions, leaving open the question, who 
may decide (and on what basis) on a potential system-wide bailout. 
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4. The monetary policy nexus 
As things currently stand, financial stability in the Banking Union 
would appear to depend more directly on monetary policy than on the 
arrangements for banking supervision and resolution. In particular, in 
the summer of 2012 the European Council’s endorsement of the Banking 
Union project was swiftly followed, first by an uncharacteristically strong-
ly-worded public commitment by ECB President Mario Draghi’s ‘to do 
whatever it takes to preserve the euro’, and then by the announcement of 
the so-called ‘outright monetary transactions’ (OMT) programme. The 
latter allows, under certain conditions, the ECB to intervene in the sec-
ondary sovereign bond markets in order to stabilize prices, if a euro area 
country comes under extraordinary and, in the ECB’s view, unjustified 
market pressure. These ECB announcements marked a turning point in 
the crisis, quelling turbulence and contributing to the steadying of sov-
ereign bond prices, as reflected in a rapid and substantial convergence 
of countries’ interest-rate spreads. Indeed, the OMT programme shaped 
market expectations so forcefully merely by being announced that its 
actual activation has proven unnecessary (cf Occhino, 2015). 
More generally, since the eruption of the crisis the ECB has resorted to 
a wide range of unconventional monetary tools, in repeated attempts to 
reflate the economy and support the credit intermediation function. Not 
only has it kept its key policy rate (main refinancing operation rate) at 
record low levels, but has also relaxed its collateral eligibility standards. It 
has carried on extraordinary long-term refinancing operations (LTROs), 
including two operations of very long-term duration (with 36-month 
maturities), which provided ample liquidity to the banking system. More 
recently, it embarked on new asset-purchase programmes (ABSPP and 
CBPP3, involving the purchase of simple and transparent asset-backed 
securities and of a broad portfolio of euro-denominated covered bonds, 
respectively), with a view to facilitate credit provision to the economy. 
Finally, in March 2015 it put in operation a fully-fledged quantitative 
easing programme (Public Sector Purchase Programme, or PSPP), 
involving the purchase from European institutions and national agencies 
of € 60 billion worth of sovereign bonds and securities per month over 
a intended period of at least 20 months. Less directly, the Eurosystem 
has enabled the financing of countries’ balance-of-payment deficits by 
permitting the automatic accumulation of very large-scale open debits 
by deficit national central banks as part of the operation of the TARGET 
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cross-country wholesale payment system. And on a number of occasions 
it has authorized the extension of substantial amounts of emergency 
liquidity (ELA) by national central banks to credit institutions in dis-
tressed countries. 
Through this wide range of tools, the Eurosystem has essentially 
turned into the euro area’s ultimate and all-inclusive backstop, supporting 
the general macroeconomic situation, the banking system at both the 
currency area and national levels, the smooth operation of sovereign 
bond markets, the refinancing of cross-border payment imbalances, and 
even the resumption of activity in asset markets! The unconventional 
character and wide scope of the interventions have attracted two types 
of criticism. On the one hand, the ECB’s broad and bold interpretation 
of its monetary functions has led to accusations that it overstretches its 
Treaty mandate and breaches the prohibition on the monetary financing 
of member states. The argument has been expressed vociferously, but 
eventually unsuccessfully, in litigation relating to the legality of the OMT 
programme (BVerfG, judgment of 14 January 2014, 2 BvR 2728/13; and 
CJEU, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, judgment of 16 June 2015). On the other 
hand, the ECB is accused of following an overburdened monetary policy. 
In this context, some fear that the monetary policy will fail to achieve 
its goals; but others are more concerned about the longer-terms impli-
cations. The claim is made, in particular, that an ultra-loose monetary 
policy can encourage risk-taking, thus planting the seeds of future finan-
cial instability (see Claeys and Darvas, 2015). 
The latter possibility points to an inherent ambiguity of central 
banking, and a resulting policy trade-off. Since Bagehot’s seminal con-
tribution (Bagehot, 1873), the standard prescription is that, in times of 
crisis, central banks must support the wider banking system by acting as 
lenders of last resort. The abject failure of ‘liquidationist’ policies during 
the Great Depression has reinforced this message. And the Keynesian 
paradigm has added the dimension of active demand management to 
macroeconomic thinking, with critical implications for the conduct of 
monetary policy. If, however, a highly accommodative monetary policy 
is needed in times of economic and/or banking crisis, this leads almost 
inexorably to the validation of legacy assets of questionable quality; by 
supporting their values, monetary policy subsidizes the asset-holders and 
thereby entrenches moral hazard. This is also true of the responses to 
the present crisis. For instance, the provision of support to the banking 
sector is typically accompanied by incantations of the classical recipe for 
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lending of last resort (which requires the central bank to lend freely, to 
solvent banks, on good security, and at a penalty rate of interest). But this 
is pure rhetoric! In practice, of the classical recipe, only the first element 
(that is, to lend freely) is applied in all seriousness; as for the rest, the 
theory is honoured in the breach! Thus, lending is actually extended to 
banks with questionable asset portfolios, on the basis of relaxed collateral 
requirements and valuations which depend themselves on the central 
bank’s interventions, and at exceptionally low rates, which do not truly 
reflect risks. Indeed, this being part of a reflationary strategy, it is in the 
nature of the interventions to flood the system with fiat money liquidity, 
rather than to price risk ‘correctly’. 
Recent experience is also inconsistent with the theory that the central 
bank provides a liquidity insurance service, allowing banks to under-
invest in liquidity and free-ride on the common pool, but only to the 
extent it can mitigate this problem by (imperfectly) monitoring banks’ 
asset choices (as in Bhattacharya and Gale, 1987). In reality, the relaxed, 
market-price-based supervisory attitude to asset quality of the pre-crisis 
period has given its place to a wholesale relaxation of liquidity condi-
tions, as part of a highly accommodative monetary policy, which atten-
uates the need for immediate recognition and correction of debt over-
hang problems. At the same time, however, a remarkable hardening of 
the supervisory stance is in evidence. To a certain extent, the tough new 
capital adequacy requirements and related prudential norms, which seek 
to contain risk in particular transactional environments (e.g., securitiza-
tion), put breaks on new lending and thus operate in opposite direction 
to the reflationary monetary programmes. 
Interestingly, this amounts to reversal of a common assumption. The-
oretically, it is the banking supervisory authority, not the central bank, 
which is characterized by incentives for forbearance. For this reason, in 
past debates relating to the institutional structure of financial supervi-
sion, one of the arguments against the combination of supervisory and 
monetary functions in the central bank was that this may lead to wrong 
monetary decisions. For example, in a macroeconomic situation which 
otherwise calls for a more restrictive monetary stance, if most banks are 
in bad shape, the central bank may be diverted from its price-stability 
objective and engage instead in loose bank refinancing. Since it knows 
that any ensuing increase in inflation will improve the position of the 
banks, by gradually effacing the value of their existing stock of bad assets, 
the central bank thus trades its monetary objective of price stability for 
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bank survival. The use of monetary policy tools in support of this type 
of implicit bank bailout saves the supervisory credibility of the central 
bank, which does not want important banks to fail under its watch. This 
line of argument assumes, of course, that the central bank’s incentives 
for forbearance are eliminated, when the supervisory functions are exer-
cised by a separate authority. The experience of the recent crisis, however, 
proves that this is not necessarily so. In the present case, due to the pre-
vailing deflationary conditions, a drastic relaxation of monetary policy 
was deemed to be beneficial in terms of both general macroeconomic 
management and banking stability. This, indeed, would appear to be the 
more probable scenario generally, because banks fail preponderantly in 
periods of economic distress (Goodhart, 2000: 21–23). 
This, of course, raises a different question: Why has banking regula-
tion become so much tighter precisely at the moment when economic 
conditions would call for a countercyclical relaxation of banking stand-
ards? If supervisors are more prone to forbearance than central bankers 
are, what is the source of their demands for rapid restoration of banks’ 
capital positions and for the observance of more demanding risk-con-
trol standards, at a time when the banking industry is still ailing? This 
paradoxical situation indicates that it is misleading to describe the rela-
tionship between monetary and supervisory policy in terms of a putative 
conflict of interests, which could be avoided through their institutional 
separation. Instead, we should recognize that the more general problem 
concerns the trade-off between two discrete policy objectives (short-term 
stabilization versus long-term market discipline), both of which are inte-
gral to banking (as distinct from monetary) policy and whose interaction 
defines the overall regulatory position. 
The actual policy mix changes over the financial cycle, because 
banking policy is subject to strong time-inconsistency for two reasons. 
Firstly, banking prudential regulation is aimed at preventing bank 
bankruptcies. It thus shares certain properties with general insolvency 
law, including its propensity to vacillate between an ex ante (pre-failure) 
and an ex post perspective (cf Marinč and Vlahu, 2012: ch 2). Ex ante, 
there is insistence on hard budgetary constraints and on the principle of 
strict enforcement of claims, because this optimizes debtors’ incentives 
and reinforces market discipline. Ex post, however, the situation appears 
in a different light. Due to the long time-delays, informational asym-
metries and high administrative and transactional costs of the liquidation 
process, the termination of an insolvent enterprise will often appear more 
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costly and inefficient, and thus value-destroying, when compared with 
the alternative of its continuation as a going concern, following some sort 
of debt restructuring. Thus, real insolvency actions tend to relax ex post 
the budgetary constraints and to treat debtor enterprises more leniently 
than what would be necessary in order to eliminate moral hazard. This 
shift in perspectives applies with a vengeance to bank failures – not to 
mention system-wide banking crises, when the incentives for forbear-
ance are almost insurmountable! This is due to the overriding consider-
ation that bank closures can cause exceptionally strong negative external 
effects. Of course, the resulting softening of the theoretically applicable 
norms creates moral hazard; but, all in all, the immediate external costs 
of strict enforcement may be so high (especially in the context of a sys-
temic crisis) (Laeven, 2011: 23–28), that even a benevolent public deci-
sion-maker may consider it preferable to relax the supervisory standards, 
and even to use public moneys for a costly bailout. 
Secondly, regulatory policy is governed by the ‘regulatory sine curve’ 
described by John Coffee, whereby, as a result of interest-group politics, 
the intensity of controls increases after a financial crisis, and then wanes, as 
market conditions return to normalcy (Coffee, 2012). This is due to the fact 
that in the wake of a crisis anti-banking-industry political entrepreneurs 
can find it easy to mobilize public support in favour of regulatory reform, 
but the effect is short-lived; once the situation improves, countervailing 
actions by the banking industry can be expected to produce a gradual 
relaxation of the norms, both by influencing their administrative imple-
mentation and by procuring legislative revisions favourable to the industry.
What is interesting about the current European situation is that reg-
ulatory policy is at the early phase of its cycle (or the upper point of the 
sine curve). Put another way, regulation now views the banking industry 
from a predominantly ex ante perspective; but this is only because it 
has externalized the management of inherited bank problems, first to 
the unprecedented public bailout programmes and more recently to the 
ECB’s monetary policy, whose reflationary monetary goals coalesce with 
the objective of gradual banking repair. 
At the end of the day, then, the key problem does not concern the 
static allocation of responsibilities to this or that institution, but the 
dynamic variation of the objectives of banking policy over time, also 
taking into account the close linkage of monetary and financial condi-
tions. The necessary trade-offs are now largely internalized within the 
ECB. Ex ante (that is, under normal market conditions) the ECB in its 
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various roles (monetary authority, banking supervisor and leading mac-
ro-prudential decision-maker) will need to prevent asset bubbles from 
building up, control interconnectedness in the financial sector (cf Alves 
et al., 2013) and, possibly, set limits on the excessive financialization of 
the economy (cf ESRB, 2014). But its actions in this direction are bound 
to entail positive regulatory costs for the regulated industry, which will 
accordingly have strong incentives to seek to neutralize the regula-
tory position. Moreover, from a policy perspective, the ECB will need 
to address the trade-off between long-term stability and resilience, on 
the one hand, and shorter-term efficiency and competitiveness, on the 
other. The dilemmas are significant, but well-known and inherent in any 
banking prudential regime – and, in more general form, in any system of 
precautionary risk-regulation.
In contrast, ex post decision-making in the Banking Union will be 
subject to novel and distinctive constraints, as a result of legal obligations 
introduced by the BRRD and the procedural interference of the SRM. 
Through its insistence on resolvability and prior resolution planning, the 
new resolution regime makes a very important step towards the reduc-
tion of the external costs of strict enforcement of insolvency norms; up 
to a point, this helps to contain moral hazard. Moreover, the BRRD now 
sets high legal barriers to certain forms of public intervention in favour 
of weak banks. But is this the end of supervisory forbearance? Will TBTF 
and moral hazard soon become dim memories from a bygone era? This 
is highly unlikely! The open-ended nature and temporal variation of the 
policy trade-off described above is unlikely to disappear in the Banking 
Union simply because of the new resolution principles in the BRRD. We 
should recall, in particular, that TBTF is not the sole cause of forbearance. 
The BRRD system is largely premised on the false assumption that banks 
fail individually, one at a time. In real life, the collapse of TBTF banks 
tends to occur in a context of wider distress. In this sense, resolvability 
cannot of itself ensure future systemic stability; it can indeed render more 
practicable the rapid recognition and write-off of bad debts, thus facili-
tating immediate deleveraging, but this can hardly be achieved without 
second-order harmful effects. It is equally unrealistic to believe that, in 
a future systemic crisis, bail-in will suffice to resolve failing banks;7 and, 
7 Time inconsistency may also affect the actual application of the BRRD’s bail-in in-
strument. Ex post, full bail-in may not appear appropriate in every case. This is why 
in the relevant provisions the apparent automaticity of bail-in is watered down by 
allowing discretionary exemptions for particular classes of liabilities.
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as discussed above, the total pre-funded resources of DGSs and the SRF 
are insufficient for system-wide recapitalization. More generally, during 
a major economic downturn, private finance for bank resolution will be 
no more forthcoming that it was during the recent crisis. This is precisely 
why the (broken) promise of a convincing fiscal backstop was so essential 
an aspect of the original Banking Union proposals. 
To strictly enforce the regulatory covenants, or to tolerate slippages 
and even provide support to failing banks, thereby entrenching moral 
hazard, is a perennial dilemma of banking policy, which we cannot simply 
wish away. But here, it is not only the formal supervisory and resolution 
process that counts. The possibility of broad state guarantees and/or of 
highly accommodative monetary interventions (for instance, in the form 
of system-wide refinancing operations, price-supporting purchases of 
assets or cheap lending of last resort) must also be considered, since these 
can offer temporary relief, and eventually salvation, to weak bank before 
the resolution threshold has been formally crossed! This is an alternative 
path to forbearance, which has been very much in evidence recently, and 
which remains open in the Banking Union. Especially in times of crisis, 
incentives to salvage all and sundry will most probably continue to dom-
inate policy decisions. Conceivably, in such circumstances, the central 
bank’s interventions may suffice to stem turbulence by supporting asset 
values. For all the immediate benefits, such a policy distorts the market 
participant’s ex ante incentives for the next period and entrenches moral 
hazard, in a manner strictly comparable to a direct bailout. The ‘effi-
ciency’ of potential central bank interventions thus acquires a different, 
less positive meaning, when one takes into account the elements of 
implicit subsidization and the indirect validation of past financial claims, 
which would otherwise turn sour. From this perspective, what counts is 
not banking regulation alone, but the overall monetary, fiscal and regu-
latory mix, which defines the contours of the safety net. The move to the 
Banking Union does not change this reality; it simply shifts it to a higher 
level and largely internalizes the relevant policy choices within the ECB. 
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Is the Banking Union as Stable and 
Resilient as it Looks? 
Viral V. Acharya and Sascha Steffen 
1. Motivation
On 29 June 2012, the European Council and euro group member states 
agreed to establish a “Banking Union” (BU) as a centralized system of 
banking supervision and resolution. Europe was mired in financial 
crises since mid-2008. The crisis that started in the mortgage markets 
in the U.S. reached a global scale and triggered a series of national crisis 
responses in Europe. These responses, however, were driven by national 
interests to protect their banking system and characterized by means of 
forbearance and massive government bailouts of failing institutions. EU 
specific regulatory and institutional reforms that followed during the 
2009 to 2012 period, however, kept a largely decentralized structure of 
national supervision.1
While some countries entered the financial crisis with already high 
debt-to-GDP ratios, other countries increased their debt levels substan-
tially given the costs of bank bailouts and economic recovery programs. 
Bank and sovereign health is highly entangled as sovereigns provide 
a (implicit) fiscal backstop for banks. Banks, in turn, are the largest 
domestic sovereign bond investors. If the economy is weak, the ability 
of debt-ridden sovereigns to provide necessary fiscal backstops might be 
questioned leading to a destructive feedback loop between bank stability 
1 Recommendations to keep the decentralized structure were documented in the “De 
Larosière Report”, a high-level report on financial supervision in the EU. Based on 
this report, the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) was established 
in 2011, which created new institutions at the European level such as the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) or the European Banking Authority (EBA) as well as 
several others. These institutions, however, had only limited supervisory power.
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and sovereign risk.2 Moreover, European banks’ cross-country holdings of 
sovereign debt due to, for example, moral hazard and regulatory arbitrage 
incentives, facilitate contagion of sovereign risk across the euro area.3
The EU responded with various support programs targeted at 
member states with strained budgets such as the EFSF and the successor, 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain and Cyprus all received financial support through these programs. 
Importantly, the countries received funds from these programs, which 
further increased their debt-to-GDP-ratios, and might then use funds to 
recapitalize their banking sector. The EFSF and ESM were not allowed to 
refinance banks directly. That is, support programs did not address the 
feedback loop between banks and sovereigns at this point.
The Banking Union is supposed to break the bank-sovereign link-
ages, make shareholders and bondholders of banks responsible for losses 
(“bail-in”) and eventually lead to sustainable growth. To achieve these 
goals, the Banking Union has three pillars: (1) a single supervisory mech-
anism (SSM) that includes a single rule book for harmonized banking 
supervision, (2) a single resolution mechanism (SRM) and (3) a deposit 
guarantee scheme (DGS). Most core European countries oppose a mutu-
alized deposit insurance system, and we thus focus on the SSM and SRM 
in our discussion. 
However, the Banking Union and the centralized approach to banking 
supervision and resolution is supposed to prevent future banking crisis 
and shield taxpayers from losses from supporting struggling banks. 
Core European countries such as Germany made clear that mutualizing 
losses due to legacy assets had to be avoided. Before the official start 
of the banking union with the start of the SSM, the ECB conducted a 
comprehensive assessment to evaluate the strength and resilience of the 
banking sector and to demand measures to recapitalize weak banks. 
Funds to recapitalize the banking systems after the comprehensive had 
to come from the national governments subject to state-aid rules (ECB, 
2 Major transmission channels include the exposure of banks to home as well as 
cross-border sovereign debt, possible write-downs of sovereign debt if sovereign rat-
ings decline, loss in value of collateral, short-term wholesale investor pre-emptive 
runs and bank downgrades due to weakening sovereigns (e.g. Acharya, Drechsler 
and Schnable, 2014; Acharya and Steffen, 2015).
3 Banks have reduced cross-country holdings of sovereign bonds since 2011 but the 
linkages between banks and domestic sovereigns have increased in Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain as banks purchased increasingly these bonds (e.g. with the 
ECB’s Long-Term-Refinancing-Operations (LTRO) in 2011 and 2012) as document-
ed in Acharya and Steffen (2015).
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2014). The comprehensive assessment comprised two key elements, an 
Asset Quality Review and Comprehensive Assessment (AQR), in which 
bank portfolios were evaluated using a single supervisory manual and a 
stress test to test the resilience of banks against various shock scenarios 
(EBA, 2014). Ideally, the comprehensive assessment would stop forbear-
ance, identify problem loans and increase equity such that the ECB can 
take over a sound banking system as single supervisor. A weak banking 
system might pose a threat to the resilience of the Banking Union right 
from the start and pose also substantial reputational risks for the ECB as 
central bank as well as regulator.4
In November 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) published the 
official results based on the AQR and stress test. In this article, we assess 
the stability of the euro area banking system. We conduct our own stress 
test analysis and compare our results with the outcome of the 2014 com-
prehensive assessment.5 Using data for all publicly listed banks that par-
ticipated in the comprehensive assessment as of 31 December 2013, we 
calculate a capital shortfall of €450 billion for the publicly listed banks 
that participated in the comprehensive assessment using a stress test 
approach similar to the EBA/ECB stress tests. We then compare our esti-
mates to the official capital shortfall estimates from the EBA/ECB. Sur-
prisingly, the two estimates are negatively correlated. This article argues 
that this striking divergence can be explained by the continued reliance 
on static risk-weights in the regulatory assessment. In fact, using the pro-
jected losses in the adverse scenario employed by the ECB and applying a 
different (non risk-weights based, i.e., simple) leverage ratio gives results 
much closer to ours. 
Our analysis has several implications regarding the resilience of the 
Banking Union. The (still) weak banking system might pose a challenge 
4 There are other uncertainties surrounding the BU. In particular, given the focus on 
euro-area institutions, what are the implications with regard to the consistency of 
EU bank regulation? What are the risks associated with effective EU bank govern-
ance? Moreover, banking supervision is not fully de-nationalized in BU. The ECB 
needs to coordinate supervision in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) with 
National Competent Authorities (NCA). National incentives of NCA were an im-
portant factor contributing to the euro crisis. Does this supervisory model increase 
efficiencies in banking supervision or make the SSM less resilient? These important 
questions are outside the scope of this article.
5 In an earlier assessment (Acharya and Steffen, 2014), we provided estimates that the 
capital shortfall of European banks might be as high as €750 billion using a bank’s 
stock market valuation to measure leverage and by estimating losses to market value 
of equity in a global shock as severe as the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
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to sustainable growth in Europe as well as the reputation of the ECB as 
a central bank and single supervisor. The non-standard policy measures 
of the ECB and the associated asset price inflation incentivizes banks to 
shift portfolios into these securities, which crowds out real sector lending 
and makes these securities systemically important. There are also institu-
tional aspects that might prove challenging. For example, supervision is 
not fully centralized and the ECB depends on information provided by 
national regulators. Moreover, it is unclear whether the resolution frame-
work envisioned in the SRM will effectively remove the bank-sovereign 
linkages. Overall, despite significant reform progress, several risks for the 
stability of the Banking Union remain.
Our article proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our stress test 
approach and compares the results to the official EBA/ECB outcomes. 
Section 3 documents implications of our analysis with respect to the sta-
bility of the banking union.
2. Analysis
2.1. Data and Sample
To investigate the strength of European banks we select all 41 publicly 
listed banks that participated in the 2014 comprehensive assessment for 
which market as well as financial statement data is available.6 We collect 
stock prices from Bloomberg and financial statement information from 
SNL Financial as of 31. December 2013, which is the balance sheet date 
used in the EBA/ECB stress tests.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics. Countries are sorted by market 
capitalization of banks (MarketCap). The total market capitalization of 
publicly listed banks is €539 billion. The average market equity divided by 
total assets (Market Equity/Assets) is 4.27% and the average book equity 
divided by total assets (Equity/Assets) is 5.27%. Market-to-Book ratios 
are, on average, 0.75 ranging from 0.57 (Cyprus) to 1.58 (Malta). There is 
substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity in terms of risk-weighted assets 
(RWA/Assets) among European banks, ranging from 23% of total assets 
(Germany) to 69% (Cyprus). Interestingly, banks in France and Germany 
are among those with the lowest RWA/Asset ratios and Market-to-Book 
(MTB) ratios. 
6 A list of these banks is provided in Appendix I.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Country  Market Equity/Assets 
Equity/
Assets
 Market-to-
Book  RWA/Assets  MarketCap 
Spain 7.05% 7.22% 1 0.48 146,082
France 3.23% 4.24% 0.68 0.26 127,696
Italy 4.29% 6.49% 0.61 0.48 83,000
Germany 2.19% 3.83% 0.61 0.23 50,570
Greece 8.26% 8.27% 0.95 0.58 26,945
Belgium 6.89% 4.00% 1.18 0.31 17,305
Austria 5.31% 7.24% 0.72 0.49 11,453
Ireland 6.11% 6.05% 0.98 0.43 9,816
Portugal 4.03% 4.48% 0.91 0.51 4,978
Malta 11.97% 7.70% 1.58 0.49 1,557
Slovakia 9.20% 11.94% 0.7 0.59 964
Cyprus 3.75% 6.25% 0.57 0.69 229
Total 4.27% 5.27% 0.75 0.35 539,083
2.2. Stress Test Analysis & Comparison with EBA/ECB Official Results
2.2.1. Shortfall measures
We compare two measures of capital shortfall, the “Regulatory Shortfall 
Measure” as used by the ECB and “SRISK” as calculated by NYU Stern 
School of Business Volatility Lab. Both concepts are conceptually sim-
ilar as they estimate losses in a stress scenario and determine the capital 
shortfall between a prudential capital requirement and the remaining 
equity after losses.
Regulatory shortfall measure: The stress scenario is the adverse sce-
nario as described in ESRB (2014) at the end of 2016. The regulatory 
benchmark is the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio that is defined as 
CET1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets (RWA). The ECB applies 
a hurdle rate of 5.5% in the adverse scenario. Note that the CET1/RWA 
ratio is the only benchmark (or leverage) ratio that has been applied in 
the comprehensive assessment of the ECB.
SRISK: The stress scenario is a systemic financial crisis with a global 
stock market decline of 40%. SRISK is our measure for a bank’s capital 
shortfall in this scenario, assuming a 5.5% prudential capital ratio with 
losses estimated using the VLAB methodology to estimate the downside 
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risk of bank stock returns.7 This scenario and the resulting SRISK measure 
use market data and market equity (instead of book equity) in determining 
leverage.
2.2.2. Comparison of Shortfall measures
Table 2 reports both shortfall measures aggregated across each country. 
SRISK suggests that the capital shortfall of the 41 publicly listed banks is 
about €450 billion while the official capital shortfall as calculated by the 
EBA/ECB is about €20 billion. 
The following graphs always show SRISK (in million euros) on the 
vertical axis. Any changes are thus due to changes in the metric displayed 
on the horizontal axis. We use aggregate data at the country level, adding 
up the estimated shortfalls across all banks within each country. Our 
results are qualitatively similar if these graphs are displayed at individual 
bank level.
7 This capital shortfall measure has been implemented based on Acharya, Engle and 
Richardson (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2013) and. The data are provided by 
New York University’s VLAB (http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/welcome/risk/). The theo-
retical motivation for the measure can be found in Acharya et al. (2010).
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Table 2: Shortfall estimates
Country  SRISK ECB Shortfall Adverse Scenario
Spain 37,914 0
France 189,042 0
Italy 76,287 7,640
Germany 102,406 0
Greece 4,360 8,721
Belgium 26,616 339
Austria 6,677 865
Ireland 3,053 855
Portugal 3,821 1,137
Malta 0 0
Slovakia 0 0
Cyprus 167 277
Total 450,343 19,834
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SRISK vs. Regulatory shortfall measure
Fig.1a plots SRISK against regulatory capital shortfalls from the 2014 
comprehensive assessment. There is no correlation (in fact, the correla-
tion is slightly negative) between the two capital shortfall estimates. Large 
banks in countries such as Germany, France or Spain had zero shortfalls 
in the regulatory assessment but show high SRISK. 
As can be seen in Fig.1a, there is a lower bound of zero associated 
with regulatory capital shortfalls. We effectively remove this lower bound 
by comparing SRISK with the un-truncated shortfall calculated using the 
CET1/RWA benchmark and a hurdle rate of 5.5% that has been applied 
in the adverse scenario. We use CET1 capital and RWA as of December 
31, 2016. 
Fig.1b plots the results. Banks in France and Germany now have even 
large negative shortfalls that can be interpreted as “surplus capital”. The 
correlation between SRISK and regulatory capital shortfalls now is large 
and negative. That is, those banks that have the highest SRISK also have 
the highest surplus capital under the regulatory capital framework.
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Fig.1a:  SRISK vs. Regulatory shortfall measure
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SRISK vs. Total Losses
We find that it is not necessarily the design of the adverse scenario and 
the associated losses that explain the negative correlation between our 
results and those of the ECB.8 To see this, we calculate total losses in the 
adverse scenario as the sum of losses in the banking and trading book 
and plot SRISK against these losses (again on the country level) in Fig.2. 
SRISK is positively correlated with total losses incurred by banks in 
the adverse scenario. This result is reassuring given that regulatory losses 
are estimated with bottom-up asset-level loss calculations applied to book 
value of equity whereas VLAB losses that feature in SRISK calculation are 
estimated using a measure of downside risk of market value of equity in 
a market-wide equity downturn.
This suggests that it is not the actual losses but rather different ways of 
specifying prudential capital requirements that must be driving the nega-
tive correlation between SRISK and the results of the ECB. An important 
difference between the leverage ratio used in SRISK and the regulatory 
8 In fact, the scenarios might even be more severe and comprise more risk factors com-
pared to European Banking Authority (EBA) stress test of 2011. And even in 2011, 
reported losses were positively correlated with SRISK (Acharya, Engle and Pierret, 
2014).
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Fig.1b:  SRISK vs. CET1/RWA
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leverage ratio is the use of risk weights in the latter. These are static for 
banks using the standardized approach. But most banks, especially the 
large banks, use the internal ratings based approach (IRB) and calculate 
risk weights themselves. For example, Table 1 suggests that the average 
risk-weighted balance sheet of large German and French banks is only 
about 25% of its original size (measured by total assets).
SRISK vs. Book Equity/Assets LVG ratio
To make this point more explicit, we now use a different prudential cap-
ital requirement in the adverse scenario of ECB stress test after losses 
have been accounted for and that does not rely on risk-weighted assets. 
We calculate the realized Book Equity / Assets ratio in the adverse sce-
nario (using the same losses that have been used by the ECB) and esti-
mate shortfalls using a 5.5% benchmark. This capital requirement is 
akin to the 5.5% simple leverage ratio required by the Dodd Frank Act 
in the United States. We plot SRISK against this new shortfall measure 
in Fig.3.
The result is striking. We find a high and positive correlation between 
SRISK and shortfalls based on this leverage ratio. In other words, it is the 
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Fig.2: SRISK vs. Total Losses
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use of risk weights in the regulatory benchmark that explains the short-
fall differential between our and the ECB’s assessment. 
3. Implications for Banking Union
A crucial weakness of the previous stress tests in Europe has not been 
addressed in the comprehensive assessment, which might impair the 
resilience of the Banking Union. In particular, the use of a single regula-
tory benchmark for capital adequacy that is based on static risk weights 
to assess the financial stability of the European banking system. Similar 
to 2011, the question whether a bank is adequately capitalized has two 
different answers using the same loss scenario but two different leverage 
ratios, a risk-weights based one and the non risk-based one. The latter 
corresponds to market-based estimates closely, highlighting that market 
assessments of risk are high precisely for those asset classes for which risk 
weights are zero (such as sovereign bonds in Eurozone) or low (such as 
residential mortgages and residential mortgage-backed securities). 
Future stress tests should incorporate a robust approach that does not 
rely exclusively on risk-weighted assets but adopts multiple approaches 
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Fig.3: SRISK vs. Book Equity/Asset
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(such as the simple leverage ratio and the one proposed in this column). 
A major problem with the Basel risk-weight approach is that risk weights 
are static and do not reflect changes in risk over time. Moreover, large 
banks use an internal modeling approach (IRB-approach), which pro-
vides them substantial leeway for gaming risk weights.9 Banks that do 
well on risk-weighted capital adequacy but poorly on other approaches 
are likely “arbitraging” the static nature of risk weights to lever up using 
zero or low risk-weight assets. On average, large banks have 25% of RWA/
Asset ratios and thus have done very well in all stress tests since 2010, as 
they have never been subject to a simple leverage ratio. Overall, European 
regulators have asked for very little capital as of now. 
The reform progress that has been made in the euro area did not 
include a decisive recapitalization of the banking sector in contrast to 
what we have observed in the U.S. This might be an important factor 
in explaining the differential development as to credit and economic 
growth. While the U.S. has experienced both an increase in real sector 
lending and GDP growth, these indicators are both stagnating (if not 
decreasing) in the euro area. Moreover, comparing the development of 
SRISK as measure of banking sector under-capitalization since summer 
2007 and between the U.S. and Europe, we observe a decrease in SRISK to 
pre-crisis levels, while SRISK and, thus, the vulnerability of the banking 
sector, are still high in Europe.
Most reform effort to increase the stability of the euro area came from 
the ECB with an attempt to increase asset prices (e.g. of government 
bonds) through various non-standard monetary policy measures such as 
LTROs, changes in the collateral framework, or quantitative easing. Nat-
urally, banks have incentives to purchase those assets that are favored by 
the ECB and that they can pledge as collateral in case of a future funding 
crisis. This, however, has two effects. First, while inflated assets prices 
increase the valuation of banks and make them look better, these asset 
classes become systemic and could adversely affect the euro area banking 
sector if there is a significant drop in asset prices. Second, banks, that 
have limited balance sheet capacity to begin with, purchase those assets 
for which they have to hold little economic capital and that are purchased 
by the ECB, which crowds out lending to the real sector. Data in the Euro-
zone (see e.g. Acharya and Steffen, 2015) suggest that lending to non-fi-
nancial firms and households decreased dramatically as banks started 
9 Behn at al. (2014) also highlight the negative consequences of the complexity associ-
ated with model-based regulation.
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buying domestic sovereign debt, particularly in the peripheral countries. 
Worse, banks might provide further funding to firms whose solvency can 
be questioned to preserve their own scarce capital. The weakness of the 
financial sector thus likely impedes sustainable growth in the euro area. 
Overall, the comprehensive assessment that preceded the start of the 
banking union might not have been successful in strengthening Euro-
pean banks’ balance sheets. National regulators from countries with 
strained budgets as well as the ECB operating without a common fiscal 
backstop might have had incentives to avoid uncovering large capital 
shortfalls. Large recapitalization requirements would have had further 
strengthened the feedback loop between banks and sovereigns instead 
of weakening this link. The Banking Union is supposed to break this link 
with a common supervision (SSM) as well as common resolution system 
(SRM). However, there are further risks surrounding the Banking Union 
that might attenuate the common supervisory and resolution objective. 
First, bank supervision is not full de-nationalized and the ECB 
depends on information generated by national regulators. Ultimately, it 
has to be seen whether this supervisory model increases the efficiency of 
banking supervision or make the SSM less resilient. 
Second, a “single rule book” does not (yet) apply to all banks. There 
are still differences e.g. as to the calculation of CET 1 capital (which is an 
important factor in assessing regulatory capital requirements) as well as 
the treatment of deferred tax assets (DTA). While these differences are 
transitory in nature, they make a common supervisory approach more 
difficult, at least as of today. 
Third, while the SRM (that becomes fully operational as of January 
1st, 2016) focuses on restructuring banks without using taxpayer funds 
by including a bail-in of investors, a restructuring fund set-up by bank 
levy’s as well as the possibility to use funds from the ESM, it is still unclear 
whether this will eventually break the bank-sovereign linkages. Several 
questions remain unanswered: How much bail-in capital is actually avail-
able? Is the size of the restructuring fund sufficient if there is a severe 
financial crisis? Moreover, the ESM can only recapitalize banks directly 
if an indirect recapitalization (in which the national sovereign borrows 
from the ESM and uses the funds to recapitalize its banking sector) is 
not possible. Overall, the Banking Union might not provide the common 
fiscal backstop that is necessary to break the sovereign-bank linkages.
Finally, our results also have implications for burden sharing in the 
Banking Union and the question how burden sharing should be designed. 
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If differences in bank capitalization determine potential shortfalls, then a 
bank levy should reflect that.
To conclude, a lot of progress has been made over the last years that 
ultimately strengthens the financial system and this progress should not 
be diminished. However, several risks remain as documented in this 
short article. How the euro area deals with these risks going forward will 
eventually determine the resilience of the Banking Union.
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Appendix I
List of public banks
Bank Country
Erste Group Bank Austria
Österreichische Volksbanken Austria
Dexia Belgium
KBC Group Belgium
Hellenic Bank Cyprus
BNP Paribas France
Crédit Agricole SA France
Société Générale France
Aareal Bank Germany
Commerzbank Germany
Deutsche Bank Germany
Alpha Bank Greece
Eurobank Ergasias Greece
National Bank of Greece Greece
Piraeus Bank Greece
Allied Irish Banks Ireland
Bank of Ireland Ireland
Permanent TSB Group Hldgs Plc Ireland
Banca Carige Italy
Banca Monte dei Paschi Italy
Banca Popolare di Milano Italy
Banca Popolare di Sondrio Italy
Banca popolare dell'Emilia Italy
Banco Popolare Italy
Credito Emiliano Italy
Intesa Sanpaolo Italy
Mediobanca Italy
UBI Banca Italy
Is the Banking Union as Stable and Resilient as it Looks?  |  Viral V. Acharya and Sascha Steffen 
104
UniCredit Italy
Bank of Valletta Malta
HSBC Bank Malta Malta
Banco BPI Portugal
Millennium BCP Portugal
VUB banka Slovakia
BBVA Spain
BFA Sociedad Tenedora Acciones Spain
Banco Popular Español Spain
Banco Santander Spain
Banco de Sabadell Spain
Bankinter Spain
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PART II
Is a Capital Market Union 
Needed?
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A Capital Market Union: A Few 
Thoughts
Giovanni Dell’Ariccia
The recent financial crisis and the subsequent lackluster recovery have 
rekindled the debate on the role of intermediated finance versus capital 
markets in the European Union. Some have argued that the crisis was 
a manifestation of vulnerabilities and pitfalls of a mostly bank-centered 
system. In particular, the inadequacy of alternative channels to funnel 
funds from savers to small and medium enterprises has come under scru-
tiny (and, related, the excessive role of debt versus equity). These con-
cerns represent the economic rationale for the “Capital Market Union” 
(CMU) sketched in a recent Green Paper by the European Commission.
The main objectives that the proposed CMU seeks to address are: 
“improving access to financing for all businesses across Europe and 
investment projects, in particular start-ups, SMEs and long-term projects; 
increasing and diversifying the sources of funding from investors in the 
EU and all over the world; and making the markets work more effectively 
so that the connections between investors and those who need funding are 
more efficient and effective, both within Member States and cross-border.”
These are worthy objectives which, if reached, would undoubtedly 
make the European financial system more efficient and resilient. Yet, 
whether the CMU can be effective in achieving them depends on what 
prevents the efficient working of the system in the status quo. I explore 
this point in greater detail in the following notes.
Implicit Theoretical Background
The Green Paper presents two sets of arguments in favor of the develop-
ment of deeper and more integrated capital markets in Europe. The first 
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is cyclical. Th e current lack of growth is seen, at least to some extent, as 
the result of banks’ distress and the associated inability/unwillingness to 
lend. In that context, the CMU is portrayed as a vehicle to provide an 
alternative source of external fi nance for SMEs. Th e second set of argu-
ments is structural. Deeper and more effi  cient capital markets would 
reduce the system’s vulnerability to future crises. Should banks fall again 
in distress, stronger capital markets could prevent or at least weaken 
the vicious bank/real-sector/sovereign spirals that played a critical role 
during the recent crisis. Th e CMU is also seen as a complement to the 
Banking Union as it would favor the creation of uniform standards for 
securitization, collateral, etc. Finally, more effi  cient capital markets are 
seen as a precondition to reduce the centrality of debt instruments as a 
source of external funding.
Th ere is an implicit theoretical background associated with these 
arguments:
First, there need to be economically meaningful fi nancial frictions 
that constrain fi rms’ and banks’ ability to borrow. Th ese are easily justi-
fi ed under a variety of corporate fi nance models (see Freixas and Rochet, 
2008 for extensive references). For instance, under limited liability, moral 
hazard concerns associated with excessive leverage will limit equilibrium 
lending through collateral constraints. A similar result can be obtained 
through hidden borrower quality and adverse selection. 
Second, the model has to involve some degree of fi nancial market 
fragmentation. In particular, one has to assume that only banks (in par-
ticular large ones) and large fi rms are able to borrow from foreign lenders 
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(banks or direct capital markets). Small and medium enterprises and 
households can, instead, borrow only from local banks. For instance, one 
could assume that the type of assets available to small fi rms and house-
holds are not accepted as collateral by international lenders (Caballero 
and Krishnamurthy (2001) present a model with some of these features.) 
One also needs the additional assumption that, at least in the short-run, 
barriers to entry (legal or economic) prevent foreign banks from entering 
the local banking market. 
In this kind of model, in tranquil times, the segmentation of interna-
tional fi nancial markets has little impact on economic activity. As long as 
banks have suffi  cient international collateral and borrowers have suffi  cient 
domestic collateral, the system operates effi  ciently. Banks will intermediate 
any saving-investment imbalance by borrowing/lending across borders 
through the interbank market and/or the collection of foreign deposits. It 
follows that, in tranquil times, the benefi ts from CMU would be limited. 
Obviously, to the extent that deeper capital markets relax borrowing 
constraints, the CMU might bring benefi ts such as greater access to credit 
and venture capital. However, these are benefi ts that in principle could be 
obtained even in autarky and it is unclear (at least for larger EU countries) 
that they are closely intertwined with the development of CMU. Th at said, 
to the extent that the CMU would bring greater competition among banks 
and other investors, it could be benefi cial even in tranquil times. 
However, it is in times of crisis that, in a model as described above, the 
CMU could bring major benefi ts. Given the assumed barriers and seg-
mentation, distress in local banking systems translates easily into a credit 
crunch. Local banks cease to be able to intermediate S-I imbalances, as 
Distress model (crunch)
Country A Country B
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they are unable to borrow suffi  cient funds from abroad. In addition, their 
local intermediation function might also be compromised. Hence, the 
real sector’s demand for funds remains unmet. Th is in turn leads to a 
compression in economic activity, which exacerbates bank distress. And 
so on. Th e CMU would help break these vicious spirals.
Essentially, the CMU would help intermediate S-I imbalances across 
countries, which local banks cannot absorb because in distress. Foreign 
banks and individual investors would be able to funnel funds directly to 
fi rms, even when a country’s banks were in distress. Th is would mitigate 
the real eff ect of the banking crisis by preventing the credit crunch and 
the associated feedback on the banks themselves.
Under these conditions, the benefi ts from the CMU can be signif-
icant. Further, if one believed that the CMU is a precondition for the 
development of local capital markets (for instance, because of economies 
of scale and scope), benefi ts would include allowing domestic investors 
to by-pass local banks and provide funding directly to entrepreneurs. 
Obviously, this analysis relies on the assumption that the bottleneck in 
fi nancial intermediation resides with the banks and not the borrowers. 
Should the credit crunch be the results of impaired fi rm balance sheets, 
repairing cross-border arbitrage conditions through the CMU would do 
little to alleviate the crisis.
 
Relationship with the Banking Union
Th e development of a CMU has elements of both a substitute and a com-
plement to the nascent European banking union. 
Distress model with CMU
Country A Country B
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It will reduce the need for a banking union to the extent that by 
allowing for direct cross-border funding of non-financial firms and 
improving cross-border capital allocation, it will weaken the sover-
eign-bank spirals that have characterized this crisis. In particular, by 
making it easier to allow for the resolution (and liquidation) of distressed 
banks, it could prove a partial substitute for the (still missing) common 
fiscal backstop that several observers consider an essential element of the 
banking union (see, for instance, Goyal et al. 2013). 
Similarly, the CMU might improve the monetary policy transmis-
sion mechanism through the development of market determined refer-
ence rates not directly subject to bank balance sheet. Again, this would 
play through the ability of foreign investors to fund non-financial firms 
directly, severing the weakening the country-level link between the 
funding conditions for banks and borrowers. 
At the same time, however, the CMU might strengthen the func-
tioning of the banking union. The SSM and uniform resolution rules 
will help promote cross-border investment in banking systems under the 
CMU. And greater cross-border ownership would allow for easier recap 
of weak banks and limit effects of local crises. Similarly, the CMU by 
easing bank funding pressures, through access to foreign equity, secu-
ritization etc., would contribute to the smooth functioning of interbank 
markets.
Finally, since even in autarky there seems to be a rationale to bypass 
sick banks, the development of a CMU seems advisable independently of 
the banking union. 
Potential unintended consequences
As for any regulatory reform, the CMU carries risks associated with its 
potential side effects. Here are a few, but the list can be most likely be 
extended. 
First, as direct funding becomes cheaper and more widely available, 
more transparent firms (those with fewer informational barriers and 
agency problems) will find it profitable to migrate outside of the banking 
system. Banks may, then, retrench into the least transparent segments 
of the market in a sort of “flight to captivity” (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 
2004). This will allow for the benefit from the CMU to extend to these less 
transparent firms as banks will reallocate their portfolios in their direction. 
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However, the move comes with risks both at the cyclical and struc-
tural level. First, on impact, the competition with newly developed cap-
ital markets will compress bank profitability. This may complicate the 
exit from the crisis in countries with capital-depleted banking systems 
(see Hoshi and Kashyap, 1999, for the experience of Japan with capital 
market development). At the structural level, to the extent that there is 
cross-subsidization of credit across market segments, opaque borrowers 
might be worse off once margins on lending to transparent borrowers are 
compressed (the empirical evidence on this effect is mixed. See Gormley, 
2014). More critically, if borrower opaqueness is correlated with risk, 
banks retrenching on opaque will be left with riskier loan portfolios.
Finally, the Green Paper rightly highlights that an efficient “plumbing” 
(the proper reform and implementation of several micro-level elements of 
the reform) is critical to ensure that transactions cost do not overwhelm 
the gains from more developed and integrated capital markets. Among 
these elements: More harmonized tax and resolution regimes: Uniform 
securitization standards; Credit bureaus (access, standards); “European 
passport” for financial assets to ensure equal treatment; Support for VC 
(possibly though a more favorable tax treatment). But the list goes on. 
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Does Europe Need a Capital Market 
Union? And How Would We Get There?
Thorsten Beck 
After the less than complete construction of the Banking Union, Europe’s 
policy makers have found a new policy target in the financial system – 
the construction of a Capital Market Union. This initiative is based on the 
observation that Europe’s financial systems are mostly bank-based and 
were missing the spare tire of market finance during the recent banking 
crisis. This column discusses the rationale for such an initiative, based 
on the theoretical and empirical literature on optimal financial struc-
tures and the factors driving financial structures, and explores the policy 
agenda awaiting Europe’s policy makers.
Optimal financial structure - what does the literature tell us?
The financial system consists of a large array of intermediaries and mar-
kets. While there has been an increasing consensus that a more efficient 
financial system can have positive repercussions for economic develop-
ment, though with important non-linearities, the discussion on whether 
a stronger reliance on intermediaries or on markets is more conducive for 
economic growth is far from being settled. 
First of all, it is important to note that financial institutions, most 
prominently banks, and financial markets overcome the agency problem 
between lender and borrower in different ways. Financial institutions 
create private information, which helps them reduce information asym-
metries. Financial markets, on the other hand, create public infor-
mation, aggregated into prices. Similarly, there are differences in the 
mechanisms through which financial institutions and markets exercise 
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corporate governance. Banks can help improve corporate governance 
directly through loan covenants and direct influence on firm policy and 
indirectly through reducing the amount of free cash flows senior man-
agement has available. Financial markets can help improve corporate 
governance by linking payment of senior management to performance, 
through voting structures, and the threat of takeover if the stock price 
falls below a value that is seen below fair value. Finally, there are dif-
ferent ways financial institutions and markets help diversify risks. Banks 
offer better intertemporal risk diversification tools, whereas markets 
are better in diversifying risk cross-sectionally. Markets are better in 
offering standardized products, and banks are better in offering custom-
ized solutions for risk management and diversification. However, banks 
and markets can also be complementary through instruments such as 
securitization, allowing exit strategies for venture capitalists, and by pro-
viding competition to each other.1
However, there are also important arguments of why banks are better 
than markets and vice versa. In liquid markets, investors can inexpen-
sively and quickly sell their shares and consequently have fewer incentives 
to expend resources monitoring managers (Bhide, 1993; Stiglitz, 1985). 
Bank-based systems mitigate this problem because banks reveal less infor-
mation in public markets (Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor, 1993). Also, 
efficient markets can reduce the effectiveness of takeovers as a disciplining 
tool, as atomistic shareholders have incentives to capture the benefits from 
a takeover by holding their shares instead of selling them, thus making 
takeover attempts less profitable (Grossman and Hart, 1980). On the other 
hand, proponents of the market-based view emphasize that powerful 
banks frequently stymie innovation by extracting informational rents and 
protecting established firms (Hellwig, 1991). The banks’ market power 
then reduces firms’ incentives to undertake profitable projects because 
banks extract a large share of the profits (Rajan, 1992). Also, banks—as 
debt issuers—have an inherent bias toward conservative investments, so 
that bank-based systems might stymie innovation and growth (Weinstein 
and Yafeh, 1998; Morck and Nakamura, 1999). Finally, bank credit is more 
cyclical than market finance, given the important role of asset values and 
wealth constraints in lending decisions.
Initial cross-country comparisons have not provided evidence for either 
view. Evidence on the aggregate cross-country level, on the cross-country 
1 See Stulz (2001) for an overview. See Allen and Gale (1999) for a comprehensive 
treatment of different theories on the different functioning of banks and markets.
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cross-industry level, and on the cross-country firm level have not found any 
evidence that countries, industries, or firms grow faster in countries with 
either more bank-based or more market-based financial systems (Levine 
2002; Beck and Levine, 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002). 
Rather, the overall level of financial development, not structure, explains 
cross-country variation in economic growth. This is consistent with the 
financial services view, which focuses on the delivery of financial services 
and less on who delivers them. However, it is also consistent with the view 
that the optimal financial structure changes as financial systems develop, 
consistent with theoretical models to this effect (Boyd and Smith, 1998). 
It is also consistent with findings on different income elasticities of dif-
ferent segments of the financial system. The development of contractual 
savings institutions and capital markets is much more income-elastic than 
the development of the banking system (Beck et al., 2008). This finding 
is consistent with the observation that most low-income countries have 
more bank-based financial systems, while capital markets emerge at more 
advanced income levels. 
More recent research, however, has given more nuanced results. Spe-
cifically, these studies suggest that for less developed countries, develop-
ment of banking systems is more important, while for more developed 
countries, markets seem more important (Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen und 
Levine, 2013, Cull und Xu, 2013). Capital market development enhances 
firm innovation (as measured by patents) while banking sector develop-
ment might actually be damaging (Hsu, Tian und Xu, 2014). And finally, 
countries with bank-based financial system have lower growth rates, 
especially during crisis times and their banks pose higher systemic risk 
(Langfield und Pagano, 2015). 
There is one important caveat to add here. Most empirical analyses 
have focused exclusively on the banking sector and equity markets, 
given data availability. While these two segments are of critical import-
ance, such a focus ignores other critical elements, including corporate 
bond markets, private debt and equity markets (including equity funds 
and venture capitalists) as well as institutional investors. Traditional 
financial structure measure do not fully capture the variety and rich-
ness of financial landscapes across countries, including the interlinkages 
between different segments, Given this rather limited empirical focus, 
it is also not clear whether the indicators of financial structure pick 
up differences between bank- and market-based financial systems, or 
rather between equity finance and debt finance, given that traditional 
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measures of financial intermediary development focus on banks (and 
thus debt), ignoring private equity, and traditional measures of capital 
market development focus on equity markets, ignoring bond markets. 
Before jumping to any conclusions on the optimality of a specific 
financial structure, let me add that the empirical finance and growth lit-
erature has shown independent positive effects of both financial interme-
diary and equity market development (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Beck and 
Levine, 2004). We can interpret this evidence as suggesting that a more 
complete financial system, with its different segments well developed is 
growth-enhancing. Recent evidence, however, has also shown that an 
oversized financial system – most likely due to regulatory subsidies and 
a credit bubble – can have negative growth effects (Arcand, Berkes, and 
Panizza, 2015). One does therefore not have to target a specific financial 
structure to justify policies aiming at a smaller banking system and the 
development of non-bank segments of the financial system.
Why is Europe bank-based?
Numerous studies have documented the bank-based nature of Europe’s 
financial systems, if not a bank bias. Langfield and Pagano (2015) report 
that EU’s banking system assets amounted to 334% of GDP in 2013, while 
the U.S. banking system amounts to only 115% of its GDP. Even in Japan- 
often cited as the archetype of a bank-based system – total bank assets 
amount to “only” 196% of GDP. How did Europe become such a bank-
based financial system? There are different hypotheses for this, referring 
to deep historic factors and persistence and more recent events. On the 
one hand, European countries has had a tradition towards strong banks, 
favouring the universal banking model, compared to the U.S. which has 
seen a long-standing hostility vis-à-vis large banks. The law and finance 
literature observes that most European countries are of Civil Code legal 
tradition, which favours large and powerful banks relative to disperse 
and atomistic capital markets. Related to this, there has been a tendency 
across Europe to focus on national banking champions. While all of this 
can explain oversized banking systems, there are also factors that explain 
relatively less developed capital markets and other non-bank segments 
of the financial system. Dispersed stock exchanges across Europe do not 
allow for the necessary network and scale economies and create infor-
mation rents for market participants in individual markets. Dispersion 
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of regulatory regimes for non-bank finance (including private equity) 
makes scale economies in the financial system segments difficult.
Using cross-country comparisons, Demirguc-Kunt and Laeven (2001) 
point to several regulatory and institutional factors that can explain why 
financial systems are more bank- or more market-based. Specifically, 
they show that countries with a strong protection of shareholder rights 
and good accounting regulations tend to have market-based financial 
systems. However, many of these institutional characteristics are strongly 
correlated with the historic and political factors discussed above. These 
different analyses suggest that the financial structure of countries might 
be a rather persistent phenomenon and not easy and quickly to change. 
It suggests that the agenda aiming at shifting the balance within Europe’s 
financial system towards more non-bank finance is a long-term one. 
Where to go from here?
Strengthening the relatively underdeveloped financial segments across 
Europe has two main dimensions. Completing the banking union might 
contribute to reducing the power of banks and thus give sufficient space 
for the development of the non-bank segments of the financial system. 
On the other hand, there is an array of policies and institutions that can 
help enhance the development of the non-banking part of Europe’s finan-
cial system and some of which have been laid out in the recent Green 
Paper by the European Commission. They include (i) the revival of secu-
ritisation markets (including the creation of standards; creation of plat-
forms; and the important interaction with liquidity requirements under 
the new Basel III regulatory regime); (ii) increase in liquidity by linking 
corporate bond markets – where segmented insolvency laws are one 
major barrier; (iii)) creating linkages between different stock exchanges 
to increase liquidity, while maintaining competition, and (iv) creating 
a EU-wide second tier capital market/private placement market. There 
are also important demand-side policies, aiming at getting more firms to 
accept market finance, which includes corporate governance reforms, but 
also reducing cost barriers, as e.g. lowering prospectus costs.
It is important to understand, however, that these policies and insti-
tutions cannot work over night. They are rather policies and institutions 
that are aimed at long-term structural changes in the financial system. 
They certainly will not contribute to leading Europe out of the current 
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crisis, but might contribute to a long-term higher sustainable growth rate 
through more efficient resource allocation.
The discussion around a capital market union is often seen as a fol-
low-up to the discussion and design of the banking union. However, there 
are critical differences. The banking union project has been primarily 
designed to construct a supra-national financial safety to help revive an 
efficient and stable Single Market in Banking. The capital market union 
project, on the other hand, is more targeted at a large number of many 
small reforms across different non-bank segments of the European finan-
cial system. While stability concerns are certainly not to be ignored, they 
are not at the centre of attention as in the case of the banking union. Crit-
ically, while the different segments of the banking union (often referred 
to as the three pillars) are closely interlinked, it is not obvious that this is 
necessarily the case for the different reforms captured under the heading 
of Capital Market Union. While they certainly might reinforce each other, 
they do not show the same interdependence as in the case of the banking 
union. In addition, the banking union project is mainly a Eurozone pro-
ject (given that the externalities are primarily though not only within the 
monetary union), while the capital market union project is aimed at the 
whole European Union.
In summary, the capital market union is a worthwhile economic 
policy goal, not so much to change the financial structure of Europe, 
but to close gaps in Europe’s financial sector. It is a long-term goal that 
requires deep structural reforms that will change the relative power posi-
tions of players within the corporate and financial systems of Europe. 
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Evaluating the 2013 Euro CAC 
Experiment
Elena Carletti, Paolo Colla and Mitu Gulati
1. Introduction
The subject of this volume is “The New Financial Architecture in the 
Eurozone”. As one might expect, since this is about the “new architec-
ture”, most of the essays in this volume are forward looking in terms of 
talking about pieces of the architecture yet to be put in place. Our essay is 
instead backward looking. It looks at one of the pieces of this architecture 
that was put in place two years ago, in January 2013; the Euro CAC. There 
may be lessons to be learned from this Euro CAC experiment in terms of 
what to do (or not to do) going forward. 
On January 1, 2013, it became mandatory that every new sovereign 
bond issued by a member of the European Monetary Union include a 
new contract clause called a Collective Action Clause or CAC.1 This, we 
believe, constituted the biggest one-time change to the terms of sovereign 
debt contracts in history, impacting a market of many trillions of euros. 
And it was not just that the change was big in terms of the size of the 
market it impacted; it was big in terms of its impact on the documenta-
tion of each individual Euro area sovereign bond contract. To illustrate, 
1 There was an exception for bonds of maturities under a year and bonds being tapped 
from bond issuance programs already in place. The latter exception, however, could 
only be used to a limited extent and had to be gradually phased out.
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prior to January 1, 2013, all of the terms of a local-law Irish sovereign 
bond fitted on about a page and a half; the full document was about three 
pages long. After January 1, 2013, the document was twenty pages long; 
almost all of that space taken by the new CAC term. It was a big change. 
But did it do anything? And, more importantly, did it do what it was 
intended to do? 
The Euro CAC initiative was put in place in the wake of the sovereign 
debt crisis that hit the Euro area in late 2009. The goal, as announced 
by the Euro area finance ministers on November 28, 2010, was to “safe-
guard financial stability”.2 The task of designing this Euro CAC and 
implementing the initiative was delegated to what is called the “Bonds 
and Bills Committee”, a committee comprised of the debt managers of 
all the EU area countries that meets regularly in Brussels to discuss mat-
ters of common concern. Under the leadership of the head of the French 
Treasury, and with an eminent US law firm advising it, this committee 
took somewhere between a year and two years of regular meetings (once 
a month in Brussels, typically) to design their clauses (Gelpern & Gulati 
2013). It is hard to estimate exactly how much time and effort went into 
the production of these new Euro CACs, but with at least eighteen coun-
tries at the negotiating table on a monthly basis, each of which would have 
probably had multiple bureaucrats and lawyers working on preparing for 
the meetings and then attending, it must have been thousands of man 
hours that went into this project. Roughly two years after the initiative 
was put into place, we can begin evaluating its impact. Did the initiative 
achieve what it was aimed at? 
That then raises the question of what the initiative was aimed at 
achieving. The announcement of the Euro area finance ministers in 
November 2010, said that the initiative was meant to “safeguard finan-
cial stability”. But that is too vague to evaluate. If we dig deeper into what 
policy makers seem to have intended at the time though, it seems clear 
that their original intent was to send a message to the markets that there 
would be “PSI” or “private sector involvement” in restructurings in the 
future. That is, that in the future all of the burdens of a sovereign debt 
failure in the Euro area would not be put on the taxpayers via bailouts; 
instead taxpayers private investors would have to take a hit if the countries 
they invested in got into serious debt problems. Putting in provisions into 
the bonds that detailed precisely how these future restructurings would 
2 See http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/cac/cac_2012/final_-_cac_public_report.
pdf
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take place was a clear way of sending such a message. For example, an 
Irish investors holding an twenty-page post-2013 Irish bond that had 
more than a dozen pages detailing how a restructuring of his bonds would 
take place would surely notice the difference between that and the three-
page pre-2013 Irish bond that said nothing about a restructuring. In the 
latter, he would be hard pressed to claim that he had not had notice that a 
restructuring of his debt was a possibility.
The question to ask then is: Did the markets get the message that 
was intended? Did they see these post 2013 bonds, with their new CAC 
terms, are more likely to be restructured than their pre 2013 non-CAC 
compatriots.
The case we make in this essay is that, at least based on preliminary 
indications, there is reason to be concerned that the policy goals of the 
Euro CAC project (regardless of whether they were laudable ones) were 
not achieved. If so, then the question that should be asked by policy 
makers is why not? Or, put differently, what should have been done dif-
ferently?
2. CACs: Some Background
 
Collective Action Clauses or CACs are easily the most studied contract 
provisions in sovereign bonds; they may well be the most studied con-
tract provision in any setting whatsoever. The reason they have garnered 
so much attention is that on multiple occasions over the past few dec-
ades, they have been seen as providing a solution to global financial crises 
that hit the sovereign debt markets. The standard in sovereign bonds for 
much of the past century was that if a debtor wanted to get a reduction 
in its obligations, that reduction had to be individually approved by each 
bondholder. In practical terms, a large scale restructuring of a bond with 
many thousands of dispersed holders was near impossible. The end result 
then, for a sovereign in default, would be either that the Official Sector, 
fearing the contagion that might occur from a protracted default, would 
provide a bailout (e.g., Mexico in 1995) or the sovereign would be mired 
in years of litigation (e.g., Argentina over the past decade). Neither out-
come was viewed as good.
CACs are provisions that make it easier for a sovereign debtor to do a 
debt workout, by allowing a supermajority of creditors to accept a deal for 
the entire creditor group (a contractual cram down of dissenting creditors) 
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(Portes 2004). At least three times over the past century, policy makers 
ranging from expert committees of the League of Nations in the 1920s, 
to the authors of the Rey Report in 1995 all the way to Angela Merkel 
and Nicholas Sarkozy taking a beach walk in Deauville in October 2010, 
have proposed the introduction of CACs as a way to fix problems with the 
sovereign debt market (Weidemaier & Gulati 2013). In every instance, an 
immediate response to the policy proposal from market actors has been 
the query: “But won’t the introduction of these new terms raise the cost 
of capital?”
The first initiative, that of the League of Nations in the 1920s, did 
not come to fruition, with the CAC proposal not even making it to the 
final report of the League Committee in charge of proposing changes. 
The second CAC initiative, that began roughly in 1995, was aimed at 
foreign-law emerging market sovereign bonds issued primarily in New 
York. This initiative, starting in 2003, was an enormous success in terms 
of the rate of voluntary adoption of the CACs proposed by a G10 com-
mittee of experts (almost 100%). And dozens of academic papers were 
written, both before and after the 2003 initiative, analyzing the question 
of whether the new terms would (or have) increased or reduced the cost 
of capital.
We will not get into the details of the prior academic work, both for 
reasons of space and because the Euro CAC experiment turned out to 
be quite different than the one undertaken a decade prior in the New 
York market for emerging markets sovereign issuers. The focus of the 
prior studies was foreign-law governed bonds whose terms typically 
already required a high vote for them to be altered (typically, unanimous 
approval). The CACs that were being put in place in these foreign-law 
emerging market bonds were going to make restructurings easier in 
moving from a high vote requirement (usually, unanimity) to a lower one 
(usually 75%). The Euro CAC initiative was different in that it was taking 
local-law governed bonds that had no CACs and putting in CACs (with a 
vote between 66.67% and 75%). As we will explain in more detail below, 
using the context of the Greek restructuring of 2012, it is not at all clear 
from the outset that inserting a CAC into a local-law bond will make 
restructuring easier. The reason being that “local law” bonds can arguably 
altered at whim by the local government. In such a context, why would 
one expect a CAC to have any effect at all? 
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3. The Euro CACs
The sovereign debt crisis that hit the Euro area nations in 2010-2013 went 
through a number of stages. Initially, there were big bailouts with trans-
fers of funds from the richer nations to the poorer ones. And later, there 
was a brutal restructuring in one country, Greece. To say that there was 
political and economic fallout from the crisis and the missteps that were 
taken in trying to fix it is to put it mildly. As a result, the Euro area policy 
makers put in place a number of policy measures aimed at ensuring that 
the resolution of future sovereign debt crises would not be quite so costly 
to the Eurosystem. The initiative that most directly impacted the sover-
eign debt market was the imposition of an identical debt restructuring 
mechanism, via contract, in all Euro area sovereign bonds that were 
issued after January 1, 2013.
In constructing the Euro CAC initiative, Euro area policy makers 
had borrowed from a US Treasury Department initiative from roughly 
a decade prior, in 2002-03. That initiative, constructed in the wake of the 
sovereign bailouts of the mid 1990s and the default of Argentina in 2001, 
was focused on emerging market issuers (mostly Latin American) who 
were issuing sovereign bonds to mostly foreign investors under New York 
law. The Euro area version of the initiative, however, was significantly 
more ambitious than the emerging market version in three ways. The 
size was larger (it applied to a multi trillion dollar market as compared to 
one that was a in the tens of billion), the scope was wider (applied via the 
local laws of eighteen different Euro member nations as opposed to one 
foreign law (New York)), and the CAC provisions in question were more 
powerful (applying in an aggregated fashion across a full set of a nation’s 
bonds, as opposed to on a bond by bond basis). As noted at the outset, the 
Euro CAC initiative of 2013 engineered, at one blow, the single biggest 
change to sovereign bond contract terms ever – and this is a market that 
has been around for at least five centuries, if not more. 
CACs, as noted, are contract provisions that allow for a majority of 
creditors in a single bond, or sometimes even across an issuer’s full series 
bonds, bonds, to vote to modify the payment obligations to the debtor 
(with the permission of the debtor). Put simply, they are a mechanism 
that allows for the debtor in crisis and a majority of creditors (usually 
a supermajority, between 66.67% and 75%) to agree to a restructuring 
of obligations that the debtor owes in a fashion that forces the deal on 
a minority of dissenting creditors (holdouts). Prior to January 2013, the 
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overwhelming majority of bonds of Euro area countries (over 95% of a 
market of upwards of $10 trillion in outstanding bonds) contained no 
such contract provisions. If these had been foreign-law governed bonds, 
a Euro area sovereign wanting to restructure them would have had to go 
to each individual bondholder and ask her to voluntarily take a haircut; 
an impossible task. But these were local-law governed bonds; meaning 
that the local legislature could write new terms into them. As a result, 
Greece, prior to its March 2012 restructuring, was able to legislatively 
impose a specially designed set of CACs on its local-law bonds and then 
conduct its restructuring. 
4. The Euro CACs: Predictions
What was the predicted impact of the Euro CAC policy move? Looking 
back through the policy briefs, press reports and academic articles written 
at the time tells us that there was variation in terms of what policy makers 
expected from the Euro CAC initiative. 
Initially, and before the Greek restructuring of 2012, there were those 
(perhaps the majority) who saw the Euro CAC move as profoundly 
anti-creditor; and particularly so vis-à-vis the holders of bonds of the 
weaker Euro area nations. Certainly, this was the intended message of 
the Franco-German announcement on October 18, 2010 (made after the 
infamous Deauville beach walk). Private creditors were now forewarned 
that they could be restructured (Gelpern & Gulati 2013). If there was a 
sovereign crisis in the future, private creditors could no longer expect to 
be bailed out (in Greece, at least for the first few years of the crisis, the 
private creditors were bailed out in full). Under this view, one might pre-
dict that the CAC bonds would be perceived as riskier than the non-CAC 
ones; after all, the CAC ones were the ones where bondholders were told 
explicitly that a restructuring was possible in the future.
The Euro CAC initiative, as some policy makers have explained to us, 
initially had a dual purpose. The hope was to both produce the effect of 
assuring current bondholders (in non-CAC local-law bonds) that they 
were safe (because CACs would only be put in place after Jan 1, 2013) 
and also to assuage the concerns of taxpayers (who were worried, in late 
2010, that they would be repeatedly on the hook for providing repeated 
bailouts to the weakest nations of the Euro area). As it turned out though, 
bondholders did not believe the message. The announcement of the CAC 
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initiative in late 2010 did not calm the markets; if anything, investors 
may have taken the announcement as a sign that restructurings were 
coming, and soon (Gelpern & Gulati 2013). Within a year, the markets 
were proved right in that it was announced that Greece would be pur-
suing a restructuring of its bonds. In March 2012, that announcement 
was implemented in brutal fashion via a retroactive legislative imposition 
of a special set of CACs on all Greek local-law bonds (Zettelmeyer, Tre-
besch & Gulati 2014).3
One might ask at this stage, after the Greek restructuring in 2012, 
whether there was any more need for the Euro CAC initiative. After all, 
the fact that the message that non-CAC local law bonds were safer than 
CAC bonds could no longer be sent (the March 2012 restructuring by 
Greece arguably put an end to that). But the Euro CAC initiative did not 
get abandoned. Perhaps policy makers thought that the markets would 
believe their repeated assertions that Greece restructuring was “unique 
and exceptional”. 
Some of the policy makers who were interviewed about the foregoing 
put forward a more nuanced explanation for why the Euro CAC initiative 
went forward. The new story justifying the Euro CAC initiative, these 
policy makers asserted, was that the initiative would send a pro-creditor 
message. Instead of telling creditors that restructurings would be more 
likely in the future, the new story was that CACs were a commitment 
not to do a Greek retroactive change in the law in the future. The Greek 
restructuring was, to reiterate, was “unique and exceptional.” Unlike with 
Greece, where the sovereign had retroactively imposed a vote require-
ment on its bonds after it had figured out how many votes it had (or so 
we suspect), thereby making it near impossible for bondholders to hold 
out against deals they thought were unsatisfactory, the vote requirements 
would now be clear and uniform for everyone from the start. The predic-
tion, under this pro creditor story then is the opposite of that under the 
first story: the local-law bonds with CACs here should have lower yields 
than their non-CAC counterparts because the CAC bonds, in the case of 
a restructuring, would be assured an orderly restructuring process where 
the rules of the game would be known in advance (unlike with Greece 
and unlike with the non-CAC local law bonds).
The question in evaluating the CAC initiative then is whether it resulted 
in assuring the markets that CAC bonds would fare better (or worse) in 
3 There was an exception made for a subset of bonds held by Euro area official sector 
institutions such as the European Central Bank.
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future restructurings than the non-CAC ones. Prior to implementation, 
policy makers seem to have made predictions going both ways.
5. Some Preliminary Insights
The dataset we utilize is drawn from a variety of sources (Bloomberg, 
Dealogic, and Thomson One Banker). It is made up of 85 CAC bonds 
for 13 Eurozone sovereigns issued between January 1, 2013 and June 
31, 2014 with maturity larger than one year (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain). All bonds are either zero coupon or have a 
fixed coupon. Figure 1 displays the issuance activity of CAC bonds in our 
sample, over time. By the end of the first quarter of 2013 all countries had 
issued at least one bond with a CAC. Figure 2 plots the time-series of the 
amount outstanding (the sum of original issues and further tap issues)4 of 
CAC bonds in Eurozone countries, both in absolute terms and relative to 
4 After issuing a new bond, governments can raise additional debt by reopening al-
ready existing securities (so-called tap issues).
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Fig. 1. CAC bonds issuances. Monthly time series of CAC bonds 
issuances by aggregate amount (grey bars, left vertical axis) and by 
number of issuances (squares, right vertical axis).
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the overall amount of long-term government debt.5 Figure 2 shows that 
at the end of June 2014 about 13% of long-term bonds included the new 
Euro CAC provision.
The joint message of Figures 1 and 2 is that CAC bonds are becoming 
more and more important in the context of Eurozone sovereign debt 
markets. We now turn to the question at the heart of the inquiry: Do 
markets see the bonds with CACs as being different from those without 
them in terms of the risk of being restructured?
To gather preliminary evidence on this matter, we select four CAC 
bonds with five years maturity issued by different countries (Austria, Fin-
land, France, and Spain). We pair each of these bonds with a non-CAC 
bond issued before January 1, 2013 by the same issuer, with the same 
currency and roughly the same residual maturity, and then compare the 
daily yields of CAC and non-CAC bonds.
5 Data for long-term government debt outstanding are sourced from the ECB Statis-
tical Data Warehouse. For each country, we consider long-term government debt 
as the sum of long-term residual maturities (over 1 year) and short-term residual 
maturities (up to 1 year), in all currencies.
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In Figure 3 we plot the yields of our bonds. We do not find that our 
CAC bonds consistently have higher yields than their non-CAC coun-
terparts for the four countries under consideration.6 Nor, for that matter, 
do we find the converse. For instance, the 5 year bonds issued by Austria 
and Finland enjoy, on average, yields lower by, respectively, 7.5bps and 
15.8bps than non-CAC bonds with similar maturity. On the other hand, 
for France and Spain we observe larger yields of CAC versus non-CAC 
bonds. Although in economic terms these yield differentials may seem 
small, they are all statistically significant. At first cut then, the evidence 
suggests that CACs did not have their intended effects. Indeed, the effects 
seem to sometimes go in one direction and at other times in the opposite 
direction.
Further, they seem to have had some explicitly unintended effects. 
The reason we say that is that the CAC initiative was explicitly intended 
— as per the directives of the treaty - to operate in the same fashion 
across all the Euro area countries.7 Put differently, while the individual 
effects in particular countries might have been expected to be different 
(with stronger effects in the weaker countries than in the stronger ones), 
the effects were all supposed to go in the same direction. But that is not 
what we see. The question is why.
Fig. 3: Yield and yield differential between CAC and non-CAC bonds. 
For each country, the left panel plots yields (in percentage) on CAC 
bonds (black line) issued with 5 yrs maturity and those of matched non-
CAC bonds (grey line). The right panel plots the yield differential (CAC 
minus non-CAC bond, in bps) for each bond pair, together with the 
average yield differential (dashed black line) and its 95% confidence in-
terval. For Austria we consider the 1.15% bond with maturity Oct 2018 
(ISIN: AT0000A12B06) and the 4.35% bond with maturity Mar 2019 
(AT0000A08968); for Finland we consider the 1.125% bond with ma-
turity Sep 2018 (FI4000068663) and the 4.375% bond with maturity Jul 
2019 (FI0001006306); for France we consider the 1% bond with maturity 
Nov 2018 (FR0011523257) and the 4.25% bond with maturity Oct 2018 
6 A recent DIW Economic Bulletin report also looks at the relative yields for Euro 
area CAC and non CAC bonds, observes the differences to be quite minimal, and 
asks the question of why this reform (particularly in the local law bond context) was 
embarked on in the first place (Steffen & Schumacher 2014).
7 Article 12(3) of the ESM Treaty stated:
 Collective Action Clauses shall be included, as of January 1, 2013, in all new euro 
area government securities with maturity above one year, in a way that ensures that 
their legal impact is identical. 
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(FR0010670737); for Spain we consider the 3.75% bond with maturity 
Oct 2018 (ES00000124B7) and the 4.1% bond with maturity Jul 2019 
(ES00000121A5). 
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Capital Markets Union and Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs): A 
Preliminary Assessment 
Pierre Schammo 
Abstract
The Capital Markets Union is the European Commission’s latest policy ini-
tiative in the capital markets field. It is a project in the making. Much of 
it remains to be spelled out and fleshed out. However, the first elements 
of a future CMU are slowly beginning to emerge. The aim of this paper is 
to discuss these elements and to offer a first assessment. In particular, this 
paper aims to discuss the relationship between the CMU and one of its key 
objectives which has proved elusive in the past: that is, of facilitating access 
to finance for SMEs. In this process, the paper offers a number of sugges-
tions on how to make progress on this crucial issue. Among other things, it 
advocates a form of supply side driven matchmaking as a means to improve 
information issues affecting SMEs in the SME funding market.
1. Introduction
The Capital Markets Union (CMU) is the European Commission’s latest 
policy initiative in the capital markets field. It is a project in the making. 
Much of it remains to be spelled out and fleshed out. However, as soon 
as the idea of a CMU was proposed, it attracted almost instant attention 
and interest. This paper offers a first assessment of the CMU initiative. It 
begins with a set of observations. Firstly, unlike the CMU’s ‘closest cousin’ 
– the Banking Union (BU) – the proposal for a CMU appears so far to 
138
have proved remarkably uncontroversial among Member States. It has 
benefited from broad support, including from the UK which is resolutely 
against joining a BU and which, one would expect, looks with suspicion 
at attempts to establish ‘unions’ within the Union.1 Secondly, the CMU 
is not only about a single capital market. To an extent, the latter is only a 
means to realise the CMU’s other objectives. In particular, the European 
Commission has been keen to stress the benefits of a CMU for small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in a post-crisis world. Thus, one of the 
ambitions of the proposed CMU is to offer SMEs better access to finance. 
It is a key objective of the CMU, but one which has proved to be elusive 
and fraud with difficulties in the past. 
Against this background, the aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, to 
assess and reflect on the first elements of a CMU; secondly, to investigate 
the relationship between the CMU and SMEs. More specifically, the aim 
is to show why the relationship between SMEs and a future CMU is a 
complex one and in this process to consider ways to make the latter more 
relevant to the former. To this effect, this paper will make a number of 
suggestions. These suggestions focus on the SME funding market and 
especially on how to address information problems affecting SMEs in this 
market. Among other things, this paper recommends a type of supply 
side driven matchmaking via pan-EU finance platforms as a means to 
improve information issues for SMEs. It will draw for this purpose on 
proposals that have recently been adopted in the UK.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 starts by discussing first 
elements of the proposed CMU. Section 3 turns to the access-to-finance 
problematic for SMEs. Section 4 concludes. 
2. The CMU: first elements
This section begins by examining first elements of a future CMU. Based 
on policy documents and the Commission’s Green Paper on building a 
CMU,2 it will show that the CMU can currently be described as an ambig-
uous concept (a.), which is underpinned by suggestions on a short-term 
programme in areas where there is broad support, and by broad/vague 
1 The idea of establishing discrete ‘unions’ appears certainly to be in the trend. There 
is of course the BU and the CMU, but the term has also been used to describe an 
Energy Union or even a Derivatives Union. Regarding the latter see Maijoor (2015).
2 European Commission, (2015b).
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ideas on potential actions for the longer term (b.). The concept and its 
potential programme are held together by objectives which are largely 
uncontroversial (c.). After discussing each of these elements, I will reflect 
on the prospect of a CMU in a more holistic manner (d.). 
a. An ambiguous notion 
The concept of a Capital Markets Union is an inherently ambiguous 
notion. On the one hand, the use of the term ‘union’ might appear to 
suggest that the CMU is supposed to mark a new stage in capital markets 
integration with presumably further institutional integration and consol-
idation at EU level. On the other hand, however, save for the word itself 
and what it brings to one’s mind (e.g., in terms of an ‘ever closer union’),3 
little is known about the meaning to be ascribed to the CMU. Unlike the 
Banking Union (BU), which was right from the beginning tied to a heavy 
institutional and integrationist agenda, the CMU concept was largely left 
unspecified when first put forward by the Commission. Its origins can be 
traced back to President Juncker’s July 2014 speech before the European 
Parliament and his political guidelines for the next Commission which 
state that:
‘Over time, I believe we should complement the new European rules 
for banks with a Capital Markets Union. To improve the financing of 
our economy, we should further develop and integrate capital mar-
kets. This would cut the cost of raising capital, notably for SMEs, and 
help reduce our very high dependence on bank funding. This would 
also increase the attractiveness of Europe as a place to invest’.4
Beyond this brief statement, Juncker did not offer details on the con-
tent of a CMU or on any future building blocks. Juncker’s November 
2014 mission letter to Lord Hill, the Commissioner for Financial Sta-
bility, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union, also offered few 
clues, except that the letter specified that the CMU was supposed to be 
in place by 2019 and that it was meant to include all the Member States.5 
The latter point was also highlighted repeatedly by Lord Hill during his 
first hearing before the European Parliament in October 2014. However, 
3 Art 1 TEU.
4 Juncker, (2014a). 
5 Juncker, (2014b). 
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Hill provided few details on the CMU initiative during his first hearing. 
Asked on the CMU, Hill noted:
‘As I was saying just now, I think the first step – which sounds very 
prosaic (but I am a practical, pragmatic person) – is to identify, first 
of all, what the obstacles currently are standing in the way of the free 
flow of capital. I do not want to start with a grandiose vision. It is a 
little over two weeks since I was nominated, and I think you would 
collectively think I had taken leave of my senses if, after two weeks, 
I were to come to you and say ‘this is everything we are going to be 
doing over the next five years’. So I am, I think, clear in my mind that I 
want to take this step by step, starting with the analysis. … So I would 
have to urge you to be a little patient, because I think to rush and 
make a mistake would be a mistake…’.6
As already noted, the beginnings of the CMU are in marked contrast 
with the BU. Not only is the latter mainly a Eurozone construct, but the 
BU was from the beginning more clearly circumscribed. Thus, when 
calling for a BU in June 2012, (former) Commission President Barroso 
added that the BU would be one of the building blocks of a Genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union and that it should include ‘single Euro-
pean banking supervision and a common deposit insurance and resolu-
tion framework’.7 Admittedly, this degree of clarity did not serve the BU 
especially well. Indeed, as finally agreed, the BU looks quite different. The 
idea of a single deposit insurance scheme had for better or worse to be 
dropped.8 In any event, the notion of a capital markets union has no par-
ticular constitutional significance. It has no place in the treaties, unlike 
the concept of a single market or the European Economic and Monetary 
Union. The CMU will however become part of the EU’s ‘nomenclature’ 
6 First hearing of Jonathan Hill before the European Parliament (Brussels, 
1 October 2015), 15-16 available at http://www.elections2014.eu/resourc-
es/library/media/20141022RES75902/20141022RES75902.pdf. Hill provid-
ed some details during his second hearing (see Hearing of Jonathan Hill 
(Brussels, 7 October 2014) 13 available at http://www.elections2014.eu/re-
sources/library/media/20141022RES75902/20141022RES75902.pdf. See also 
Reply to supplementary questions addressed by ECON to Commissioner-des-
ignate Hill, available at http://www.elections2014.eu/resources/library/me-
dia/20141006RES73040/20141006RES73040.pdf.
7 Barroso, (2012). See also European Council, The President, (2012); European Com-
mission, (2012a).
8 House of Lords, European Union Committee, (2014), p. 45.
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in the financial and banking fields. This includes the Lamfalussy four-
level approach, the European System of Financial Supervision, the single 
supervisory and resolution mechanisms and of course the BU. 9
The fact that the CMU concept lacks clarity has been widely acknowl-
edged among commentators. It has left the door open for very different 
interpretations.10 Verena Ross, the Executive Director of ESMA, put it well 
when giving evidence before the House of Lords at the end of October 
2014: ‘[i]f you ask 10 people, they will give you 10 different answers as to 
what capital markets union means’. 11
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the meaning ascribed to a future CMU has 
tended to differ according to the interests and/or role conceptions of 
CMU commentators. Moreover, among these commentators the issue 
of a possible transfer of supervisory powers to the EU level has been a 
recurring theme. For example, for Yves Mersch, a member of the ECB’s 
Executive Board, the CMU has a role to play in helping the ECB to 
implement its monetary policy.12 However, Mersch also pointed out that 
it was time for policy-makers to consider if it was still appropriate for 
Member States to be in charge of day-to-day supervision. 13 Meanwhile, 
Steven Maijoor, ESMA’s chairman, has repeatedly stressed the need to 
ensure investor protection when designing a CMU.14 However, on the 
issue of day-to-day supervision, Maijoor treaded carefully. Given that the 
decision-makers within ESMA are national competent authorities, it was 
perhaps not surprising that he stayed clear of pleading for transferring 
day-to-day supervisory powers to ESMA.15 Member States too contribute 
views to the debate. In the UK, for instance, the proposal for a CMU 
is viewed as an opportunity to promote capital markets integration and 
9 One should be forgiven for thinking that this nomenclature – from levels to a union 
– was intended to reflect stages in an increasingly integrated institutional structure. 
It is not the outcome of some grand scheme, but the outcome of reforms which were 
often put in motion by exogenous factors (e.g. the financial and sovereign debt cri-
ses).
10 See also Mersch, (2014b); Lannoo (2015) p. 1.
11 House of Lords, EU Economic and Financial Affairs Sub-Committee, (2014), p. 421.
12 Mersch, (2014a); Mersch, (2014b).
13 Mersch, (2015).
14 Maijoor, (2014b); Maijoor, (2014a); Maijoor, (2015).
15 Ibid.
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hence the City of London.16 However, the UK Government has also been 
keen to stress that a CMU did not require consolidation of day-to-day 
supervision at EU level.17 The latter reflects a long-held position in the 
UK which sees supervision as a matter for Member States. This position 
is given support by the argument that if fiscal responsibility is a national 
matter, supervisory decisions should be as well.18
Over the coming months and years, it can be expected that the CMU 
will gain more concrete shape, possibly – even though not necessarily – 
with a consensus emerging around a set of building blocks.19 For the time 
being and despite the ambiguity of the term, the notion of a CMU nev-
ertheless offers actors a ‘focal point’20 to promote cooperation on a wide 
range of possible issues.21 The European Commission has begun to spell 
out these issues in its Green Paper on a Capital Markets Union. I turn to 
the Green Paper next.
b. A short-term programme in areas where there is broad support; and 
broad/vague ideas on potential actions for the longer term
The European Commission published its Green Paper on Building a 
Capital Markets Union in February 2015.22 As a green paper, it aims to 
generate debate and discussion on possible areas for action. First and 
foremost, it offers an opportunity for feedback. In addition to the green 
paper, the Commission also consults on revising the Prospectus Direc-
tive and on a framework for securitisation.23 Both consultations are part 
of the Commission’s effort to develop a CMU. 
16 See e.g. House of Lords, European Union Committee, (2015a), p. 94, noting that the 
CMU offers ‘a golden opportunity for the UK to promote the importance of capital 
markets, as an alternative to bank funding, in the functioning of the EU economy’.
17 See House of Lords, European Union Committee, (2015b) p. 29.
18 Schammo, (2012), pp. 780-781.
19 Note that in the Commission consultation document on a framework for simple, 
transparent and standardised securitisation, the Commission notes that developing 
high-quality securitisation is one of the building blocks of the CMU. See European 
Commission, (2015e) p. 2.
20 Goldstein and Keohane, (1993).
21  cf. Mersch, (2014b), who talks of the CMU as a ‘connector and label’, noting further 
‘[t]o operate with this term will help to raise awareness, to define overall objectives, 
to prioritise resources and to ensure consistency of the individual measures’.
22 European Commission, (2015b).
23 European Commission, (2015d); European Commission, (2015e).
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Even if only a green paper, it is nevertheless noteworthy that the 
Green Paper on building a CMU contributes little to clarifying the con-
cept which is at the core of it: that is the CMU.24 Thus, it does not specify 
the meaning of a CMU and remains silent on even a working version of 
the building blocks of a future CMU.25 
Regarding the relationship between the CMU and the BU, the Green 
Paper notes that the former will benefit from the fact that the latter offers 
stability.26 It also states that a 
‘Capital Markets Union will differ from Banking Union: deepening 
capital markets requires steps that will be distinct from the key ele-
ments of Banking Union’.27 (emphasis added)
However, we are left in the dark about the distinct steps (institutional, 
substantive?) which the Commission has in mind. On a brighter note, 
the Green Paper reaffirms the Commission’s intention to ensure that the 
CMU is an EU project and not just a Eurozone project.28 The Commission 
is also keen to stress the importance of consultations, economic analysis 
and impact assessments whilst underlining that legislative action is only 
one among a series of possible courses of action.29 While these statements 
are welcomed, they should not be overestimated. They are mostly ‘better 
regulation’ platitudes.  
These observations aside, the possible reform or review suggestions 
that are listed in the Green Paper provide nevertheless some useful 
insight on the possible future content of a CMU. The Commission differ-
entiates between possible actions that might be pursued in the future and 
a number of priority areas that are singled out for early action. Regarding 
the latter, the measures include a review of the Prospectus Directive,30 
24 Admittedly, the Green Paper does specify the broad objectives of the CMU. I will 
return to these below.
25 Instead it notes that the feedback which the Commission will receive following the 
green paper will help it to ‘put in place the building blocks for a fully functioning 
Capital Markets Union by 2019’. See European Commission, (2015b), p. 3.
26 Ibid, p. 5.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 
2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or 
admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC [2003] OJ L345/64.
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work on securitisation, as well as possible actions in the areas of SME 
credit information, the European Long-Term Investments Funds and the 
private placement market.31 As noted, the Commission consults sepa-
rately on the review of the Prospectus Directive and has launched a con-
sultation on ‘simple, transparent and standardised securitisation’. 32
In selecting these areas, the Commission treaded carefully. Deciding 
to review the Prospectus Directive was unlikely to prove controversial. 
The Commission merely brought forward a review which was supposed 
to take place by 1 January 2016.33 More generally, it is worth noting that 
there was already a wide consensus on the need for some sort of action 
in many of the selected areas, before the launch of the CMU project. For 
instance, much has been said on the need to revive the securitisation 
market in the wake of the financial crisis. Influential papers were pub-
lished on the topic, notably by the Bank of England and the European 
Central Bank.34 Discussions on reviving securitisation, but also on the 
need to work on SME credit information35 and on private placements 
(or, covered bonds for that matter) have also taken place at the level of 
the OECD.36 Suggestions for action in these (and other) areas have also 
been presented in industry reports.37 The Commission also stayed clear 
of advocating possibly contentious measures in these areas. Thus, where 
industry-led action had already resulted in tangible outcomes (see the 
work on private placements), the Commission acknowledged and wel-
comed it.38
31 See also European Commission, (2014c), p. 8.
32 See supra (n 23).
33 European Commission, (2015d), p. 3. 
34 European Central Bank and Bank of England, (2014a); European Central Bank and 
Bank of England, (2014b). See also European Banking Authority, (2014); European 
Commission, (2013b) p. 12.
35 On credit reporting, see also World Bank, (2014); AFME, (2013), p. 50, suggesting 
to ‘create centralized pan-European and/or national SME information and rating 
databases…’.
36 Kaousar Nassr and Wehinger, (2014).
37 eg Ares & Co, (2013); AFME, (2015).
38 On private placements, see Charter for Euro Private Placements (Euro PP): indus-
try guidance document commissioned by the Banque de France and the Paris IDF 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (March 2014), available at http://www.fbf.fr/
en/files/9HLKDR/Charter-for-Euro-PP-March-2014.pdf; ICMA, (2015). The Com-
mission also treads carefully when asking stakeholders if any action by the EU is 
needed ‘other than supporting market-led efforts to agree common standards?’ (see 
European Commission, (2015b), p. 12.
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Turning to the Commission’s thoughts on potential areas for action 
in the longer term, the Commission clearly chose breadth over depth of 
thinking. Thus, a most striking aspect of the Green Paper is the sheer 
range of areas and ideas put forward for consideration. Areas include 
financial and securities regulation (including crowdfunding and venture 
capital), but also insurance and pension provision, supervision, company 
law, insolvency, accounting, taxation, actions in the technology area and 
public measures. In fact, the Commission invites contributions on any 
issues which ‘require action to achieve a Capital Markets Union’.39
In relation to matters such as market supervision, which in all likeli-
hood will matter for defining the future institutional shape of the CMU, 
the Green Paper strikes one as ambiguous.40 While the Commission stops 
short of pleading for a transfer of day-to-day supervisory competence to 
the ESAs, the Green Power does not explicitly rule out additional trans-
fers of powers in the supervisory field either. Hence, as far as pan-Euro-
pean supervision is concerned, the glass is either half-full or half-empty 
depending on whom you ask.
The Commission also remained somewhat circumspect on the issue 
of promoting cross-border mobility of companies. Promoting company 
mobility has proved to be an intractable problem for the EU. Legislative 
action on the topic has been sluggish. Initiatives such as a 14th Company 
Law directive, which could have facilitated the transfer of the registered 
office of a company, have never been adopted. Here too, the Commission 
is cautious when noting that ‘[f]urther reforms to company law may be 
helpful in overcoming barriers to cross-border establishment and opera-
tion of companies’.41
Hence, much of the content of a future CMU remains to be specified 
and is a priori open to proposals from stakeholders. However, the Green 
Paper does provide some clarity on one aspect of the proposed CMU – 
that is, the CMU’s objectives. I will turn to these objectives now.
39 European Commission, (2015b), p. 26.
40 The Green Paper notes that ‘[f]urther consideration could be given to the role played 
by the ESAs in this context. To the extent that national supervisory regimes may 
result in differing investor protection levels, barriers to cross-border operations and 
discouraging companies seeking financing in other Member States, there may be a 
further role for the ESAs to play in increasing convergence’ (see European Commis-
sion, (2015b) p. 22). The Commission goes on to ask: ‘Do you think that the powers of 
the ESAs to ensure consistent supervision are sufficient? What additional measures 
relating to EU level supervision would materially contribute to developing a capital 
markets union?’ (European Commission, (2015b), p. 26).
41 Ibid., p. 24.
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c. Wide consensus on underlying objectives
It is apparent that the CMU initiative is about realising a single capital 
market where capital can flow freely across borders. But to an extent this 
objective is only a means to realise the CMU’s other objectives. Thus, the 
CMU is also meant to reduce Europe’s reliance on bank finance; to help 
the real economy – especially SMEs – to gain access to capital; and to 
help investors to gain access to a wider range of investment opportunities. 
These objectives reflect the Commission’s attempt at fostering jobs, growth 
and entrepreneurship in a post financial crisis era – a core priority of the 
Juncker Commission42 – and at addressing the risks for Europe’s busi-
nesses and economies of mainly relying on banks for external funding, 
especially in times where banks tighten their lending policy. 
The CMU’s objectives provide the glue between the CMU concept 
and a yet largely unspecified agenda for realising it. However, it is also 
apparent that by defining these objectives, the Commission did not 
venture onto unfamiliar ground. Free movement of capital is a Treaty 
enshrined objective.43 Meanwhile, facilitating access to finance for SMEs 
is a chronic EU hangover from past reform rounds. In its 1998 Risk Cap-
ital Action Plan, the Commission noted for example that it was essential 
that European entrepreneurs were ‘able to access the right financing, at the 
right price, at the right place and at the right time to develop their com-
panies and their ideas’.44 Facilitating access to finance has been a theme in 
many other Commission communications, white or green papers.45 The 
EU legislature too has sought to address the issue in various ways.46 
42 Juncker, (2014a).
43 See generally Moloney, (2014); Payne and Howell, (2015).
44 European Commission, (1998), p. 2.
45 e.g. European Commission, (2008); European Commission, (2011c); European 
Commission, (2013a); European Commission, (2012b); European Commission, 
(2011a); European Commission, (2013b).
46 e.g. see Rec (132) and Art 33 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amend-
ing Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU [2014] OJ L 173/349; Regula-
tion (EU) No 345/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 
2013 on European venture capital funds [2013] OJ L115/1; Rec (44) and Art 501 of 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms 
and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 [2013] OJ L176/1; Regulation (EU) No 
346/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on Europe-
an social entrepreneurship funds [2013] OJ L115/18; Regulation (EU) No 1287/2013 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing a 
Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and small and medium-sized 
enterprises (COSME) (2014 - 2020) and repealing Decision No 1639/2006/EC [2013] 
OJ L347/33.
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The Commission’s other main ambition – that is, of diversifying 
sources of funding in order to reduce reliance on the banking sector – is 
not an unfamiliar objective either, even though it is more closely tied to 
the financial crisis and its aftermath.47 
The objectives that underpin the CMU initiative are unlikely to cause 
controversy, even among actors with potentially very different integra-
tionist preferences. The point is obvious with respect to the Commission’s 
ambition to complete a single capital market: it is a constitutionally pre-
served goal. But there is also a wide international consensus on the need 
to improve access to finance for SMEs – not least because of their contri-
bution to national economies and to growth – and to reduce businesses 
excessive dependence on the banking sector, especially in the wake of the 
financial crisis. That said, the Commission clearly did not intend to make 
the banking sector feel excluded from the CMU project. The Green Paper 
highlights banks’ crucial place within a future CMU and their key role 
within European economies.48
d. The CMU: first thoughts on first elements 
So far, I have argued that the notion of a CMU is ambiguous; that the 
Commission in its Green Paper chose breadth over depth of thinking; 
that there was already broad support for some sort of action in those 
areas which the Commission selected for early action; and finally that 
the potential programme and the CMU concept are glued together by 
uncontroversial objectives which are recurring in EU initiatives, but 
which sit well with the (potentially) varying integrationist preferences of 
Member States.
Admittedly, the fact that the Commission remains vague on the 
CMU and on possible future actions is not necessarily worthy of criti-
cism. After all, green papers are about generating feedback and testing 
the water. I also noted earlier that the CMU – for all its ambiguity – cur-
rently offered a focal point for promoting cooperation on a wide range of 
issues. Moreover, being ambiguous or vague can be a useful strategy for 
dealing with potentially conflicting policy preferences. Focusing on how 
to avoid deadlock in EU policy-making, Héritier for example notes that 
one strategy is to settle for a framework decision, ‘phrased in such vague 
terms as to allow actors with diverging views to interpret it according to 
47 See e.g. European Commission, (2013b).
48 European Commission, (2015b) p. 4. See also European Commission, (2015c).
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their individual interests’.49 The point resonates with the notion of ‘con-
structive ambiguity’. Hoffmann notes:
‘There has always been most progress when the Europeans were able 
to preserve a penumbra of ambiguity around their enterprise, so as to 
keep each one hoping that the final shape would be closest to its own 
ideal, and to permit broad coalitions to support the next moves’.50 
Focussing on the policy proposal stage, Jegen and Mérand see con-
structive ambiguity as a strategy that ‘coalesces around a “floating signifi-
er”’.51 They contend that it can serve ‘political entrepreneurs to communi-
cate with their audiences to push for a policy initiative’.52 Thus, for them, 
ambiguity can be useful for communicating proposals: ‘[t]he intuitive 
advantage of ambiguity … is that it does not offend those who hold the 
power to support or block a proposal’.53 Meanwhile, for Rayroux ambi-
guity can be useful in allowing Member States to claim domestically that 
their preferences and discourse are congruent with EU policy.54
Seen in this light, the fact that the CMU initiative lacks clarity, even 
substance, may actually serve it well: it makes space for differing inter-
pretations congruent with potentially differing preferences for the future 
shape of a CMU. Recall in this context that the BU, whose agenda was 
set out with much greater clarity, proved controversial right from the 
beginning. It meant that the Commission was forced to shed one of its 
original BU pillars early on (ie, the single deposit insurance scheme). 
Unlike the BU, the loose CMU concept and agenda do not appear so far 
to have caused upset among Member States. Even the UK,55 which has 
been highly critical of efforts aimed at closer integration – whether in 
the context of the BU or elsewhere56 – sees the CMU as an opportunity 
more than anything else. The CMU thus appears, so far at least, to have 
49 Héritier, (1999) p. 17.
50 Hoffmann, (1995), cited in Rayroux, (2014), p. 388.
51 Jegen and Mérand, (2014), p. 185.
52 Ibid, p. 183.
53 Ibid
54 Rayroux, (2014), p. 401.
55 See in the context, House of Lords, European Union Committee, (2015b), p. 12, cit-
ing Lord Hill as stating that there was ‘“a strong wind of support” among Member 
States for Capital Markets Union’. In this sense, see also Strupczewski (2015).
56 e.g. in relation to closer cooperation on a transaction tax. 
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successfully bridged the divide between Member States which are part 
of the BU and the most vocal non-participating Member State: the UK.57 
However, whether a lack of clarity is a conscious political strategy is 
unclear.58 At any rate, constructive ambiguity might well ‘go wrong’ once 
clarifications are needed.59 Hence, as far as the CMU is concerned, the 
devil is likely to be in the detail: that is, in the agenda once it is set and in 
the specific proposals once they are brought forward. Whether the CMU’s 
objectives will offer sufficient ‘coalitional glue’ if interests and preferences 
begin to differ markedly remains to be seen.60 Moreover, it is a fact that 
the CMU lacks the sense of urgency of past EU endeavours – think of 
the European System of Financial Supervision or the Banking Union for 
that matter.61 The point is noteworthy, since a sense of urgency can help 
to generate momentum and improve the odds of successful reforms in 
Brussels. In final analysis, however, it might well be that what proves cru-
cial for improving the odds of the CMU reform agenda are the skills of 
the person who was tasked with delivering it – Jonathan Hill – especially 
when it comes to bridging a potential future divide between the UK and 
the BU Member States.  
3. The CMU and SMEs
In this section, I will try to put flesh on the bones of the CMU pro-
ject. I will begin with a few general observations. First of all, it is worth 
recalling that the CMU’s objectives are wide, but also overlapping. A key 
objective such as ‘better access to finance for SMEs’ is merely empha-
sising the potential benefits of a single capital markets for SMEs. It is 
also plain that the CMU is supposed to benefit a variety of actors on 
both the demand side and the supply side: e.g. businesses, especially 
57 See in this context, Ringe, (2015).
58 Whether much serious thought was given to the choice of CMU language is ques-
tionable. See Davies, (2015), noting that ‘[t]he capital-markets union actually began 
as a slogan, coined by one of EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s aco-
lytes’. See also Jegen and Mérand, (2014), p. 183 who note that ambiguity is rarely a 
‘conscious strategy’.
59 Jegen and Mérand, (2014) p. 183.
60 Arguably, the fact that a single capital market where movement is seamless has yet 
to fully materialise and that SMEs still face obstacles when seeking access to capital 
does not offer much support for the power of such objectives (ideas) over interests.
61 See Fuentes, (2015), citing David Wright, Secretary General of IOSCO, as noting that 
‘Europe always works best with deadlines. 2019 is a long term deadline …’.
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SMEs, but also investors, insurance companies, pensions funds, banks, 
or other financial participants. Different actors have different profiles; 
they have different financial needs or resources, different levels of finan-
cial literacy, different levels of access to relevant information, etc. Thus, 
when assessing the CMU and what it offers each group (and sub-group) 
of actors, a multitude of factors need consideration. For the present 
purposes, the point is that the sheer number of factors complicates an 
appraisal of the CMU. Hence, rather than to attempt to formulate gen-
eral and abstract proposals, I will attempt to make suggestions in rela-
tion to one group of actors – SMEs – and one of the CMU’s objectives: 
that is, helping SMEs to gain better access to external finance. I will start 
by identifying the problematic (a.), after which I will reflect on possible 
solutions (b.). 
a. Pathology
To properly appreciate the ‘access to finance’ problematic for SMEs, I 
will begin by highlighting a number of key issues. I will focus mainly on 
issues which affect the demand side: that is SMEs.62 
‘SME’ is an umbrella term which lacks a single definition
As noted above, my aim is to make progress on designing a CMU by 
focussing on SMEs only. This task is complicated by the fact that there 
is no single definition of SME’s.63 The Prospectus Directive (PD), for 
instance, provides that SMEs are companies:
‘… which, according to their last annual or consolidated accounts, 
meet at least two of the following three criteria: an average number of 
employees during the financial year of less than 250, a total balance 
sheet not exceeding EUR 43 000 000 and an annual net turnover not 
exceeding EUR 50 000 000’.64
62 However, it is understood that there are obstacles on the supply side as well, which 
will further complicate access to finance for SMEs (in the area of insolvency, securi-
ties law, etc.).
63 See also in this context, House of Lords, European Union Committee, (2015b), at 
para 80; AFME, (2015), p. 30.
64 PD Art 2(1)(f).
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By defining SMEs in this manner, the PD draws on a standard EU defi-
nition of SMEs.65 MiFID II, however, defines SMEs as companies which 
‘had an average market capitalisation of less than EUR 200 000 000 on the 
basis of end-year quotes for the previous three calendar years’.66 There are 
other definitions. According to the World Bank, for example, many banks 
define SMEs as businesses with sales of less than USD 2 500 000 and USD 
10 000 000, respectively.67 Other definitions focus on other figures (e.g. an 
annual turnover of up to GBP 25 000 000).68 In other cases, it is the size 
of the funding sought which serves as a proxy for determining whether a 
business is small, medium or large.69
Besides definitional issues, there are other serious complications. Par-
ticularly problematic is the fact that ‘SME’ is an umbrella term. As a result, 
the range of businesses that are treated as ‘SMEs’ tends to be very broad. 
These businesses might often have little in common.70 Thus, besides size, 
SMEs will vary along various dimensions: industry and sector, level of 
innovation, business ambitions, growth ambitions, etc. Variation may 
then become especially problematic when trying to diagnose problems 
and defining solutions. 
Using capital markets is often considered uneconomical 
Even if we overlook definitional issues, there are a number of other prob-
lems which require consideration. One such consideration concerns the 
size of funding which SMEs require. Specifically, the point is that the 
65 Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, 
small and medium-sized entreprises [2003] OJ L124/36. Note that according to the 
Commission Recommendation, SMEs are enterprises ‘which employ fewer than 250 
persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or 
an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million’.
66 MiFID 2, Art 4(1)(13). The EUR 200 000 000 figure in MiFID 2 is still well above the 
figure which is included in the PD’s definition of companies with ‘reduced capitali-
zation’ (PD Art 2(1)(t)), which are companies listed on a regulated market and which 
had ‘an average market capitalisation of less than EUR 100 000 000 on the basis of 
end-year quotes for the previous three calendar years’.
67 World Bank, (2014), p. 3.
68 See House of Commons, Treasury Committee, (2015) p. 3.
69 World Bank, (2014), p. 3.
70 There may also be relevant geographical differences. For example, the 2014 SAFE 
Survey reports that the proportion of SMEs which sees access to finance as the most 
pressing issue is largest in Cyprus, Greece and Slovenia whereas the relative low-
est number are located in the Czech Republic, Austria and Slovakia. See European 
Commission, (2014b), p. 142.
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amount of external finance which SMEs require will generally not be on 
the same scale as other (ie, large) businesses. At the same time, because 
of variation within the SME group (e.g. in terms of size), the amount 
of funding that SMEs may require is also likely to differ markedly.71 For 
example, the 2014 SAFE survey reported: 
SMEs across EU-28 that were expecting growth were asked to indi-
cate what amount of financing they would like to obtain. In 2014, 
most SMEs expecting growth would aim at obtaining financing 
between 25,000 Euro and 99,999 Euro (25% […]). 13% of SMEs 
would aim at obtaining less than 25,000 Euro, 19% would aim at 
obtaining between 100,000 Euro and 249,999 Euro, 18% would aim at 
obtaining between 250,000 Euro and 1 million Euro and 14% would 
aim at obtaining more than 1 million Euro to finance their growth 
ambitions. Between 2013 and 2014 there were no major changes in 
the amount of financing SMEs obtain.72
To this one must add that the cost involved with raising capital on 
stock markets is substantial. Expenses include due diligence costs, the 
cost of complying with disclosure requirements (initial and ongoing) 
and other regulatory requirements. Hence, because of the size of 
funding sought and the cost associated with raising capital on stock 
markets – or perhaps better, because of cost relative to funding size 
– many SMEs will consider capital markets a profoundly uneconom-
ical route for raising funds.73 Moreover, instead of measures aimed at 
facilitating equity investment (e.g. venture capital or business angels), 
71 Ibid, p. 61, noting that ‘there is a positive correlation between enterprise size and 
financing: larger enterprises more often apply for external finance than smaller ones. 
The same holds for innovative enterprises in comparison with non-innovative enter-
prises’. See also BMG Research and Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, 
(2013) p. 27. 
72 European Commission, (2014b), p. 85. The remaining 11% were reported as na/dk 
(‘no answer/don’t know’). Note that the survey defines SMEs as enterprises with 
1-249 employees (see fn 1, p. 9). For the UK, see also BMG Research and Department 
of Business, Innovation and Skills, (2013), p. 27.
73 Figures are difficult to find, but see tentatively, Zeidler, (2014), noting that raising 
funding on capital markets only makes sense for business with yearly turnaround of 
at least EUR 50 Million; AFME, (2013), p. 29, noting that ‘[f]or many corporates, par-
ticularly smaller firms, vanilla bank lending (including both term loans and credit 
facilities), is the main source of finance. The cost and ticket size required for capital 
markets issuance by corporates is typically prohibitive for transaction sizes below 
€500 million’.
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many SMEs view public measures as a core driver for their future 
financing.74 
However, all this is not meant to suggest that one should not attempt 
to improve access to different sources of finance. Recall in this context 
that the Commission has also launched a consultation on the Prospectus 
Directive (PD).75 The directive requires an issuer to publish a prospectus 
in case where a company seeks to raise capital by making a public offer or 
where it seeks admission to trading of securities on a regulated market. It 
also requires each prospectus to be approved by the relevant competent 
authority. Because of its importance for the CMU, it is worth briefly con-
sidering the Commission consultation on the PD.
The PD is arguably a key measure for delivering a successful CMU. 
To be effective, its requirements must be properly calibrated. They must 
strike a proper balance between the different interests at stake. This also 
implies that the regime must be properly circumscribed. In its consulta-
tion, the Commission seeks feedback on inter alia the scope of the pro-
spectus regime and on various exemptions from the obligation to publish 
a prospectus. Together these provisions determine the outer limits of the 
prospectus regime: they contribute to determining when an offer can be 
considered a private placement and whether there is room outside the 
prospectus regime for other forms of funding: e.g., investment based 
crowd funding. Specifically, the PD includes a number of thresholds, 
which contribute to determining whether the directive applies and, if it 
applies, whether a securities issue can be exempted from its key require-
ments. Among the former is Article 1(2)(h) which excludes from the PD’s 
scope ‘small offers’, that is offers of securities with a total consideration 
in the EU of less than EUR 5 Million.76 Among the latter is Article 3(2) 
which includes a list of exemptions which apply to offers that would oth-
erwise be treated as public offers (e.g. an offer made to less than 150 per-
sons per Member States or an offer of securities with a total consideration 
in the EU of less than EUR 100 000). 
Besides consulting on the PD’s scope, the consultation also seeks 
views on how to deal with compliance costs for SMEs in case where 
the directive’s disclosure provisions do apply. Among other things, the 
Commission seeks feedback on the directive’s ‘proportionate disclosure 
regime’. The latter is meant to offer SMEs and companies with reduced 
74 European Commission, (2014b), p. 88.
75 European Commission, (2015d).
76 PD Art 1(2)(h).
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market capitalisation a lighter prospectus regime. However, the regime is 
thought to be ineffective.77 The Commission also consults and on a pos-
sible prospectus regime for SME growth markets, a new category of mul-
tilateral trading facilities under MiFID 2.78 In this context, the Commis-
sion considers whether it should introduce a ‘bespoke prospectus regime’ 
for SMEs (or for companies with reduced market capitalisation).79 The 
consultation also opens the door for significant changes to the prospectus 
approval system under which each prospectus must be approved by a 
competent authority before it can be published. 
Admittedly, there are other areas under consideration, which I will 
not discuss here. Instead I will limit myself to a few comments. First 
of all, it remains to be seen whether the EUR 5 Million threshold 
under Article 1(2)(h) is in and of itself problematic for many SMEs.80 
A more likely problem with Article 1(2)(h) is that Member States are 
left with discretion to unilaterally determine the treatment of offers that 
are below the EUR 5 Million threshold. They are thus able to define 
onerous prospectus requirements for offers that fall outside the scope 
of the directive.81 Regarding SME Growth Markets, these markets might 
well prove popular with a portion of SMEs. A simplified prospectus for 
SMEs which list on these markets could be a way to make progress and 
77 European Commission, (2015d), p. 13.
78 See MiFID 2, Art 33.
79 European Commission, (2015d), p. 14.
80 The figures quoted above (see supra, text to n 72) suggest that the funding needs of 
a majority of SMEs are well below the 5 Million threshold. Moreover, SMEs that 
wish to raise capital in excess of 5 Million on a stock market are currently able to ac-
cess MTFs (eg AIM). MTF are not currently covered by the PD (although the Com-
mission is now consulting on the matter). SMEs which contemplate listing on these 
markets will therefore not – currently – have to comply with the requirements of the 
directive, provided that they do not seek funding from the public (and if they are, 
are unable to rely on one of the exemptions of Art 3(2)). With regard to crowd-fund-
ing, note that the general EUR 5 Million is still far greater than the USD 1 million 
threshold which is the upper limit on the offering amount under the crowd-funding 
exemption of section 4(6) of the US Securities Act of 1933.
81 To be fair, the point did not escape the attention of the Commission which noted that 
investment-based crowd funding might be discouraged in Member States where the 
prospectus requirements are applied below the EUR 5 Million threshold (see Euro-
pean Commission, (2015d), p. 6). Note that the PD includes a very small offers ex-
emption in Article 3(2) which exempts offers of securities ‘with a total consideration 
in the Union of less than EUR 100 000’. Because of the interplay between Art 1(2)
(h) and Art 3(2), Member States are unable to require publication of a prospectus for 
offers of less than EUR 100 000. However, for offers above this threshold, but below 
the EUR 5 Million threshold of Art 1(2)(h), they are left with discretion. 
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accommodate SMEs, provided however that information asymmetries, 
which have tended to be significant in the SME funding market, are also 
dealt with. But it is not obvious that the PD is the right instrument for 
addressing the concerns of SMEs/SME Growth Markets. In particular, 
it is not obvious that the PD is especially well suited for striking the 
right balance between (i) the concerns of SMEs/SME Growth Markets 
– in terms of reducing compliance costs82 and allowing for flexibility83 – 
and (ii) the needs of investors. The PD has proved to be quite an inflex-
ible piece of legislation which is especially concerned with levelling the 
playing field between Member States. This is obvious as far as disclosure 
requirements are concerned (principle of maximum harmonisation as a 
general rule), but also as far as prospectus approval is concerned (ex ante 
review of each and every prospectus). 
To be sure, the Commission has long acknowledged the importance 
of taking the needs of SMEs into account.84 However, the PD has not been 
very effective at reducing compliance costs for SMEs. Thus, reducing 
‘administrative costs’ was a core theme of the 2010 Prospectus Amending 
Directive.85 In order to meet this objective, the Commission proposed, 
when bringing forward the proposal for an amending directive: the 
establishment of a proportionate disclosure regime, to abolish restric-
tions which prevent issuers of certain types of non-equity securities 
from choosing between a limited number of different competent author-
ities, and to facilitate offers of securities to employees under employee 
share schemes.86 However, the outcome of these reform proposals was 
rather mixed. As already noted, the Commission is currently consulting 
82 See also MiFID 2, Rec (132).
83 The need for preserving an ‘appropriate degree of flexibility’ in relation to SME 
growth markets was acknowledged by ESMA when advising the Commission on pos-
sible subordinate measures for MiFID 2/MIFIR. See European Securities and Mar-
kets Authority, (2014), p. 352, noting that ‘… among existing markets with a focus 
on SMEs, a broad spectrum of approaches exists in relation to the setting and appli-
cation of issuer admission and disclosure requirements. Given this level of diversity, 
the preservation of an appropriate degree of flexibility for market operators under the 
supervision of NCAs, at member state level, is a central them of ESMA’s advice’.
84 e.g. European Commission, (2008). 
85 Directive 2010/73/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Novem-
ber 2010 amending Directives 2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when 
securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and 2004/109/EC on the 
harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issu-
ers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market [2010] OJ L327/1, 
recitals (1)-(4).
86 See European Commission, (2009b); European Commission, (2009a).
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on reforming the proportionate disclosure regime which it says is ‘per-
ceived as too burdensome’.87 It also contemplates further changes to the 
rules governing employee share schemes, which it sees as possibly failing 
to encourage third country issuers from offering securities to their EU 
employees.88 The Commission is also consulting – again – on the issue of 
the determination of the competent authority for issuers of non-equity 
securities, its initial proposal having been rejected by the EU legislature. 
Hence, attempting to undo the PD in order to accommodate SMEs 
might not be the best way forward. A more promising way would be to 
deal with SMEs in a separate directive which does not come with the ‘bag-
gage’ of the PD (both in terms of its underlying approach and in terms of 
its underlying politics). Admittedly, it remains to be seen whether there 
is effectively a need for EU action in this area. But if so, a directive ded-
icated to SMEs might be more effective at balancing the needs of SMEs 
and those of investors, thereby hopefully contributing to creating the 
conditions for SMEs to grow and to achieve the scale needed to raise 
capital on the main market of a stock exchange. 
SMEs face information problems
Offering SMEs better access to finance is not only a problem of the economics 
of lending or investing. It also depends on proper information. There is a 
wide consensus among public and private actors that information problems 
affect the prospect of SMEs attracting external finance. On the supply side, 
investors/lenders face information asymmetries which affect their ability to 
assess the creditworthiness of SMEs and the risks involved with SME busi-
nesses. Unsurprisingly, the Commission in its Green Paper, identifies work 
on SME credit information as an area for early action.89 However, informa-
tion problems also affect the demand side (SMEs). The Green Paper has less 
to say about these information problems. The Commission notes: 
‘[i]n Europe, most SMEs only approach banks when seeking finance. 
… Although banks sometimes refer SMEs on to alternative finance 
providers, this does not always work: sometimes, neither banks nor 
SMEs are sufficiently aware of the existence of alternatives’.90
87 European Commission, (2015d), p. 13.
88 Ibid, p. 11.
89 European Commission, (2015b), p. 10.
90 Ibid, p. 14.
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In fact, informational problems are pervasive on the demand side. 
They affect SMEs ability to identify financing options and to choose the 
most appropriate one. They are widely acknowledged. Thus, in its 1998 
Risk Capital Action Plan, the Commission highlighted the ‘general lack 
of understanding and awareness of financing options’ among SMEs.91 
Financial market actors have been keen to highlight the issue too.92
Responding to such failures is not merely a matter of improving the 
flow of information between borrowers and potential lenders/inves-
tors. The problem has an educational dimension. Identifying the most 
appropriate financing option requires basic understanding of corporate 
finance, including knowledge of salient differences between debt and 
equity finance, their implications for the management and control of 
the business, etc. Education also matters for other reasons: successfully 
attracting external funding requires business owners to meet the expec-
tations of finance providers: for example, in terms of developing and pre-
senting solid business plans. 
   
Given the needs and characteristics of SMEs, banks have particular 
advantages 
So far I highlighted a number of key aspects of the ‘access-to-finance’ 
problematic of SMEs. Specifically, I referred to the (comparatively lim-
ited) size of funding which most SMEs require; the cost of raising cap-
ital on stock markets; and the information problems which investors/
lenders and SMEs face. All this contributes to explaining why bank 
finance is the preferred source of external finance for SMEs in Europe. 
To be sure, the fact that bank finance is so prevalent in Europe has also 
to do with the fact that in comparison to the US, Europe has many more 
91 European Commission, (1998), p. 18. In the UK, see also BMG Research and De-
partment of Business, Innovation and Skills, (2013), noting that ‘[w]hilst the vast 
majority of SMEs are aware of finance from a bank, awareness of other sources of 
finance is lower. For instance, 53 per cent of SMEs were aware of venture capitalists, 
and 52 per cent were aware of asset based finance. However, less than a third were 
aware of business angels, export/import finance, peer to peer lending, and less that 
12 per cent were aware of crowd sourcing or mezzanine finance. Fewer businesses 
were actually aware of specific suppliers for these non-bank types of finance’.
92 eg AFME, (2015), p. 30, noting that ‘SMEs often feel lost when trying to identify 
alternative sources of funding’.
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small businesses.93 Given their size, they will not, in general, have access 
to capital markets. But even so, banks have in comparison to other pro-
viders of finance, a number of key advantages to offer. At the risk of sim-
plifying a more complex and diverse picture, banks’ business models are 
better suited for small scale lending. They have the necessary infrastruc-
ture and expertise to engage in SME lending.94 Importantly, they benefit 
from an ongoing relationship with SME customers. Thus, in comparison 
to other finance providers, a bank is often more actively involved with 
the SME business and will be able to offer SMEs a wider range of ser-
vices. The relationship aspect of SMEs and their banks is widely seen as 
important in explaining SMEs’ behavior when seeking external finance. 
For example, a 2013 BIS/BMG research study notes:
‘Most SMEs do not shop around when they need finance. They typ-
ically approach just their main bank within a week of needing the 
finance. This is because they have an existing relationship with their 
bank, and view the application process to their bank to be easier’.95
Because of their close involvement with SMEs, banks also tend to 
have better information about their SME customers. They will therefore 
be able to better assess the SME business and the risks that are involved. 
Last but not least, because of banks’ pivotal role, it is hardly surprising 
that SMEs are more confident in dealing with banks than with other 
finance providers. The 2014 SAFE survey thus notes:  
‘[t]here exist considerable differences in the confidence among SMEs 
regarding talking about financing and obtaining the desired results 
with either banks on the one hand, and equity investors and venture 
93 See Goldman Sachs, (2015), p. 4, noting that ‘[t]he high level of bank-dependence in 
the Euro area also reflects the importance of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in the European corporate sector. In the EU, half of all workers are employed 
by firms with fewer than 50 employees, whereas in the US that proportion is only 
around one-quarter … As a rule, small businesses cannot issue directly on public-
ly-traded securities markets, since insufficient information is available for investors 
to assess corporate performance and creditworthiness. SMEs are therefore more 
likely to rely on banks’.
94 e.g. European Central Bank and Bank of England, (2014b), p. 8, noting that ‘… 
for certain types of lending, such as loans to SMEs and residential and commer-
cial property lending, banks are arguably better placed to extend credit given their 
branch network, credit assessment expertise and their operational capabilities’).
95 BMG Research and Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, (2013), p. 1. 
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capital enterprises on the other hand, even within countries. It holds 
for each country that SMEs find the latter to be more intimidating …’. 96
Access to external finance is not the most pressing issue for many SMEs 
Last but not least, it is worth remembering that while access to finance is 
a significant issue, it is not the most pressing issue for many SMEs. For 
instance, the 2014 SAFE survey reports that 
‘In 2013 and 2014, the most pressing problem amongst SMEs in 
EU-28 was finding customers. From the items in the questionnaire, 
SMEs on average rated access to finance as the fifth most pressing 
problem they faced; it is mentioned by 14% of the SMEs as the most 
pressing problem’.97
Likewise, the ECB notes on the issue of access to finance of SMEs in 
the euro area that finding customers ‘remained the dominant concern 
for euro area SMEs’ during the surveyed period, with access to finance 
‘somewhat less of a concern’.98
b. Solutions
In the preceding part, I highlighted a number of issues which contribute 
to explaining the access-to-finance problematic for SMEs. In this final 
part, I will discuss ways to deal with this pathology. I will first return to 
the Commission’s Green Paper and examine it in light of what I have said 
so far about SMEs (i), after which I will make a number of suggestions on 
a future CMU agenda (ii).  
96 European Commission, (2014b), p. 116, noting further that ‘[t]he difference is, how-
ever, relatively smaller for countries such as Denmark, Malta, Hungary and Greece. 
The difference is particularly large in the Czech Republic and Slovakia’.
97 Ibid, p. 141. However, there is variation among Member States. The survey notes: 
‘SMEs experience the problem of access to finance the most pressing in Cyprus, 
Greece and Slovenia; and the least pressing in the Czech Republic, Austria and Slo-
vakia. Comparing across different types of enterprises, SMEs in construction con-
sidered the problem of access to finance the most pressing. Micro enterprises con-
sider the problem of access to finance the most pressing, whereas large enterprises 
find it least pressing. More innovative enterprises experience more access to finance 
problems than less innovative enterprises’.
98 European Central Bank, (2014), p. 4. Like the 2014 SAFE survey, the ECB reports 
significant variation among Member States (see ibid, pp. 4-5).
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(i) Thoughts on the Green Paper’s first thoughts 
Looking at the Commission’s Green Paper in light of the pathology 
described above, the following points can be made: 
First of all, it is plain that because of the issues highlighted above,99 
banks will need to continue playing a pivotal role in the SME funding 
market in Europe. The fact that the Commission has singled out work on 
high quality securitisation as an area for early action is therefore clearly 
important. It is hoped that if banks can free up their balance sheets by 
using securitisation (hence reducing the capital that banks must hold 
against these loans), securitisation will enable banks to increase their 
lending to SMEs.100 Secondly, even if capital markets are likely to play 
a more indirect role for many SMEs, attempting to diversify sources 
of funding for SMEs is an objective which the Commission is right in 
pursuing. Large SMEs might thus be able to reap benefits of any future 
work on a pan-EU private placement market. Work in the area of ven-
ture capital or peer-to-peer lending/crowd-funding might also benefit a 
portion of SMEs (e.g., start-ups). The Commission is also right to con-
sider other areas for action. As already noted, attempting to deal with 
information asymmetries in the SME funding market is important and 
should be welcomed. Meanwhile, progress in fields such as insolvency, 
taxation or securities law may prove to be crucial for stimulating cross-
border investment. The Commission is also clearly not oblivious to the 
role that public measures can play in terms of facilitating access to finance 
for SMEs.101 The fact that the Green Paper considers action on ancillary 
fronts (e.g. cross-border mobility or restructuring) is useful too. As noted 
earlier, access to finance is an important, but not necessarily the most 
pressing issue for many SMEs. Cutting red tape and trying to improve the 
99 e.g. the small scale funding needs of a large proportion of SMEs and the larger pro-
portion of small businesses in the EU in comparison to the US.
100 see e.g. European Central Bank and Bank of England, (2014b), p. 8, noting that ‘[b]y 
potentially enabling banks to lend without committing too much capital and other 
sources of funding, securitisation could provide indirect market access to certain 
borrowers, such as SMEs, who are otherwise unable to access markets directly’. See 
also House of Lords, European Union Committee (2015b), para 29; AFME, (2014), p. 
11. 
101 European Commission, (2015b), pp. 1 and 18. Regarding public measures, see es-
pecially the Regulation (EU) No 1287/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 December 2013 establishing a Programme for the Competitiveness of 
Enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (COSME) (2014 - 2020) and 
repealing Decision No 1639/2006/EC [2013] OJ L347/33. See also European Com-
mission, (2014a); European Commission, (2015a). 
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general regulatory and legal environment for SMEs is important, inde-
pendently of the funding problematic. As far as the CMU is concerned, 
it is reasonable to assume that any measure which directly or indirectly 
contributes to fostering growth, will also improve the odds of a business 
gaining access to a wider range of funding sources: for example, on the 
main markets of stock exchanges which are currently not accessible to 
many SMEs.
Hence, the Green Paper and its ideas on areas of possible action should 
be welcomed. However, much remains to be spelled out and fleshed out 
and it is likely that the devil is going to be in the detail: that is, in the spe-
cific proposals once they are brought forward. That said, more thought 
needs to be spent on how to address information problems in the SME 
funding market. Specifically, the Commission in its Green Paper appears 
to lack imagination when thinking of possible measures for addressing 
information problems on the demand side – that is, information prob-
lems which affect SMEs when seeking funding. In order to address the 
latter, the Green Paper notes that 
‘[b]anks could be encouraged to provide better feedback to SMEs 
whose credit applications are declined and to raise awareness about 
alternative financing opportunities for SMEs whose credit was 
declined’.102
These suggestions prompt a number of comments. Firstly, the ref-
erence to banks being ‘encouraged’ appears to be a nod to self-regu-
lation. In fact however the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) 
already includes a ‘feedback’ provision on credit decisions by banks. 
Thus, regarding loan applications, Article 431(4) CRR requires banks, 
if requested, to explain their rating decisions to SMEs.103 Secondly, con-
cerning the Commission’s other suggestion – ie, to encourage banks to 
‘raise awareness about alternative finance opportunities’ for SMEs – it is 
worth noting that this approach has already been tried out at the national 
102 European Commission, (2015b), p. 14.
103 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms 
and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 [2013] OJ L176/1, art 431(4) which 
states that ‘[i]nstitutions shall, if requested, explain their rating decisions to SMEs 
and other corporate applicants for loans, providing an explanation in writing when 
asked. The administrative costs of the explanation shall be proportionate to the size 
of the loan’.
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level. Thus, in 2010 major UK high street banks committed to a number 
of measures with a view to help businesses in search of finance. These 
commitments were set out in a taskforce report. With respect to informa-
tion problems, the report concluded:
‘Customers need to know what to do, and where to go, if the bank 
declines a credit application or offers an alternative finance solution. 
The Taskforce banks have agreed to commit to providing proactive 
and clear information on what alternative sources of finance and 
other help might be available. … Our signpost initiative sets out the 
minimum standard of service customers will get, either verbally or in 
writing. If their loan application is unsuccessful, they will be told why 
and they will then be guided to alternative sources of help and advice, 
including how to improve their creditworthiness. …’.104
However, these commitments appear to have largely failed to deliver 
results. The 2014 SME Finance Monitor reported in relation to busi-
nesses, whose loan applications had been declined, that only 9% had been 
offered an alternative form of funding or suggested alternative sources 
of external finance by the bank.105 On the quality of the advice that these 
applicants received, it noted that:
‘Two thirds (61%) thought that the advice their lender had offered at 
that stage had been poor, 14% thought it had been good while 9% had 
not been offered any advice’.106
Finally, according to the Finance Monitor, only 11% of unsuccessful 
applicants had been referred to ‘any other sources of help or advice’ by 
the bank.107
It is this sort of finding which the UK government highlighted when 
proposing legislation in this area.108 Following the adoption of the Small 
Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, section 5 of the act now 
104 Report of the Business Finance Taskforce, (2010). Supporting UK business. (Octo-
ber), p. 42, available at https://www.betterbusinessfinance.co.uk/images/pdfs/Busi-
ness_Finance_Taskforce_report.pdf.
105 BDRC Continental, (2015), p. 148.
106 Ibid. According to the survey, these results represented some progress in compari-
son to previous years.
107 Ibid.
108 See in this context, HM Treasury, (2014), pp. 5-6.
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authorizes the Treasury to establish a mandatory referral system by way of 
regulations. Under this system, designated banks will be required to refer 
certain information about their SME customers and the latter’s funding 
needs to so-called ‘finance platforms’. The information in question relates 
inter alia to the amount and type of funding sought, the length for which 
the SME has been operating and receiving income, information regarding 
contact details, legal structure and the funding timetable.109 The finance 
platforms are supposed to function as an access point and connect other 
finance providers with SMEs.110 As noted, this mechanism requires sep-
arate regulations to be made by the Treasury. The regulations are at the 
time of writing only available in draft form.111 For the present purposes, 
suffice to say that the transfer of the relevant information to a finance 
platform is subject to the SME’s consent.112 Crucially, a designated bank 
is only required to transfer information about its SME customer if the 
latter’s application for a loan or for another credit facility from the bank 
is considered to be ‘unsuccessful’.113 ‘Unsuccessful’ is a term which is 
defined in the draft regulations.114 It covers the case where a designated 
bank decides to simply reject its customer’s application. It also covers the 
situation where the bank offers its SME customer a finance facility ‘on a 
different basis’, which the latter goes on to reject for reasons which do not 
concern the fees or interests that the bank wishes to charge its customer. 
Given these limitations, it remains to be seen whether these new 
finance platforms, once the relevant regulations are made, will be effec-
tive in improving competition in the SME funding market. However, 
they might well prove useful in helping SMEs to gain access to alternative 
sources of finance. One advantage of the scheme is that SMEs will not 
have to actively search for alternative sources of funding. Instead of being 
109 Note that the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 leaves the duty 
to specify relevant information to the Treasury. The relevant regulations are cur-
rently only available in draft form. See the draft schedule of the Small and Medium 
Sized Business (Finance Platforms) Regulations 2015, available at https://www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389210/The_Small_
and_Medium_Sized_Business__Finance_Platforms__Regulations_2015_Regula-
tions_draft_statutory_instrument.pdf.
110 s. 5 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015.
111 See supra (n 109). 
112 s. 5(2)(a) of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015.
113 s. 5(1).
114 Draft regulation 2(2) of the Small and Medium Sized Business (Finance Platforms) 
Regulations 2015.
Capital Markets Union and Small And Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs)  |  Pierre Schammo 
164
in an active mode,115 they will be put in a reactive mode: matchmaking is 
primarily meant to be supply side driven via finance platforms.116 How-
ever, it is plain that robust rules will need to be put in place in order 
to protect SMEs throughout the process, notably from untrustworthy 
finance providers.117 Moreover, in order to prevent a lemons market from 
developing,118 credit information on SMEs will need to be easily available 
to finance providers.119 
(ii) Thoughts on a future Commission White Paper on building a 
CMU 
At the time of writing, the Commission’s consultation on the Green Paper 
is ongoing. Once the consultation is closed, it can be expected that the 
Commission will come forward with more specific proposals for action 
at EU level – presumably in a White Paper on building a CMU. Herein-
after, I will make some suggestions on areas for future action. In line with 
what I said earlier, I will proceed on the premise that bank finance will 
continue to prove crucial for many SMEs, but that seeking to improve 
access to finance for SMEs, by diversifying funding choices, is an objec-
tive that should be pursued vigorously. Moreover, from what I have said 
so far, it is plain that addressing information problems on the demand 
(for funding) side should be as much a priority as dealing with informa-
tion problems affecting the supply (of funding) side. The latter area has 
been singled out for early action in the Green Paper; the former not.
Hereinafter, I will focus on how to address information prob-
lems affecting SMEs on the demand side. I proceed on the premise 
that improving access to finance for SMEs is not merely a question of 
improving the flow of information. As noted earlier, SMEs need more 
than raw information: they need advice, education and support. I will 
115 See e.g. platforms such as http://www.betterbusinessfinance.co.uk/, http://europa.
eu/youreurope/business/funding-grants/access-to-finance/.
116 Note that under draft regulations, a business that does not agree to its information 
being provided to a finance platform, will nevertheless be offered generic informa-
tion by its bank on finance platforms, including on how it can refer itself to designat-
ed finance platforms (draft regulation 4(3)).
117 See in this context, HM Treasury and Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 
(2014).
118 Akerlof, (1970).
119 See in this context, s 4 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 
which seeks to facilitate a better flow of credit information on SMEs via Credit Ref-
erence Agencies. 
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begin by examining the issue of improving the flow of information, after 
which I will turn to the issue of support (broadly defined).
Facilitating the flow of information 
Before setting out substantive ideas, it is worth briefly considering the legal 
justification for EU action in this field. As already noted, a proper flow of 
information between SMEs and potential lenders/investors is crucial for 
improving the prospect of SMEs gaining access to finance. However, from 
an internal market perspective, improving the flow of information is clearly 
also important for ensuring that a single market for capital can function 
properly. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that information asym-
metries which affect the SME funding market at the domestic level will 
be even more severe at a pan-EU level. Addressing information problems 
in the SME funding market has thus a clear internal market rationale. The 
more difficult question is how best to address the issue on a pan-EU basis. 
As noted, the Commission in its Green Paper offers little in terms of an 
initial reflection on how to address information problems on the demand 
side. To make progress on the matter, I will suggest that supply side driven 
matchmaking via private sector finance platforms might be the way for-
ward. One could thus imagine pan-EU finance platforms similar to the ones 
that are likely to emerge in the UK once the relevant regulations are made. 
Like in the UK, the crux of such an arrangement would be a system of man-
datory referrals from designated banks to pan-EU finance platforms. Like 
in the UK, the subject matter of the referral would be information: that is, 
information concerning the funding needs of an SME customer. The aim of 
this new mandatory referral system would be to connect SMEs across the 
EU with finance providers (including with competing banks) by relying on 
pan-EU finance platforms as an information access point. 
To be sure, there is a need for a deeper reflection on how a mandatory 
referral system could effectively work on a pan-EU basis; what safeguards 
would need to be put in place in order to protect the interests of SMEs 
as well as the interests of investors/lenders; what role finance platforms 
could play in relation to raising awareness of public measures; to what 
extent their role should extend to advice and support; and what type of 
funding model would be appropriate for a pan-EU finance platform.120
120 Note that under draft regulation 6(7) of the UK draft regulations, finance platforms 
cannot charge fees to SMEs. See also in this context the literature on two-sided mar-
kets, e.g., Rochet and Tirole, (2003); Evans, (2011).
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 However, as in the case of UK finance platforms, there are two 
obvious bottom lines. First, any transfer of information to a pan-EU 
finance platform would presuppose that the SME to which the informa-
tion pertains, gives its consent. Once the information is transferred, rules 
will need to be in place in order to ensure that the SME remains in con-
trol of the process, including in control of information which allows it 
to be identified.121 These safeguards will be important in order to protect 
against cold calling, a practice that would undermine confidence in the 
operation of pan-EU finance platforms and undermine the CMU’s objec-
tives. Secondly, it is plain that information asymmetries, which might 
prevent lenders/investors from assessing the creditworthiness of an SME 
business, would have to be addressed in order to deal with the ‘lemons 
market’ problematic. 
With these safeguards in place, further thought should be given to 
the costs and benefits of going beyond the UK arrangements. Recall that 
according to section 5 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment 
Act 2015, a designated bank is only required to transfer specified infor-
mation about its SME customers to finance platforms if the request for 
bank funding is ‘unsuccessful’. Recall also that under the current draft 
regulations, a request for funding will not be considered to be unsuc-
cessful if an SME customer is offered a finance facility on a ‘different 
basis’ and the latter rejects the offer for reasons having to do with the fees 
or interest to be charged by the bank.122 Given the objectives of the CMU 
and the nature of the problem – especially, the need to address informa-
tion problems on a pan-EU scale and the fact that SMEs do no tend to 
actively shop around for funding – there is a need for a deeper reflection 
on the circumstances which justify a transfer of information to a finance 
platform. Specifically, thought should be given to the question of whether 
a mandatory referral system should also apply in case where a bank offers 
its SME customer a finance facility, but the latter rejects the offer because 
of the fees or interest which the bank wishes to charge. Such a measure 
would not only contribute to improving access to finance; it would also 
ensure more effective competition in the SME funding market. Moreover, 
the additional burden that such a system would impose on banks can a 
priori be justified. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to assume that banks will 
121 See generally, HM Treasury and Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 
(2014).
122 Draft regulation 2(2) of the Small and Medium Sized Business (Finance Platforms) 
Regulations 2015.
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be able to benefit from a mandatory referral system if they themselves 
decide to join finance platforms in order to bid for business from SMEs 
which bank with their competitors. It is also worth noting in this context 
that the information that banks would be required to refer is unlikely to 
be proprietary information. In the case of the UK, for example, the infor-
mation in question is basic information about the SME and its funding 
request.123 In fact, given the nature of the information that is referred, 
one might well imagine actors other than banks referring information 
about SMEs to pan-EU finance platforms. Accountants could play such a 
role.124 However, imposing a mandatory referral obligation on account-
ants would a priori be a step too far: the cost involved in establishing 
systems to ensure a transfer of information would likely be dispropor-
tionate to the benefits (if any) of such a system for accountants. This is 
not to say that accountants (or other professionals for that matter) could 
not be encouraged to offer SME customers the option of transferring 
information regarding their funding needs to pan-EU finance platforms. 
However, such a system, whilst voluntary, would need to be subject to the 
same safeguards as a mandatory system.    
Advice, education and support
As noted above, SMEs not only need raw information about funding 
opportunities. They need advice, education and support. These different 
services can be regrouped under ‘information provision’, but for the sake 
of convenience, I will group them together under the umbrella term of 
‘business support’ initiatives. The CMU offers an opportunity to reflect 
on how best to meet the needs of SMEs in this area. 
It is apparent that business support can be offered on a commercial 
basis or as part of a commercial activity. It is conceivable that pan-EU 
finance platforms could play a significant role in this area too. However, in 
the remainder of this paper, I will focus on SME business support that is 
offered on a not-for-profit basis by public actors or through public schemes. 
It is worth beginning by highlighting a number of considerations.
  
123 See the draft schedule of the Small and Medium Sized Business (Finance Platforms) 
Regulations 2015.
124 See in this context, BMG Research and Department of Business, Innovation and 
Skills, (2013), p. 52, noting that survey results showed that ‘[a]ccountants were the 
most trusted source of advice, by 86 per cent of those likely to use advice in future if 
they had difficulties raising finance…’.
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First of all, there is much to be said in favour of a ‘one-stop shop’ 
mechanism in this field: by concentrating a number of business support 
services in a physical or virtual place, a one-stop shop mechanism can be 
a useful practical solution for helping SMEs to get support, advice and 
generally to gain access to information, including regarding public meas-
ures. However, secondly, to be effective a one-stop shop mechanism must 
be sufficiently visible. Pleading for visibility is then arguably pleading 
against too much diversity in this field and in favour of more integration 
or at least a more integrated strategy. However, in fact there appears to 
be a good degree of diversity in this field, with Member State and EU 
schemes co-existing. The Enterprise Europe Network (EEN) is the EU’s 
response to SME business support. The EEN is a one-stop shop.125 It has, 
according to the Commission, a particularly important role to play in 
‘overcoming information asymmetries faced by SMEs and alleviating 
transaction costs associated with cross-border activities’.126 It operates at 
national level through its member organisations. 127
Despite – or perhaps more fittingly, because of – existing schemes at 
Member State and EU level, some see the US Small Business Administra-
tion (SBA) as a more effective example of a one-stop shop mechanism.128 
125 Rec (17) of Regulation (EU) No 1287/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 December 2013 establishing a Programme for the Competitiveness 
of Enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (COSME) (2014 - 2020) and 
repealing Decision No 1639/2006/EC [2013] OJ L347/33.
126 European Commission, (2011b), p. 6.
127 Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 1287/2013 sets out the actions which the EEN may 
undertake: ‘(a) provision of information and advisory services on Union initiatives 
and law; support for the enhancement of management capacities to increase the 
competitiveness of SMEs; support aimed at improving SMEs’ financial knowledge, 
including information and advisory services on funding opportunities, access to 
finance and related coaching and mentoring schemes; measures to increase SME 
access to energy efficiency, climate and environmental expertise; and promotion 
of Union funding programmes and financial instruments …; (b) facilitation of 
cross-border business cooperation, R&D, technology and knowledge transfer and 
technology and innovation partnerships’. In addition, the network is meant serve as 
a ‘communication channel’ between the Commission and SMEs and may serve to 
deliver services on behalf of other Union programmes, ‘including dedicated adviso-
ry services encouraging SME participation in other Union programmes’.
128 See AFME, (2015), p. 30, noting that ‘[i]nterviewees also highlighted that SMEs’ 
historical reliance on banks meant that SMEs often feel lost when trying to identi-
fy alternative sources of funding. This is not helped by the plethora of government 
and non-government schemes set up to support SMEs in recent times. The US Small 
Business Administration was identified by both bank and non-bank sources as a 
good example of a “one-stop-shop” for SMEs in need of both advice and funding’. 
See also House of Lords, European Union Committee, (2015b), p. 31.
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The SBA is a federal agency. It was set up in 1953 by the US Congress in 
order to ‘aid, counsel, and protect the interests of the nation’s small busi-
ness community’.129 Its range of services includes (inter alia) information 
provision, advice, education, and financial support through various pro-
grams.130 It also helps to uphold the interests of small businesses in the 
award of government contracts.131
It might well be that the US SBA is an example of a one-stop shop 
which is worth emulating. However, considering a more integrated one-
stop shop solution akin to the US SBA would prove to be problematic in 
the EU: not only as a matter of political reality, but also as a matter of con-
stitutional law. This is because SME business support is closely linked to 
industrial policy under the EU Treaties and the EU only has supporting 
competence in this area. That is, it can only take action in order to ‘sup-
port, coordinate or supplement’ Member State actions.132
Hence, the CMU faces arguably some political and constitutional 
limitations which might come to affect its ability to deliver one of its key 
objectives. However, this is not to say that the existing EEN should not be 
part of a discussion on a future CMU. There might be room to improve 
existing EEN arrangements within existing boundaries: for example, 
in terms of the visibility of the mechanism or the depth and quality of 
services provided at national level.133 Hence my final proposal concerns 
the scope of the CMU initiative. Fragmentation of policy initiatives is 
unlikely to serve SMEs well. The Commission did not mention the EEN 
in its Green Paper on the CMU. Given the emphasis placed on access to 
finance for SMEs and the range of areas under consideration in the Green 
Paper, this omission is noteworthy. 
129 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Small Business and the SEC: a guide for 
small businesses on raising capital and complying with the federal securities laws, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm.
130 For details, see U.S. Small Business Administration, (2014).
131 Ibid.
132 Article 6 TFEU. Thus, Regulation (EU) No 1287/2013, which specifies the EEN’s 
actions, is based on Articles 173 TFEU (industrial policy) and Article 195 TFEU 
(tourism). The COSME Regulation was not intended to replace national initiatives. 
See European Commission, (2011b), p. 11.
133 See in this context Art 10(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1287/2013 which states that the 
Commission shall assess the Network ‘in terms of its effectiveness, governance and 
provisions of high-quality services across the Union’.
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4. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to assess the CMU initiative, as it is emerging at 
the time of writing. The paper attempted to gather first elements regarding 
the shape and content of the CMU by relying on policy documents and 
especially on the Commission’s Green Paper on a CMU. Ultimately, this 
paper sought to investigate the relationship between the CMU and SMEs 
and make proposals on how to make the former more relevant to the 
latter. 
By way of conclusion, it is worth considering two final issues. They 
have to do with the CMU or with the proposals that I made in this paper. 
Firstly, critics of the CMU initiative might seek to dismiss it as just another 
example of European gobbledygook. However, this criticism largely fails 
to do justice to the project. As noted earlier, for all its ambiguity, the 
notion of a CMU offers currently a focal point for promoting coopera-
tion on a wide range of issues. Moreover, the CMU offers an opportunity 
to make progress on some long-standing issues. The second issue con-
cerns the proposal for pan-EU finance platforms and for rolling out a 
mandatory referral system on an EU wide basis. The idea of finance plat-
forms bridges a (somewhat artificial) divide between capital and banking 
markets. It is reasonable to assume that banks will be interested in being 
members of pan-EU platforms and as such be interested in competing 
for business alongside alternative finance providers. Critics might point 
out that such a system would do little to address Europe’s bank bias: that 
is Europe’s dependence on the banking sector. However, such a criticism 
is artificial and largely unwarranted. The EU would be pursuing an unre-
alistic strategy if it believed that banks would simply stop playing a role 
in the SME funding market as a result of the establishment of a CMU. To 
be successful, the CMU should not be about imposing a choice between 
banks and other finance providers. Instead, it should be about offering 
greater choice. Banks will continue to matter in the SME funding market. 
The Commission is right not to exclude them from the CMU initiative.  
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Single Market vs. Eurozone: Financial 
Stability and Macroprudential Policies 
Carmelo Salleo
The financial crisis which started in 2007 was the most severe in decades. 
It affected deeply some of the most advanced economies, in particular 
the US and the EU, and elicited strong responses. Policy makers focused 
along two lines of action:
• Conjunctural measures, aimed at avoiding the freefall of the 
economy and possibly elicit a quick comeback. Fiscal, monetary and 
prudential measures were taken in the heat of the moment, possibly 
with mixed results.
• Structural measures, devised to combine into a new analytical and 
institutional framework aimed at strengthening the resilience of the 
financial sector and at fostering a comprehensive approach to finan-
cial stability.
In this short essay I will look cursorily at the policy reactions of policy 
makers in the US, UK and EU to see what stylized facts can be drawn 
(with no pretence of science), then describe the new institutional setup 
in the EU and what challenges it poses to an area which can be broadly 
partitioned into three: the euro area (EA), the UK and CEE1.
1. Conjunctural responses to the crisis
I will first look at fiscal, monetary and prudential policies across the US, 
UK and EU, then assess their collective impact on the three economies 
1 As this volume also contains a submission which brings in the Swedish perspective I 
will defer to its author for further thoughts on the impact of the new framework on 
countries which do not fall in the three clusters I discuss here.
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and draw tentative conclusions – figures are rounded up and not all defi-
nitions are exactly consistent with each other, but this intended to be a 
bird’s eye view of the main trends. The EA will be looked at in terms 
of averages, even though responses were heterogeneous across coun-
tries – but the goal here is to give an overall perspective across the three 
economies and not to analyse in detail how the crisis played out within a 
monetary union. 
a. Fiscal policy
The pattern of the fiscal policy response has been relatively similar across 
all three economies: an increase in 2008-10, then a decrease, but the 
orders of magnitude were quite different (Fig. 1).
In the US the government deficit had been around 2 per cent of GDP 
before the crisis; it jumped to about 9 per cent for the years 2008-10, then 
decreased again over the following years to about 3 per cent. If we take 2 
per cent as a sort of long-term average, the US government injected more 
than 25 p.p. of GDP into the economy in just four years.
In the UK the government deficit was also hovering around 3 per 
cent before the crisis; it then jumped above 10 per cent in 2009 and came 
down relatively quickly but was still close to 5 per cent in 2014. Over 6 
years the UK government injected into its economy more than 25 p.p. of 
GDP.
In the EA the weighted average of government deficits was less than 
2 per cent of GDP before the crisis, it rose above 6 per cent in 2009-10 
but was back to 3 per cent in 2013. If we take as long-term average 2 per 
cent, the extra resources pumped into the economy by EA governments 
was less than 15 per cent over 5 years. This might of course be due also 
to the fact that the EA lacks a central fiscal authority which could take 
decisive action in a short time-span, while national governments might 
try to free-ride on each other’s expansion.
Over-simplifying a bit, the US went for a sharp boost, the UK for a 
more steady approach, the EA had overall a smaller fiscal response.
b. Monetary policy
As the impact of fiscal policy is powerful but takes time to feed into 
the economy, central banks went quickly into easing monetary policy, 
bringing reference rates to close to zero in order to counter deflationary 
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pressures. However the impact on real rates was different, reflecting dif-
ferences in the structure of the economy and perhaps about inflation 
expectations (fig. 2.1).
In the US policy rates dropped to (almost) zero in 2009 and real rates2 
stayed a little above minus 2 per cent, starting to pick up only in mid-
2014. This means that for about five years those willing to invest or con-
sume were effectively subsidised by their creditors at a steady rate.
In the UK policy rates also dropped to (almost) zero in 2009 but real 
rates went all the way to almost minus 5 per cent towards end-2011 then 
climbed up to zero at the end of 2014. Somehow inflation expectations 
(or perhaps expectations about the UK economy as a whole and about its 
performance relative to the global economy) have been volatile over the 
past few years, and might have been turning more pessimistic over the 
latter period.3
In the EA policy rates dropped more slowly – below 2 per cent only 
towards the end of 2009 and below 1 per cent in 2014. Real rates got close 
to zero only towards the end of 2010 and have stayed broadly there since. 
Hence the monetary stimulus for investment and consumption has been 
less pronounced than in the US or the UK, probably due to a pessimistic 
outlook on the performance of the EA economy (which would be con-
sistent with expectations of very low inflation). 
So conventional monetary policy had to grapple with the zero lower 
bound problem: once there, policy rates’ influence on the economy 
depends on variables that are generally beyond the grasp of central 
banks. But central banks didn’t confine themselves to manoeuvring 
prices (interest rates), they also engaged in non-conventional measures, 
by using quantities (expanding their balance sheets) (fig. 2.2). 
The Fed increased the size of its balance sheet from about 6 per cent of 
GDP in 2007 to more than 15 per cent already in 2008 and around 23 per 
cent in 2013. Its purchases of government bonds were about 20 per cent 
of the federal deficit in 2009-10, more than 50 per cent in 2011 and 2014, 
close to 80 per cent in 2013 (fig. 2.3). In this indirect form of cooperation 
between the government and the central bank, in which the central bank 
through its purchases effectively ensured that fiscal expansion would not 
2  Calculated ex-post, with all the limitations of such an approach.
3 For a given nominal rate a higher real rate implies lower inflation expectations – this 
could be either due to more faith that the Bank of England will keep inflation under 
control compared to what investors thought in the earlier years of the crisis, or more 
pessimistic expectations about the performance of the UK economy over the next 
few years – hence lower inflation expectations.
Single market vs. Eurozone: financial stability and macroprudential policies  |  Carmelo Salleo
182
raise interest rates and crowd out private investment, monetary expansion 
accompanied fiscal expansion at its peak (the first few years) and provided 
some form of support for the government’s debt management program.
The Bank of England followed a similar expansion path for its balance 
sheet, from 7 per cent of GDP in 2007 to15 per cent in 2008 and more than 
20 per cent already in 2012. It purchased large amounts of government 
bonds (relative to government deficit) in 2010, 2012 and 2013. The cen-
tral bank expanded its balance sheet together with the first round of fiscal 
stimulus, then again when the government deficit was about to shrink. 
The ECB’s balance sheet expanded from 18 per cent of the area’s 
GDP in 2007 to 24 per cent in 2008, to close to 34 per cent in 2012 then 
decreased to 26 per cent in 2014. Its purchases of government bonds 
issued by EA governments over the years 2010-2013 were less than 8 per 
cent of their deficits. 
The maximum expansion of central banks’ balance sheets compared 
to 2007 is similar across the three economies (a little above 15 per cent of 
respective GDP), but the ECB purchased a much smaller fraction of gov-
ernment deficit, thus letting governments finance themselves on financial 
markets as usual.4
c. Prudential policies
Fiscal and monetary policies are the classical conjunctural tools, but there 
is also a whole set of instruments which affect the supply (and some-
times demand) of credit and which can be put under the broad umbrella 
of prudential policies that affect the economy as a whole. Furthermore, 
given that the crisis was mainly a financial one at least at the beginning, 
and that there was broad consensus about the need to reduce a debt over-
hang in the economy and strengthen the banking system to reduce moral 
hazard (the too-big-to-fail problem) and cost for taxpayers, prudential 
polices have been just as important a tool.
I will focus in this section on measures aimed at increasing the resil-
ience of the banking sector via increases in capital because of their con-
junctural impact. Other measures were undertaken (such as the creation 
4 On the general issue of the effects of quantitative easing, see e.g. “The Effects of 
Quantitative Easing on Interest Rates: Channels and Implications for Policy’’, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2011, by Arvind Krishnamurthy and 
Annette Vissing-Jorgensen and “ECB Policies Involving Government Bond Pur-
chases: Impact and Channels’’ (2014 WP), by Arvind Krishnamurthy, Stefan Nagel 
and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen.
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of asset management companies or of resolution funds in some coun-
tries, government guarantees on bank bonds, bank workouts, etc.) but 
from a conjunctural perspective they are perhaps less relevant.
Broadly speaking, regulators and supervisors realised that banks were 
undercapitalised either already ex ante, holding too little capital for the 
risks they underwrote, or ex post after having had to absorb severe losses. 
Banks were therefore requested to increase substantially their capital 
ratios to ensure a sufficiently comfortable buffer for absorbing potential 
additional losses, and they had the choice between raising equity (not 
easy in difficult market conditions), retain earnings (not easy with a weak 
economy) or deleverage (not good for a fragile economy).
I will look in turn at risk-weighted capital ratios (fig. 3.1), which are 
informative about banks’ risk-taking capacity ex ante5, and at leverage 
ratios (fig. 3.2), which are informative about banks’ resilience in case of 
a shock.6
The general set of rules to be adopted was decided collectively within 
the Basel framework, but national authorities can exert some moral sua-
sion to accelerate the adoption of measures or even adopt more stringent 
requirements.
The Tier 1 ratio of US banks was below 10 per cent in 2008, and went 
above 12 per cent already in 2009. Their leverage declined slightly from 
assets being 10 times equity in 2008 to a ratio of around 9 in 2010. US 
banks, which are a much smaller part of the financial system than in the 
EA, strengthened quickly their capital positions in terms of ex ante risk but 
left their resilience to shocks broadly unchanged. The improvements were 
mainly due to increases in capital, as the weight of banks’ total assets to 
GDP actually increased from 70 to 85% between 2007 and 2014 (fig. 3.3).
UK banks started below 8 per cent of Tier 1 ratio and increased it 
continuously to above 13 per cent by 2014. Their leverage ratio decreased 
from 27 to 17. UK banks increased significantly both their risk taking 
capacity and their resilience to shocks, and they did it by increasing cap-
ital but also by deleveraging a bit, as their total assets to GDP ratio fell 
from 460 to 400 per cent. These data reflect also the fact that the large UK 
banks are also global players, so maybe this last figure is only relatively 
meaningful.
5 Higher ratios mean that banks’ probability of default is lower – assuming the map-
ping from risk to capital is correct of course.
6 As losses are in nominal terms and not weighted, low levels of capital in the system 
mean it is more fragile in case of another crisis.
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As for EA banks, they increased their Tier 1 ratio from 8 to 12 per 
cent, and their leverage ratio decreased from 25 to 17. On the whole this 
was achieved mainly via capital increases, as their share of total assets 
over GDP fell only slightly from 340 to 310 per cent.
Overall all three banking systems have similar risk taking capacity, 
US banks have much smaller balance sheets so their resilience is higher 
– but of course one should look at a broader set of financial institutions 
to assess the resilience of the industry as a whole. It seems that in the end 
deleveraging was contained – from a macroeconomic perspective the 
credit supply seems to have been marginally affected by banks’ massive 
recapitalization efforts, although of course portfolio allocations might 
have shifted towards assets with lower risk weights, such as government 
related securities, displacing credit to the economy.
d. Outcomes
I will look at the combined effect of fiscal, monetary and prudential policies 
on the economies of the US, UK and EA by describing trends in the finan-
cial sector (total debt over GDP,), the economy (GDP per capita and unem-
ployment) and macroeconomic imbalances (the current account position). 
The US – total debt in the economy was at 270 per cent of GDP in 
2007; it shrank a little at the beginning then actually rose, to almost 300 
per cent in 2014 (fig. 4.1). The private sector’s share decreased a little, 
from 205 to 195 per cent, and the government’s share increased from 65 
to 100 per cent. The private sector deleveraged a bit but the public sector 
more than compensated for it. If debt overhang was a problem, the only 
possible benefit has been a shift to the government’s balance sheet, which 
is probably more solid that the private sector’s, but the overall magnitude 
of the problem has actually increased.
Real GDP per capita stayed broadly constant – at first it decreased 
slightly, then it increased; in 2014 it was 2 per cent higher than in 2007. 
The unemployment rate on the other hand reached a high of almost 10 
per cent in 2010, the dropped to 6 per cent in 2014, still higher than 
before the crisis when it was below 5 per cent. The current account deficit 
was halved between 2007 and 2014, to 2.4 per cent of GDP, possibly also 
thanks to exchange rate effects induced by the ultra-lax monetary policy.
The policy mix chosen by US policy makers can be described as a 
combined loosening of fiscal and monetary policy, of significant magni-
tude and apparently with some synchronization in timing, and a relative 
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tightening of prudential policies. It stabilised the economy, brought back 
unemployment, reduced the current account deficit and debt in the pri-
vate sector, strengthened the banks but at the cost of much higher public 
debt and larger central bank balance sheet. 
Of course one would need a counterfactual to see where the US 
economy would be had policies been more conservative. If fiscal multi-
pliers are close to one and given that extra low rates decreased the cost of 
servicing debt, the fact that real GDP per capita stayed broadly constant 
indicates that the economy might have deteriorated significantly without 
such policies. 
One might wonder whether, if another crisis of similar magnitude 
hits the US economy, there is enough space for a repeat of such a policy 
performance. The challenge is then to make sure that these policies were 
actually conjunctural, i.e. that they can be at least partially reversed to 
create room for possible future interventions.
The UK – total debt in the economy rose from 220 to 250 per cent 
of GDP (fig. 4.2). The private sector’s share shrank, from 185 to 160 per 
cent and the government’s share increased from 50 to 90 per cent. Just as 
in the US, the private sector’s deleveraging was more than compensated 
by a massive increase of government debt. The UK’s banks simultaneous 
increase in Tier 1 ratio, deleveraging and shrinking of their balance sheets 
indicates that they didn’t shift much towards holding government bonds, 
but they might have constrained the supply of credit to the private sector.
Real GDP per capita dropped during the crisis, and was still slightly 
lower in 2014 than in 2007. The unemployment rate rose to 8 per cent in 
2011 and was back to almost pre-crisis levels in 2014, at 6 per cent. The 
current account deficit on the other hand increased, from 1.5 to 4.3 per 
cent of GDP. The new jobs created after the through of the crisis were 
probably not high-paying ones and in non-tradable sectors.
The UK policy mix was of very loose fiscal and monetary policies and 
quite tight prudential policies. It was followed by a stagnant economy, 
deleveraging of the private sector but a deterioration of the current 
account position; banks became much more resilient.
Again, the challenge is to re-create room for possible future interven-
tions by reducing the government’s deficit (which is part of the program 
of the recently re-elected conservative government); the complication 
with respect to the US is a less vibrant economy and higher real rates. 
If there isn’t a pickup in global demand UK policy makers might find 
themselves in a difficult situation, with few instruments at their disposal.
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The EA – total debt in the economy has grown from 230 to 250 per 
cent of the economy (fig. 4.3). The private sector’s exposure stayed broadly 
constant around 160 per cent of GDP, while the public sector’s grew from 
70 to 90 per cent. There was no deleveraging in the private sector but it 
had started out with low levels compared with the US for example, while 
the public sector on the whole is reaching high levels.  
Real GDP per capita was 3 per cent lower in 2014 than in 2008, and 
unemployment is above 11 per cent and 4 p.p. higher than in 2008. The 
current account went from a deficit of 1.6 per cent of GDP in 2008 to a 
surplus of 2.4 of cent in 2014. This is all consistent with a contraction of 
output.
The policy mix in the EA was obviously affected by the lack of a central 
fiscal policy maker which could work in tandem with monetary policy, as 
happened implicitly or explicitly in the US and the UK. In the end fiscal 
policy was on the whole moderately loose, while monetary policy was 
more aggressive, in particular with its non-conventional measures. Pru-
dential policies were tighter than in the US but looser than in the UK. The 
EA’s economy fared the worst of the three, with a slightly lower increase 
in public debt (but starting also from higher levels), a weaker economy, 
banks that are not in better shape than the others and only an improved 
current account (but probably due more to the recession and terms of 
trade effects than to increased productivity).
The challenge as for the UK is to reduce governments’ deficits in the 
face of weak growth; the task is complicated by the fact that government 
debt is higher in the weaker countries, and by more cumbersome deci-
sion-making processes which impose additional costs in terms of delays 
and compromises.
e. The bottom-line
Almost 6 years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers the economies of 
the US, UK and EA have not really fully recovered to where they would 
have been without the crisis. If one assumes a trend growth of 1 per cent 
for real GDP per capita (lower than GDP because of ageing popula-
tions, immigration, etc.) then it is lower by 3 to 6 p.p. compared to what 
it would be.7 Unemployment is still higher than before, in particular in 
7 For a comparison with the great Depression see also “The Current Financial Cri-
sis: What Should We Learn from the Great Depressions of the Twentieth Century?” 
(2009), by Gonzalo Fernandez de Cordoba andTimothy Kehoe, mimeo.
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the EA. Total debt is still high due to the expansion of government debt, 
central banks are in uncharted territories. The only bright spots are lower 
private sector debt and more resilient banks.
This being said, the stylized facts described above suggest some les-
sons in terms of responses to a financial crisis, and some challenges.
Fiscal policy is very powerful, especially in coordination with an 
aggressive monetary policy; together they can compensate for private 
sector deleveraging and seem to work well in reducing unemployment, 
less so in promoting growth.8 
Non-conventional monetary policy measures can play a role when 
policy rates hit the zero lower bound. Their impact, and the effects of 
central banks buying large amounts of government bonds should be fur-
ther explored.
Prudential policies should be seen as part of the broader policy mix. 
They can be tighter when fiscal and monetary policy are looser, otherwise 
they risk spurring excessive deleveraging in the private sector and delay a 
possible upturn of the economy. 
The main challenge is how to reduce the public sector’s balance 
sheets without derailing a fragile recovery. Just as coordination within an 
economy improves the effectiveness of each policy, perhaps international 
coordination of the three policy domains could create economies of scale 
and scope. Of course one would need to integrate in the picture the other 
key players in the global economy – Japan, China, the other emerging 
markets – but the description of such strategic interactions goes well 
beyond the scope of this paper.
2. Structural measures
While policy makers dealt with the crisis by manoeuvring fiscal, monetary 
and prudential policies, together with regulators they also set out to amend 
the old framework and design a new one which would address some issues 
which the crisis highlighted as key to preserve financial stability.
Most measures affect banks, and therefore were designed and agreed 
upon within the Basel framework (the so-called Basel 3 agreement), 
then they were adopted in the EU regulatory framework with the CDRD 
IV/CRR in 2013. This new set of regulations updates and upgrades the 
8 On private sector deleveraging and fiscal policy see “Balance Sheet recession as the 
Other Half of Macroeconomics”, (2012), Richard Koo, mimeo. 
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microprudential framework which had shown many weaknesses, and it 
formally introduces the concept of macroprudential regulation, aimed at 
preserving financial stability.
a. The instruments 
Without getting into the details of the new tools created to reduce sys-
temic risk, here’s a quick summary of the main instruments which are 
now at the disposal of macroprudential authorities.9
To address the pro-cyclicality of the financial system, the main tool 
is the counter-cyclical capital buffer. Banks are supposed to fill the buffer 
in good times (defined as: when the credit-to-GDP gap is above some 
threshold, which is in turn linked to the probability of a crisis), so that 
when there is a downturn they can decumulate them thus not constraining 
the credit supply. The idea is that the buffer increases the resilience of 
banks to shocks, softens the impact of a downturn and possibly also curbs 
risk-taking during the boom phase by increasing the cost of credit since 
equity is more expensive than debt (this last effect rests implicitly on the 
assumption that Modigliani-Miller does not apply to banks).
To address the risk of contagion across the banking system, more cap-
ital buffers were devised so that banks can absorb higher losses, which 
decreases counterparty risk. Furthermore limits to large exposures can 
be imposed to reduce interconnectedness. Sectoral risk weights can also 
induce banks to reduce common exposures and thus the risk of general-
ized losses.
To deal with the related risk of firesales, which were one of the ampli-
fying mechanisms of the crisis, the new framework adds to the toolbox 
two liquidity ratios which should ensure on the one hand that banks have 
a balanced structure of assets and liabilities in terms of maturities, and on 
the other hand that they have enough cash to finance their operations for 
a month without having to start selling assets of lesser liquidity – which 
could trigger widespread firesales.    
Finally, to address moral hazard induced by banks that are too big 
to fail, systemic institutions are required to hold extra buffers so as to 
reduce the impact of their possible demise. They are also required to have 
high levels of bail-in-able liabilities to protect depositors and taxpayers 
9 For a more detailed description of instruments available in the EU, see The ESRB 
Handbook on Operationalising Macroprudential Policy in the Banking Sector 
(2014).
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(so-called TLAC requirements), and they must also issue contingent con-
vertible bonds (CoCos) which convert to equity or absorb losses when 
regulatory capital dips below a certain threshold which is still way above 
resolution levels. This instrument should provide an additional layer 
of protection to debt-holders and is cheaper than equity as long as the 
coupon is tax-deductible (which it is generally in Europe but so far not in 
the US so US banks are not issuing CoCos yet). 
Many of these instruments are meant to preserve financial stability 
but they also affect the safety and soundness of individual institutions 
and have therefore also a microprudential dimension. This raises compli-
cated issues of governance:  how should the two sets of prudential poli-
cies coordinate, what kind of conflicts could arise (e.g. in a downturn the 
macroprudential angle would suggest a release of buffers to sustain the 
credit supply while the microprudential perspective would be more con-
servative given the heightened risk of debtors), how does this all interact 
with the other macroeconomic policies are all issues that have found dif-
ferent solutions at the national and EA level.
b. The institutions
As the crisis hit the EA particularly hard, it became clear that its 
banking system was fragmented and therefore also had difficulties 
transmitting evenly monetary policy impulses. It was therefore decided 
to create a Banking Union, which would ultimately rest on three pillars; 
a common supervision, a common resolution scheme and a common 
deposit insurance.
The construction started by setting up a common banking supervi-
sion function, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), entrusted to the 
ECB. The governance of the SSM is complicated, as the ECB’s Governing 
Council decides upon input of a Supervisory Board which does not have 
the same exact composition, but for the purpose of macroprudential pol-
icies the key result is that the ECB can use all and only the instruments 
detailed in the CRD IV/CRR, and only to tighten them. The rationale 
was probably that while national authorities might be hesitant to tighten 
during a boom and risking bringing it to a premature end, in a downturn 
there would be no inaction bias in loosening. The other key point is that 
national authorities can not only also use the same instruments (in both 
directions), they can also use any other instrument which is not contem-
plated by the CRD IV/CRR, such as Loan-to-Value, Debt-to-Income or 
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Loan-to-Deposit ratios, which are considered to be rather effective tools. 
National authorities play an important role in the macroprudential set-
ting of the EA also because in a monetary union with non-synchronous 
financial cycles macroprudential policy often needs to be tailored to the 
specific situations of individual countries. This complex setup means that 
within the EA macroprudential policy is a coordinated effort between 
microprudential and macroprudential perspectives on one hand, and 
between national and EA-wide perspectives on the other.
The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) provides a framework for 
the orderly resolution of banks in the SSM space, and is especially impor-
tant for banks with significant cross-border activities. It ensures that to 
the maximum extent possible taxpayers are shielded from the cost asso-
ciated with bank failures and it has access to a resolution fund to help 
cover the cost of bank resolution. This way there is an appropriate degree 
of burden sharing across countries and the costs of bank failures are 
spread to avoid what happened during the crisis, namely that widespread 
bankruptcies in some countries had systemic effects on the economy. The 
SRM complements the SSM in that now that banks are supervised by a 
single entity with common standards it also makes sense that resolution 
is dealt with within a unified framework.
The last pillar of the Banking Union, a common deposit insurance is 
still in the works. Once it will be in place the EA will have a consistent, 
integrated framework to deal with issues pertaining to the banking sector 
and to a large extent to financial stability since banks are still the domi-
nant players in the EA’s financial system.
The other EU countries adopted a variety of governance structures to 
deal with the new framework for banking regulation and macroprudential 
supervision. In the UK all powers were given to the central bank, which 
is therefore responsible for monetary policy, microprudential and mac-
roprudential supervision. In Sweden the banking supervision authority 
is also in charge of macroprudential supervision. In Denmark macropru-
dential supervision is performed by a committee chaired by the Treasury. 
In principle given the complementarities and trade-offs involved among 
the three policy domains (fiscal, monetary and prudential) many govern-
ance structures might make sense. The key issue of course is to ensure 
proper accountability of choices and a decision-making process which 
is effective within its institutional framework. In the EA, in which there 
is no overall fiscal policy and in which banks are by far the most rele-
vant actors in the financial system, it makes sense to have the ECB at the 
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center of the framework, albeit with shared responsibilities with national 
authorities and with the recognition of the independence of its monetary 
policy function from the other policy domains.
The key difference between the EA and the other EU countries is that 
in the EA there is no central fiscal policy, which as seen in the previous 
section is an important element of macroeoconomic stabilization. So in 
the EA it is particularly difficult to reap the benefits of a synchronized 
action of fiscal, monetary and prudential policies.
c. The challenges within the EU
The EU economy can (simplistically) be seen as an economic space organ-
ised around three poles: the EA, the UK and Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), which is not a homogeneous economy but a set of countries that 
share some common traits (fig. 5). The differences in economic, finan-
cial and institutional structures among these three areas mean that their 
interaction creates some challenges for policy makers when it comes to 
preserving financial stability in the EU.
The EA and CEE
Most CEE countries pegged their currency to the euro, therefore their 
monetary policies are heavily influenced by ECB decisions. In terms of 
using monetary policy for financial stability purposes, if their financial 
cycles are not aligned with the euro areas this means that there is little 
leeway, and actually they could be importing instability if for example in 
order to preserve the exchange rate they have to implement a monetary 
policy which is looser than what local conditions would suggest.
A second issue is that most CEE banking systems are part-owned by 
EA banks, which in many cases actually collectively have a significant or 
even majority market share. This means that CEE banking supervisors 
are host authorities and have little scope for an independent prudential 
stance. Home supervisors might fail to take into due consideration the 
issues of host supervisors, and cross-border banking groups might have 
strategies which transcend any specific local market. How banks manage 
their consolidated balance sheets across subsidiaries and what overall 
stance home supervisors think is appropriate determine in large part the 
dynamics of local banking markets and therefore the financial cycle.
This leaves CEE countries with fiscal policy as a financial stability 
tool, but this is obviously sub-optimal given the many other objectives 
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and constraints faced by fiscal policy makers. This assessment is rather 
gloomy in principle but how relevant are these issues in practice?
On one hand, business cycles of CEE and EA countries are not too 
divergent, probably because the EA is by far the major trading partner for 
most CEE economies, and in most cases exchange rates can be adjusted 
on a one-off basis to correct for imbalances before they build up too 
much.
On the other hand some countries are entering in “close cooperation” 
with the SSM, which in essence means that over time they might join the 
banking union and become “co-home supervisors” of their own banks. 
This way they will be able to bring their perspective to the core of the new 
supervisory decision making process rather than having to interact on 
the basis of decisions taken entirely elsewhere.
For macroprudential issues the ESRB provides a forum in which to 
discuss and coordinate macroprudential stances and policies so there is 
scope for at least ample information sharing.
Finally, being part of the EU ensures that CEE countries will partici-
pate in the common development of new tools and frameworks, such as 
the Capital Markets Union project, and the further integration of finan-
cial infrastructures. More integration across the whole EU and a role in 
the governance mechanism should foster convergence and decrease the 
risk for a country of finding itself at odds with the rest but with little tools 
which can be used effectively.
The EU and the UK
The UK has an independent monetary policy10 and therefore it is more in 
control of its business and financial cycle. Linkages with the EA are mostly 
due to cross-border flows and common exposures. Therefore coordina-
tion of macro-and micro-prudential policies would be beneficial to both 
economies, although even measured in terms of financial assets the EA 
is a much more important partner for the UK than vice-versa. Also in 
this case coordination can be achieved by having open discussions at the 
ESRB on respective goals and policy stances.
One issue is that both economies vie for a top role as financial centers 
in the world, and policy makers might be tempted to use prudential 
10 To the extent that monetary policy can be truly independent, in particular of oth-
er monetary policies: on the global financial cycle see Rey, H (2013) “Dilemma not 
Trilemma: The global financial cycle and monetary policy independence”, paper pre-
sented at the Jackson Hole Symposium, August 2013.  
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policies as competitive tools. Before the crisis there were fears of a race 
to the bottom in order to help national champions compete in the global 
area, and to reduce the local cost of business in a bid to attract market 
share. After the crisis some claim that prudential policy is still used 
for competitive purposes, this time around by gold plating common 
European regulations in order to attract business by claiming a higher 
level of resilience. Whether this is true or not, it is important that 
prudential policies are not diverted from their main goal, as using them 
for competitive purposes basically negates their basic aim which is to 
de-risk the sector and improve its resilience.
There is still a structural problem, which is the different role played 
by banks and markets in the EA and the UK. Banks are dominant in the 
EA, while markets play a much more important role in the UK. This leads 
to different policy perspectives as instruments are different, and different 
policy stances as market reactions are much more pro-cyclical and swift 
than banks’, not to mention that markets are more integrated interna-
tionally. Taking this into account means that although intentions might 
be the same in the EA and the UK in terms of overall goals (e.g. increase 
the resilience of banks) the instruments chosen and timing might be 
different, e.g. UK authorities might favour a quick increase in straight 
equity to assuage investors while EA authorities might be comfortable 
with a build-up over time. This could lead to frictions as banks in both 
economies compete with each other and this different treatment might 
affect their business choices, even though it can be perfectly rational and 
optimal from a systemic perspective.
One final issue which might affect the interplay of prudential policies 
is the possibility that the UK exits the EU. If this were to be the case, what 
would be the implications for financial stability and macro-prudential 
policies? Perhaps not much, since the above discussion does not seem 
to depend much on the UK being part of the EU framework, but such a 
momentous event would definitely have many unforeseen consequences.
Summing up
The governance of different policy domains and their interplay among 
the main EU economies will shape the European way towards financial 
stability.
The key role of fiscal policy also for financial stability cannot be 
ignored. Within the EA this calls for much greater cooperation and coor-
dination also in the fiscal dimension.
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The relationship between the EA and CEE is a story of increasingly 
deep real and financial integration. The (semi-)fixed exchange rate regime 
and strong presence of EA banks in the CEE make the two regions very 
interdependent also from a financial stability perspective. This calls for 
more integration of prudential policies.
The relationship between the EA and the UK seems sufficiently loose 
and with enough degrees of freedom that differences in financial cycles 
should have little spill-overs if properly managed.
Conclusions
All in all, perhaps the main lesson of the crisis is that neither countries 
nor policies should be looked at in isolation – this is true in general and 
even more so when dealing with such an elusive and multi-dimensional 
concept as systemic risk.
We need a true general equilibrium approach to preserve financial 
stability in the EU and in the world, which puts together fiscal, monetary 
and prudential policies. Whether we will be able to achieve a sufficient 
degree of cooperation across sectors, policy domains, countries and gov-
ernance structures is the greatest challenge ahead. In the European Union 
we are working towards further integration of markets and institutional 
frameworks, streamlining of decision-making processes and cooperation 
within and across policy domains.
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Figure 2.1: Nominal and real interest rates (%)
UK: Bank of England ocial bank rate
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Figure 2.2: Size of central banks’ balance sheet (% GDP)
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Figure 2.3: Purchases of government securities by central banks (% 
deficit)
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Figure 3.1: Tier 1 capital ratio (%)
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Figure 3.2: Leverage ratio (%)
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Figure 3.3: Total banking assets (% GDP)
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Figure 4.1: Outcomes UK
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Figure 4.2: Outcomes US
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Figure 4.3: Outcomes EA
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Figure 5: Real and fi nancial relationships within the EUI
Notes:  
Full lines represent trade to GDP ratio (i.e. bilateral X+M /GDP)
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The Banking Union from an Outside 
Perspective1 
1. Introduction
This chapter contains some reflections on the achievements the EU banking 
union as seen from outside and its key challenges for the near future. I will 
touch upon four aspects of the banking union, without any ambition of 
completely covering all the arguments involved, mainly focusing on the 
supervisory aspects of the union. First, in Section 2, I will discuss the geo-
graphical and institutional setting of the banking union. Next, Section 3 
deals with the rationale behind the Banking Union and describes what I 
consider important costs and benefits. In Section 4, I list some consider-
ations that may have contributed to some countries, deciding to opt out 
from the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Finally, in Section 5, I dis-
cuss what implications SSM has had for non-participating EU countries 
so far and identify some of the challenges I believe lie ahead. 
2. Geographical and institutional dimensions of banking union
For a proper assessment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism it is impor-
tant to take into consideration its need to communicate with national 
authorities and institutions that are not subject to the SSM rulebook. 
1 Disclaimer: The comments in this chapter are the author’s own views and do not 
necessarily reflect the opinions of the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank. I am 
grateful to Reimo Juks, Mattias Hector and Christina Nordh-Berntsson for sugges-
tions and comments on a draft of the conference presentation. All remaining errors 
are mine.
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So what does the landscape look like outside the banking union? 
Currently, nine out of 28 EU member states, Bulgaria, Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the 
UK, participate in neither the Euro nor the SSM. These nine countries 
host, among others, six of the 15 globally systemically important banks 
(G-SIBs) designated by the Financial Stability Board that the EU hosts. 
These six G-SIBS have substantial activities through both subsidiaries 
and branches inside the SSM that play an important role in the econo-
mies of some SSM members.
The cross-border activities of large international banks can give rise 
to several situations. A parent bank outside the banking union can have 
subsidiaries inside. Swedish banks, for example, hold large markets shares 
in Finland and the Baltics, and banks with their domicile in Denmark as 
well as in the UK also have a substantial foreign business that plays an 
important role in the economies of some SSM member states. Many of 
these subsidiaries are supervised by the ECB because they meet one of 
the five “significance” criteria that can trigger direct supervision by the 
ECB. Another possibility is that a parent inside the banking union has 
subsidiaries outside. Austrian, Italian and German banks in particular 
have substantial networks in Central and Eastern Europe. These subsidi-
aries are supervised by non-SSM authorities.
Because of these financial linkages that cross the banking union “bor-
ders”, in order to achieve an effective regulation and supervision of EU 
banks it is important that the banking union will facilitate an effective 
coordination of microprudential, macroprudential, resolution and crisis 
prevention policies. 
3. Rationale for a banking union
Before I get to my “outsider’s” view of the banking union I want to com-
ment briefly on some of the principal arguments for and against creating 
a banking union. In doing so I will draw selectively on what I consider 
important research insights.
Acharya (2003) captured early on why a joint regulatory framework and 
a common supervisory standard will limit excessive risk-taking by bank, 
provided that regulatory standards are high. Acharya also argued that this 
reduces the risk for regulatory capture and the need to use tax money or state 
guarantees for bailouts of institutions that are deemed too big to fail (TBTF).
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Empirical work has shown that a single supervisory standard may 
not only limit the risk for differences in supervisory standards or reg-
ulatory implementation but also reduce the risk of negative regulatory 
spillovers between countries. Ongena, Popov and Udell (2013) found 
that more competition in home markets and tighter business restric-
tions in domestic markets are historically associated with laxer bank 
lending standards abroad. Firstly, they found that lower barriers to entry 
in domestic markets (proxied by a regulatory environment that permits 
more bank competition), results in lower lending standards (proxied by 
more lending to ex-ante risky firms) by cross-border banks in local host-
country markets. Secondly, tighter restrictions on non-core bank activi-
ties, like banks’ involvement in securities markets, insurance, real estate, 
ownership of non-financial firms, et cetera, also result in lower lending 
standards by cross-border banks in local host-country markets. Ongena 
et al. found that both types of cross-border spill-over effects are stronger 
when banks are less efficiently supervised at home.
Creating a common level-playing field thus facilitates a better risk-
sharing and diversification by banks across home and host countries. 
Such improved risk-sharing and diversification may in addition reduce 
the systemic importance of banks, since the diversity and loss absorbing 
capacity of the banking sector would increase. 
Creating a single standard for banking regulation and supervision can 
also be associated with inefficiencies, both smaller and larger. As Acharya 
(2003) argued, if a joint regulatory and supervisory standard is based on 
the “lowest” or a “lower” common denominator, then a ”one size fits all” 
approach may not generate the above mentioned benefits. 
Other risks a banking union may need to deal with are of a more 
endogenous, second-round, nature. Better opportunities to engage in 
risk-sharing and diversification across countries are likely to lead to a 
change in the pattern of contagion between financial institutions. A pre-
paredness to look more at inter-linkages is necessary. International con-
tagion’s basic workings were well illustrated by the events in 2008-2009, 
when stress in funding markets spilled over from the United States and 
contagion on the asset side occurred from the Baltics for Swedish banks.
In research related to that of Peek and Rosengren (2000), who found 
that the Japanese banking crisis had a negative impact on construction in 
the U.S. commercial real estate market, De Haas and van Horen (2012) 
provide deeper evidence on the mechanism through which more risk-
sharing can lead to a stronger transmission of potentially a broader 
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range of foreign shocks. Their work shows that, following the failure of 
Lehman, banks reduced credit less to markets (i) that were geograph-
ically close banks, (ii) where they were more experienced, (iii) where 
they operated a subsidiary (iv) and where they were integrated into a 
network of domestic co-lenders. Ongena, Peydro and Van Horen (2013) 
offer further evidence of the challenges that international linkages create. 
They find that, during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, internationally-bor-
rowing banks2 contracted their credit more than domestic banks that are 
funded only locally did. As a result, firms that were dependent on credit 
and at the same time had a relationship with an internationally-bor-
rowing domestic or a foreign bank, as compared to a locally-funded 
domestic bank, suffered more in their financing and real performance. 
The above pattern of transmission of financial shocks implies that 
financial globalization and internationalization of banking services can 
have substantial real consequences if not properly addressed by policy. 
This line of research thus suggests that banks that expand abroad and do 
so further away from their home markets, at least in an initial stage, may 
transmit shocks to their host countries more forcefully. Because research 
in this field is both new and scarce, we do not know with enough cer-
tainty how robust these effects are, whether they will disappear over time 
and what the costs associated with a transition to a new equilibrium with 
European banks in a truly European banking market will be.
4. What conditions may have contributed to countries opting 
out?
So far, only members of the Euro Area have joined the SSM, with Den-
mark considering joining (Jacobsen, 2015). What factors are likely to 
have contributed to non-Euro countries deciding to opt out of the SSM 
- for the time being? 
Foremost, the design of the SSM created a governance structure 
that leans heavily on the ECB and is highly integrated with that of the 
Euro area, thereby reducing the influence of non-euro member states. 
Since non-Euro Area countries cannot gain a seat or voting right in the 
ECB’s Governing Council (GC), this institutional construction created 
an opening for situations where the GC can overrule decisions by the 
2  This applies to both domestic - and foreign-owned banks.
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Supervisory Board, where non-Euro members of the SSM would get a 
seat and a say.
At the time of the negotiations, Denmark’s Parliament, in corre-
spondence with the European Commissioner (Folketinget, 2012) argued 
that “further integration between Euro Area Member States must not 
be allowed to undermine cooperation in EU28. […]” Furthermore, 
“during the negotiations on the SSM, several non-Euro Area Member 
States, including Denmark, attached great importance to ensuring that 
non-Euro Area Member States that choose to join the SSM can partic-
ipate on balanced conditions in relation to Euro Area Member States. 
This is particularly relevant in terms of the voting rules that apply to 
the Supervisory Board and relations to the Governing Council of the 
ECB.” The UK House of Lords (2012) argued along similar lines that the 
“main bone of contention for Member States such as Sweden, Poland 
and Hungary has been how to ensure that they would have a full and 
equal role in the decision-making process. The ECB statutes make 
clear that only Euro area Member States have a vote on [KR: supervi-
sory decisions by] the Governing Council.” In fact “the Swedish finance 
minister, Anders Borg, was reported as stating that ‘either you must 
change the treaty so it’s clear that every member is treated equitably 
or you need to move it outside of the ECB’” (House of Lords, 2012). 
The above arguments make clear that, going forward, it will be a challenge 
for the EU to balance the practical advantages of building new institu-
tions on existing institutions that involve only a subset of EU nations, like 
the ECB, against the need to create EU-wide institutions that involve all 
member states.
5. Challenges associated with the Single Supervisory Mechanism
What particular challenges does the start of the banking union bring 
about for EU countries, either collectively or individually? In this chapter 
I briefly discuss four challenges associated with the SSM, without any 
pretense of either completeness or representativeness. 
First, the occurrence of banks based in non-SSM countries with sub-
stantial banking activities within the SSM “borders” creates a challenge 
in the stress tests. For example, in the asset quality review and stress tests 
of 2014, the ECB was responsible for stress testing the Finnish subsidiary 
of Nordea, while Sweden’s FSA stress tested the Swedish business. Such 
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shared responsibility between the ECB and non-SSM supervisors when 
stress-testing cross-SSM-border banks particularly creates challenges for 
the consistency in testing methodology and the interpretation of partial 
results.
Secondly, the creation of the SSM creates a number of challenges for 
existing cross-border cooperation structures. The Nordic-Baltic coun-
tries are all relatively small and were early movers in creating cross-
border institutions. Long-standing supervisory colleges for Nordic 
banking groups have been involved in the coordination of supervisory 
plans, the regular exchange of information on risks, liquidity and capital 
adequacy, joint inspections and - risk assessments and decision making 
process, for example as an input to EBA guidelines and work on colleges 
in the EU or joint supervisory teams in the SSM. They have also had a 
well-established Nordic-Baltic cooperation structure for macropruden-
tial and financial stability issues. The Nordic-Baltic Macroprudential 
Forum (NBMF), set up in 2011, has regularly brought together central 
bank governors and heads of supervisory authorities to discuss macro-
prudential policy issues. The Nordic-Baltic Cross-Border Stability Group 
(NBSG) is based on a memorandum of understanding on crisis coordi-
nation signed in 2010 and was set up in 2011 as a multilateral cooper-
ation structure between Nordic and Baltic central banks, ministries of 
finance and supervisory authorities and concentrates on strengthening 
financial crisis management. 
With the creation of the SSM, the ECB will become an important 
player in the supervisory colleges and the likely successor of the NBSG. 
With the BRRD still being implemented in national law, new cooperation 
structures and institutions are still in the process of being worked out. 
Changing asymmetries in the home-host relationship will be part of these 
transitions, as for example Nordic and Baltic subsidiaries are often of stra-
tegic importance to of non-SSM banks, but tiny from an SSM perspective. 
The third challenge concerns the role of the ESRB with the European 
supervisory architecture. Macro-prudential policy in SSM member 
states is a shared responsibility between the ECB and competent national 
authorities; in non-SSM countries only the respective national authority 
is responsible. As a result the ESRB through its ATC and the ECB 
through its FSC have closely related and sometimes partially overlapping 
responsibilities. The ESRB is the only EU-wide institution that includes 
the European supervisory authorities and identifies and analyzes sys-
temic risk issues and can make recommendations or give warnings. 
PART III  |  Single Market Versus Eurozone
213
Through its Advisory Scientific Committee the ESRB has some built-in 
guarantees against the risk of politicization of policy. Moreover, while 
SSM covers the banking industry, the ESRB also covers the insurance 
industry, shadow banks, financial markets and financial infrastructure. 
The ESRB has also been highly involved in developing a macropruden-
tial framework and toolbox that all EU countries can work with. How-
ever, the ESRB is currently quite dependent on the resources and man-
agement attention of the ECB. It has therefore been suggested that the 
ESRB should be further strengthened, for example by becoming more 
independent through the appointment of a managing director and that 
the ECB and ESRB coordinate their work in their respective committees. 
Finally, the earlier mentioned issue of cross-border sharing of supervi-
sory responsibility has implications for the flow of supervisory infor-
mation to central banks and raises some questions how the availability 
of important supervisory data can be guaranteed in, for example, crisis 
situations when a central bank needs to exercise its role as emergency 
liquidity provider. Parent-subsidiary relations may also lead to fluctu-
ations in the availability of high-quality pledgeable collateral, thereby 
affecting the ability of central banks to provide liquidity assistance
6. Concluding remarks
The introduction of the Single Supervisory Mechanism raises a number 
of important questions. First, how can mechanisms be established that 
ensure a high standard of supervision and regulation in the SSM. Second, 
how can it be accomplished that the success of the banking union does 
not solidify the separation between Euro and non-Euro countries. Third, 
how will the cyclicality of credit across countries change as banks become 
more European and how effective will the policy tools we have to address 
be? Fourth, existing cross-border fora for the coordination of prudential 
policies and crisis prevention should be used where this is productive. 
Finally, the role of the ESRB should be strengthened so that it can act as 
a vehicle to assess risks across the whole EU and all branches of finance. 
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The EU and the Eurozone
Harold James
The uncertainty about the outcome of the 2015 British election – which if 
it results in a Conservative victory is likely to produce a vote on EU mem-
bership that may well bring Britain out of the Union – combined with the 
increasingly likelihood of a Greek default and a partial or grey exit from 
the Euro raises in a suddenly acute form the question of the relationship 
of the EU and the Eurozone.
The Maastricht Treaty basically assumes that all EU member countries 
will satisfy the membership criteria for the currency union and stipulates 
that they are then obliged to join. The exceptions (opt outs) only relate 
to the UK and Denmark.  The UK has been in a paradoxical position of 
championing the rather abstract case (with which probably a majority 
of economists agree) that a currency union requires a greater measure 
of fiscal integration than the EU or the Eurozone currently possesses. 
US policy-makers made very similar points. But on the other hand, the 
UK made it clear that it did not want to participate in that greater fiscal 
integration; and (with the Czech Republic) voted in January 2012 not to 
accept the fiscal compact treaty (on “legal grounds”).
Brexit may thus in theory make a move to greater fiscal integration 
easier.  At the time of the Maastricht discussions, many European policy 
makers, like the influential Commission President Jacques Delors, simply 
assumed that the EU share of the budget would rise to about 3 percent of 
GDP (by coincidence, that was about the share in peacetime of the US fed-
eral budget during the nineteenth century).1 Instead, the figure remained 
stuck at just over 1 percent (it has actually declined slightly since the 
1990s). Denmark on its own is unlikely to want to remain an outlier, espe-
cially since the management of the currency since the GFC has been rather 
1 See James (2012), p. 253.
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precarious. There is a similarly strong case why Sweden might want to end 
its anomalous “out” position – for the same kind of reasons as Norway and 
Switzerland are finding it very hard to live with an independent currency 
and to devise an appropriate set of monetary and exchange rate policies.
But at the same time the contemporary Greek experience should be a 
warning against thinking that there might be a new political equilibrium 
that shifts towards an obvious acceptance of greater fiscal federalism.
In justifying the “no” in 2012, Prime Minister Cameron explicitly 
played the idea of the common free market out against the Eurozone, 
with its fiscal promises: “They must not take measures that in any way 
undermine the EU single market.  We’ll be watching like a hawk.” In this 
spirit, here are some suggestions for how the single market can be made 
to work better:
1. Currency Innovation: The Meaning of Currency Union
The debate about currencies within the EU should include a greater will-
ingness to think about alternatives.  In 1992-3, the EMS crises almost 
destroyed the path to the Euro, but the crisis was resolved by instituting 
greater flexibility: through wider (15 percent) margins in the exchange 
rate bands. The modern equivalent to the band widening of 1993 would 
be keeping the Euro for all members of the Eurozone but also allowing 
some of them (in principle all of them) to issue – if they needed it – 
national currencies.  The countries that did that would find that their new 
currencies immediately trading at what would probably be a heavy dis-
count.  California adopted a similar approach at the height of the recent 
financial crisis, issuing IOUs when faced by the impossibility of access to 
funding. The success of stabilization efforts could then be read off from 
the price of the new currency.  If the objectives were met, and fiscal sta-
bilization occurred and growth resumed, the discount would disappear. 
In the same way, after 1993, in a good policy setting, the French franc 
initially diverged from its old level the band but then converged back 
within the band.  Such a course would not require the redenomination of 
bank assets or liabilities, and hence would not be subject to the multiple 
legal challenges that a more radical alternative would encounter. There 
would also be the possibility that the convergence did not occur. The two 
parallel currencies could then coexist for a very much longer time period. 
This is not a novel thought.  It was one of the possibilities that was raised 
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in the discussions on monetary union in the early 1990s, that there might 
be a common currency but not necessarily a single currency.
2. Minimizing Financial Vulnerability: Banking Union
The debate on banking union also needs to be recast.  What is now termed 
a banking union – that is common European regulation with some fiscal 
capacity for resolution in the case of failed banks – is a very belated but 
necessary completion of the monetary union. Even this step is only partial, 
and has excited a great deal of opposition from Germans who do not want 
to bailout south European banks. Thus while there is European supervi-
sion, the resolution process is predominantly national.  Critics have cor-
rectly identified the problem, that some sort of permanent fiscal mecha-
nism is required in order to pay for the bailouts and thus in fact implies a 
move to a real political union which regularly redistributes resources. But 
there is also a legitimate worry that the creation of an extended banking 
union would involve very large insurance commitments, that Europe’s 
citizens are not necessarily already willing to take on. The current discus-
sion – as set out for instance in the very helpful Four Presidents’ Report 
of December 2012 - is set out very much in terms of an “insurance type 
mechanism”: but it is important to remember that insurance mechanisms 
are not suited to make long term one way transfers, rather they have to 
represent a genuine sharing of risk (ie of conditions which at the time of 
making the insurance contract cannot be anticipated).
In a recent extended analysis of political economy trilemmas, the 
analysis of financial vulnerability provided the key linkage by which 
instability is transferred from the primarily technical domain of currency 
arrangements to the large fundamentally political problems of democ-
racy and the international order.2 Taking the fangs out of a dangerous 
financial system – for instance moving along the path from a bank-based 
system to a greater orientation toward capital markets – is thus an impor-
tant element in rectifying flaws. The critical issue is to find innovative 
institutional paths to allow small and medium sized enterprises – that are 
traditionally at the core of economic dynamism in Mediterranean coun-
tries, but also in German and in Baltic Europe.
Securitization, which is often especially in the US presented as the 
villain of the 2008 crisis because of the centrality of problems in the 
2 Bordo and James (2015).
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securitized mortgage market, may be the most hopeful solution. Com-
bining and repackaging small enterprise loans – from different regions 
and from different kinds of economic activity – is an obvious step to risk 
diversification. Of course, there can still be shocks that produce coor-
dinated and generalized slowdowns, and that require macro-economic 
responses; One of the problems of bank lending in many countries (in 
the US but also in Europe) has been that it was increasingly directed 
toward property lending – and just served in consequence to drive 
up real estate prices and in this way accounted for probably the major 
source of increased wealth inequality in modern societies.3
3. Becoming more American: The Capital Markets Union
Part of the transformation of Europe’s economy consequently should 
lie in a reduction of the role of banks in financing business activity and 
an increase in the access to capital markets, especially for SMEs. This 
has become part of the official European agenda for the capital markets 
union, sketched out in the green paper. Creating a genuine capital union 
will also require steps to ensure compatibility for products across national 
frontier, and provisions for greater transparency, including credit regis-
tries and credit ratings for SMEs. Up to now, small enterprise credit rating 
is handled in a very different manner in different countries: by private 
providers in some cases while in others central banks still play a major 
role in maintaining. The Banque de France created its major credit reg-
ister in 1946; Germany has had a tradition of private associations, such 
as Creditreform established in 1879, and which then internationaliuzed 
their activity. There is also a requirement for convergence on legal pro-
cedures, notably bankruptcy: the idea of integrating capital markets thus 
requires really quite considerable steps in political and legal integration. 
4. Shifting the Tax Base: Tax Union
Fourth, the debate about fiscal consolidation is in deed of rethinking. One 
of the great controversies of the nineteenth century U.S. revolved around 
Henry George’s proposal for a land tax.4 He explained that a great part of 
3  See Ronglie (2015).
4 See George (1873).
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the gains from productivity were captured through rents of monopolists 
or land-owners.  Competition policy – the limiting of monopoly power 
– has from the beginning been a core task of the European Economic 
Community / European Union. But the land-owning issue has not been 
the subject of thought or debate – until very recently.
The recent story of Europe has been a process of learning lessons about 
the appropriate character of the tax base. In the 1970s, with increased 
capital integration, many European countries discovered that they could 
not tax capital highly – as large companies would otherwise move their 
operations. Capital was too mobile, and especially smaller European 
countries adopted low rates of corporate taxation which contributed 
to stronger and more dynamic economic performance. With increased 
mobility of people, the same limits are being reached for personal tax: 
as President Hollande found when he introduced a tax on the super-rich 
(over one million euros), which brought unexpectedly little revenue, and 
which he was obliged to scrap. The threat of the tax just precipitated the 
move of high-earning French residents to other countries, with lower tax 
environments. One solution – a common European tax rate – is hardly 
likely to lead to greater dynamism, and is incompatible with the principle 
of national democratic choice.  
Taxing land more effectively has many obvious advantages.  It isn’t 
easy to conceal land, and it’s impossible to move it. Taxing under-uti-
lized land (empty, neglected and decaying houses) imposes a cost on the 
owners that they will try to avoid by selling their property to others who 
can make better use of it. Taxing urban land is an effective counter to 
the substantial rents that are created by planning restrictions in densely 
populated urban settings.  
5. Transfers without Politics: Welfare Union
Problems of transfers in a large unit are at the heart of the political pro-
cess of building federations or federalism.  The better way of discussing 
transfers within a large and diverse political order is to think of them 
as individualized or personalized.  In particular, a European-wide social 
security system would not only be a logical completion of the labor 
mobility requirements of the single European market.5 It would indi-
cate that the insurance principle is not just one which it is appropriate to 
5 For an extended discussion, see Dullien (2014), also Andor (2014).
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apply to financial institutions. It would provide an important buffer in 
that booming areas would pay in more, and shrinking areas would draw 
out more – without these payments going through government bodies 
and appearing as transfers from North to South – whether in a country 
such as Italy or in the whole of the European area. Defusing the polit-
ical problem requires less statehood, rather than necessarily requiring 
the erection of a European super-state. But like the problem of designing 
better bank insurance, it also depends on making more adaptable labor 
markets so that the threat of large-scale unemployment swamping and 
destroying the insurance system is minimized.
6. Common Projects: Energy Union
The argument in favour of a European energy union – a genuine common 
energy market with common regulation – may even be stronger than the 
case that was successfully made in the 1980s and 1990s for a monetary 
union.  Security concerns and worries about the extent of risk generate 
considerable pressure to implement dirigiste measures that may be coun-
ter-productive and harmful. 
A coordinated approach to energy needs to address equally obvious 
problems that are often not recognised explicitly. Just as in the case of 
the European Union’s overall “growth, stability, and cohesion” objectives, 
the 1996 Internal Energy Market directive’s goals of (1) secure, (2) envi-
ronmentally compatible, and (3) competitive energy sources are in con-
flict with each other: renewable energy may be environmentally sound, 
but is neither secure nor inexpensive; foreign supplies of oil and gas may 
be inexpensive at a point in time, but are subject to geo-political risks. 
Policy choices need to provide a framework to guide the myriad choices 
of market participants, producers and consumers, through a pricing 
mechanism that is accepted as fair and transparent. An economic argu-
ment can be made for security-oriented policies like renewable energy 
subsidies that increase both current costs and self-sufficiency.
 The difficulty in formulating a forward-looking energy policy arises 
from the difficulty in comparing different types of risk and drawing 
appropriate policy lessons. There are at least four different perceptions 
of risk, and while all are clearly present, they tend to be seen in quite 
contrasting ways in different European countries, and consequently pro-
duce varied and mutually incompatible responses from national political 
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authorities: in CO2 emissions and global warming; in nuclear energy; in 
security dependence on imported gas and oil; and in the vulnerability 
of grid delivery systems to periodic breakdown. Each of these threats is 
treated in very different ways. Since public debate is often driven by single 
headlines, a nuclear accident such as Fukushima produces a greater sense 
of danger than the vaguer (but more certain) long-term threat of climate 
change. The risk of system breakdown only enters the political debate 
after a concrete instance. Politics thus tends to respond too late to threats.
A fundamental philosophical division is discernible in energy discus-
sions, around the choice between long-term planning or fixing of prices 
in order to generate certainty about future signals on the one hand, and a 
response to short-term and noisy market signals on the other. The debate 
is most pronounced in the case of the two environmentally and politi-
cally most sensitive issues: gas pricing, and nuclear energy. The greater the 
diversity of supply, and the more market alternatives exist (including dif-
ferent forms of energy), the more resilient the energy economy becomes 
against unanticipated events, including attempts to blackmail energy 
users. In other words, diversity of supply limits the power of the resource 
providers. Marketization can thus also provide a substantial impetus to 
improve political conditions in other parts of the world, and reduce the 
monopoly rents that corrupt politicians extract in resource-rich countries. 
There is a geographical divide in Europe between those countries that 
rely on spot markets and those that use long-term oil-indexed contracts 
to purchase and receive their natural gas supplies. Northwest Europe has 
spot markets, with LNG import facilities and hubs. Oil-indexed contract 
markets predominate in Central, Eastern, and Southern European coun-
tries, where only one or two suppliers provide gas to domestic markets 
and there is little gas supply diversification.6 The geopolitical strategy 
of President Putin is based around a pipeline view of the world, rather 
than a LNG vision. One result of the Ukraine-Russia crisis of 2014 may 
be a greater awareness of the security threat, an enhanced willingness 
to construct LNG facilities, and an expansion of the market principle of 
spot pricing as a result, rather than long-term indexation to other energy 
products. 
Flexibilisation is an important principle in wholesale markets; but it 
can also play a major part in promoting domestic energy efficiency. From 
a consumer point of view, a move to flexible pricing may be an increas-
ingly attractive way of steering demand away from peak times, at which 
6 See Melling (2010); and European Economic Advisory Group (2015). 
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the production costs/marginal costs are high. Reducing extreme peaks of 
demand (and consequently of pricing) in an energy supply network that 
is pushing against capacity restraints requires a better linkage of supply 
systems that are still not fully integrated. The same is true for the poten-
tially even bigger problem of smoothing peaks in green energy supply. If 
the national smoothing capacity becomes exhausted thanks to the clo-
sure of conventional power plants, as is regularly the case in Germany, 
there is a case for selling the excess electricity to other national energy 
markets and use their smoothing capacity. 
Further improving the linkage requires a substantial investment in 
transmission systems. One response to the financial and debt crisis, which 
is also a crisis of European growth, is to demand higher levels of invest-
ment – both public and private – in Europe. The problem is that in the 
past, much public sector investment has been misdirected as a result of 
the political bargaining processes. However, private investment has also 
been misdirected (above all in large construction booms). Investment in 
energy networks may offer appropriate incentives to private producers 
looking at innovative ways of producing new clean energy sources. Since 
the search for funding also coincides with a widespread sentiment that 
Europe should investigate large infrastructure investment projects, it may 
be conceivable to fund the new energy transmission channels, both elec-
tricity gridlines and gas pipelines, with public or a mixture of public and 
private funding. A security levy on energy supply might be an appro-
priate way of ensuring the fiscal sustainability of such investment. 
7. Common Projects: People Union
One of the gravest security crises currently facing Europe is the out-
come of the disintegration of neighboring regions: North Africa and the 
Middle East in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring; and more recently 
the crisis in eastern Ukraine.  Europe is confronting a humanitarian crisis 
as a consequence of the flight of refugees from civil war in Libya and 
Syria.  ISIS is indeed trying to use the threat of further expulsions as a 
weapon against Europe.
The countries that are today on the front line of Europe’s humani-
tarian struggle are by chance also the worst affected by the financial crisis: 
Greece, Italy, Spain. Responding to the distress of refugees is a European 
task, and the financial consequences of the refugee crisis cannot be left to 
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the crisis-struck states, in which there is an inevitable political feeling that 
resources devoted to accommodating and even potentially integrating 
refugee populations can only come at the expense of citizens. Any ade-
quate solution to the refugee challenge involves including or integrating 
them in a constructive way, at least for some time, into the host societies. 
It would necessarily involve substantial financial injections from Europe 
as a whole into the countries at the forefront of the refugee crisis. That 
could also be a source of new dynamism, and an answer to the problem 
of European ageing and decline.
At the same time, ensuring that people can move with dignity also 
requires the elaboration of a precise political program to stabilize the 
neighborhood of Europe. Europe cannot be an island in a sea of a human-
itarian disaster.  It needs to act effectively to end the chaos that is driving 
despairing people by the millions to a European safe haven.
8. Common Projects: Military Union
At the outset of the 1990s, many European leaders in the face of the 
new security challenge created by the collapse of communism and the 
Soviet Union emphasized that they needed to find a way to permanently 
secure European peace. Even at the time, it was not quite obvious that a 
currency union was the best way to do this (it was rather a question of 
the central bankers having plans for a currency union in their draws). 
Would not a common European army be a better course?  In the nine-
teenth century, many people made the argument that universal military 
service was a central part of the project of nation-building.  Jean-Claude 
Juncker recently triggered a storm of controversy when he made this sug-
gestion, and critics emphasized the difficulty of expecting military sac-
rifice without a much further deepening of  political community.  On 
the other hand, common defense organization and procurement would 
certainly involve major savings, generate a more effective capacity to pro-
ject power, and might well indeed make a wider group of young people 
realize that they are Europeans.
9. Common Projects: Youth Union 
But a similar argument could be made for encouraging other sorts of 
organized movement: a common social year (in a different country), but 
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also cross-national apprenticeship schemes: indeed this is an area that 
some German companies have tried, with considerable success.7 Fos-
tering youth mobility is probably a better way of moving to an integra-
tion of outlooks and attitudes, but also to a dissemination of best practice 
across Europe. Countries with high levels of out-migration at some point 
in the last (Ireland and Poland are the most striking examples) found 
that the return of you migrants who had increased their skill levels repre-
sented a major source of dynamism.  In that sense, if the current crisis is 
promoting higher migration, it should not simply be a source of worry: 
in the long-run, it may have a strengthening effect.
10. Thinking Globally: Global Union
The management of cross-national problems and the containment of 
nationalistic quarrels certainly require technical fixes.  But it also needs 
more. The fatal loops that tie badly managed currencies to the destruction 
of the international economic and political order inevitably conjure up 
memories of the disasters of the 1930s, the Great Depression and the drive 
to war.  Currency wars are now making their reappearance.  The rise in 
the exchange rate risks choking off an incipient strong US recovery.  Unu-
sually, Federal Reserve officials now sound worried about the currency. 
The unpleasantness created by the strong dollar additionally interacts with 
the vulnerabilities of the political system with a President committed to a 
significant trade agenda faced by a hostile and increasingly obstructionist 
Congress. The fierce debates about dispute settlement in the Trans Pacific 
Partnership as well as in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner-
ship play into the hands of trade skeptics. We should remember that there 
can be global disaster, as well as merely European disaster.
A politically legitimate mechanism for solving the problem of inter-
national adjustment was the unsolved problem of the twentieth century. 
In Europe and elsewhere it generated enormous conflict. There is an 
urgent need for ways of constructing currency stability that go beyond 
the narrow framework suggested by the OCA literature.  Fixing this issue 
is a European but also a global agenda for the twenty-first century.
7   For a more developed suggestion, see Guardian (2012).
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